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In the past two decades, the application of 
the combined skills of various disciplines to 
the study of those forces that exert a decisive 
influence in the formulation of foreign pol­
icy has brought increased recognition of the 
role of social-psychological factors in the 
decision-making process. To date, however, 
the significance of the "strategic image" held 
by any nation's governing elite, by which it 
selectively defines and evaluates the coun­
try's international position as a determinant 
of its foreign policy, has been almost totally 
neglected. 
By concentrating attention specifically on 
the strategic images held by successive Nor­
wegian leaders in the 1940's, and by tracing 
the evolution of the security concept that, 
in 1949, resulted in Norway's decision to 
renounce its neutrality and to join the North 
Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Burgess is able to 
demonstrate conclusively that an under­
standing of the security image held by the 
Norwegian authoritative elite serves to ex­
plain on what basis the makers of foreign-
policy decisions found options confronting 
them either acceptable or unacceptable. He 
finds, furthermore, that the failure of the 
attempt in 1949 to establish a joint Scandi­
navian defense system, in response to shared 
societal and political goals clearly working 
in favor of common policies and programs, 
is directly attributable to a fundamental dis­
parity in the security concepts of the nego­
tiating parties that effectively prevented their 
concluding a mutually acceptable defense 
pact. 
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Foreword 
The Mershon Center for Education in 
National Security represents one of the Ohio State University's 
commitments to policy analysis and scholarly research on the grav­
est global problems of our time. The Center's conception of 
national security" recognizes the existence of many national 
securities and postulates no overriding, all-embracing definition. 
Not only does each nation have its image of what constitutes se­
curity, but subgroups (including various 'elites" and "publics") 
within each nation have competing formulations of security ob­
jectives. The Mershon Center devotes a substantial share of its 
resources to learning more about the processes by which decisions 
concerning national security are reached. These processes include 
the mechanisms by which contending images of security are for­
mulated and the procedures through which decision-makers 
choose from arrays of alternative security goals and alternative 
programs of action to achieve the selected goals. 
In many countries at different times, the effectiveness of the 
policy-making process is itself an issue of public policy. The 
Center's continuing interest in policy-making processes is not 
description of the processes but discovery of the ways in which 
variations in the processes relate to variations in the content or 
substance of policy, i.e., in the outcomes of the processes of 
decision. 
Philip M. Burgess, Assistant Professor of Political Science 
and Director of the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, is one of 
several participants in Mershon's continuing efforts to unravel 
the elusive relations between process and outcome. In this book, 
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he investigates the images that Norwegian foreign ministers 
and other elite decision-makers hold of their nation's interests 
and objectives. Professor Burgess is not content with a histor­
ical resume of one nation's elite images of security; he extends his 
analysis to theorizing about the ways in which these images affect 
the outcomes of foreign and defense processes. Through research 
such as is reported in this volume, the Mershon Center hopes to 
demonstrate that studies of policy-making processes are not only 
of aesthetic interest to academic observers of politics but also that 
the processes are important factors in shaping the values and out­
comes that are at the core of political decisions in any country at 
any time. As policy scientists learn more about the ways in which 
process shapes outcomes, decision-makers and their constituents 
will be better able to realize national and international security 
consistent with their images of preferred outcomes. 
JAMES A. ROBINSON, DIRECTOR 
Mershon Center 
for Education in National Security 
Prefiace 
This book on Norwegian foreign policy-
making focuses on the period 1940 to 1949. During this period a 
fundamental change occurred in Norway's foreign policy—a 
change from neutrality and withdrawal from international poli­
tics to active participation in the Atlantic Alliance Treaty. For 
Norway's experiences, like most other nations', during and after 
World War II had a profound impact on outlook on interna­
tional politics. And the change in outlook—or rather the percep­
tion of Norway's relations in a larger international system—is a 
primary concern of Professor Burgess. He has largely confined 
his study to the perceptions of the "authoritative" elite, i.e., 
prime ministers, foreign ministers, and defense ministers. 
When World War II broke out, Norway had enjoyed peace 
for 125 years—since 1814. This long span of peace was due to 
not only domestic forces; to a large extent it was the result of 
external circumstances. With her long and ice-free coast border­
ing the North Atlantic Ocean, Norway held an important strate­
gic position, particularly significant for her powerful neighbor 
Great Britain. If some hostile great power should seize control of 
the Norwegian coast, this would mean a serious disadvantage for 
British sea power. As long as Britain was strong enough to 
prevent other great powers from gaining a foothold on Norwegian 
territory, Norway's wish to remain neutral did not conflict with 
British interests. 
In this respect the geostrategical situation of Norway was 
similar to that of other nations bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the 
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outstanding case in point being the United States of America. 
Protected by British sea power, these countries could develop 
their democratic institutions and national resources relatively 
undisturbed by international conflicts.1 
This external background of Norwegian foreign politics was 
clearly recognized by Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen who 
stated in 1914, "We trust in England." Although his statement 
was strongly attacked by political opponents, it is not quite clear 
whether this reaction was due to the bluntness of his declaration, 
or whether some leaders simply did not recognize the signifi­
cance of strategical factors. 
Neutrality and withdrawal from international conflicts were 
the key words of Norwegian foreign politics until World War II. 
After World War I Norway was an ardent supporter of the 
League of Nations. Pacifist sentiments were prevalent among a 
large proportion of the population, and national defense was 
reduced to a minimum. During the 193O's the defense was not 
improved significantly, despite growing international tension, 
and despite the failure of the League to maintain peace. 
Both militarily and politically the German attack on Norway 
in April, 1940, came as a surprise. Despite rumors of an imminent 
German invasion, the government did not make military prepa­
rations. A leading Norwegian commentator on foreign politics at 
that time has told an anecdote which clearly characterizes the 
confusion of the situation. On April 9, when German forces 
invaded Oslo, and he was seeking shelter from the bombing, 
people came up to him and asked his expert opinion on what was 
happening. They wanted to know from where did the attacking 
airplanes come. His answer was: "They must be British, because 
the German Luftwaffe would not have been able to break 
through the British blockade of Skagerak and Kattegat." This 
perception of the military situation, held by an influential expert, 
would certainly not be expressed in public statements by the 
authoritative elite. Although a number of political and military 
leaders might not share the opinions of this commentator, his 
view apparently constituted an underlying strategical assump­
tion of Norwegian foreign policy. The German attack revealed 
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that modern warfare—in particular the development of long 
ranged air forces—had changed dramatically the strategical posi­
tion	 of Norway: the country was no longer sheltered by the 
British navy. 
The experience of the German attack and subsequent occupa­
tion led to a rethinking on Norwegian foreign politics. The 
discussions which were carried out in circles around the exile 
government in London have been extensively covered in the 
present volume. The government eventually arrived at the posi­
tion that Norway in the future would have to solve her problem 
of national security in collaboration with the Western powers. 
From the very beginning Norway strongly supported the col­
lective security system of the United Nations. However, as the 
cold war emerged and as it was realized that the United Nations 
did not give sufficient security, Norwegian policy-makers were 
again faced with a national security problem. Three alternative 
solutions seemed open: 
(1) the country could join Sweden and Denmark in a Scandi­
navian defense alliance; 
(2) she could join the Western powers in the broader	 defense 
alliance that was being planned; or 
(3) she could return to her prewar position of neutrality. 
The last solution was never seriously considered, so the discus­
sion focused upon the two other alternatives. The Scandinavian 
defense negotiations did not turn out to be successful. Although 
the period covered in this study ranges from 1940 to 1949, the 
emphasis is placed upon the period between January, 1948, 
when the Scandinavian negotiations started, until April, 1949, 
when Norway joined the Atlantic Alliance. 
Indeed, the images of the authoritative elite changed during 
the decade of the forties. Before the war the leaders expressed 
the perception that great powers were immoral and undepend­
able in their relations with other nations. From this they drew 
the conclusion that the safest policy for a small country was to 
avoid involvement in international conflicts. After the war co­
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operation with great powers was seen as instrumental for preserv­
ing national security. The Foreign Minister, on several occasions, 
expressed the view that, by being actively involved, small nations 
could contribute to maintaining international peace and stability. 
However, in his study of foreign policy-making, Professor 
Burgess does not limit himself to the analysis of changing elite 
images. His main concern is the problem of how policy outcomes 
are related to leadership images. A strategical image contributes 
to defining the political situation for the decision-makers. When 
the image is given, the decision-makers are faced with the ques­
tion: which alternative courses of action should be considered? 
Indeed, the number of alternatives as seen by the leaders is in 
most cases surprisingly low. 
To my knowledge, this is the best study made of Norwegian 
foreign politics in the period since 1940. The author describes 
some major events in Norwegian domestic and foreign politics, a 
technique that aids the reader in comprehending the general 
context in which foreign policy decisions were made. Although 
he is a foreigner to the system, Professor Burgess seems to have 
acquired good insight in Norwegian politics. The author's in­
terpretation is compelling (albeit pre-operational). 
The author has denned the limits of his analysis as embracing 
largely the authoritative elite, and this limitation in focus should 
be kept in mind by the reader. Both before and after the war a 
large majority of the parliament supported the foreign policy of 
the government. Therefore, we may assume that the images held 
by the authoritative leaders would be shared by a substantial 
proportion of the total political elite. However, this does not 
mean that we should expect to find anything close to a consen­
sus. Throughout the period the policies described have been 
opposed by a small, but vigorous, minority. And people who 
oppose the official policies are most likely to perceive interna­
tional politics in a different way than authoritative leaders. Of 
course, we may also expect some disagreements concerning stra­
tegical images among people who otherwise tend to agree with the 
main conclusions of the official policies. Professor Burgess is 
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certainly aware of this. He has extended the present work into a 
new study in which a number of political, administrative, and 
military leaders have been interviewed. In addition to giving a 
picture of elite image that shows subtleties and nuances, this 
new study is likely to produce valuable knowledge about the 
processes of policy-making. 
In my opinion the most interesting aspect of the present 
volume pertains to the unsuccessful Scandinavian defense nego­
tiations. In this analysis the author is concerned not only with 
Norwegian elite images; he also tries to depict strategical images 
of Swedish and Danish authoritative leaders. Because of differ­
ences in geostrategical position and in past experiences, the 
strategical images differ in several respects. For several decades 
efforts have been made to establish co-operation between the 
Scandinavian countries, culturally, economically, and politically. 
Although the results of these efforts have been substantial, one is 
left with the impression that they could have been even greater. 
The analysis presented here suggests that differences in elite 
images constitute—at least in some areas—an obstacle to Scandi­
navian co-operation. 
The study is a good example of how elite images can contrib­
ute to explaining conflicts and co-operation among nations. In 
recent years we have seen a number of studies of elite images. As 
two outstanding examples should be mentioned Singer's study of 
American and Soviet elites 2 and Holsti's study on the outbreak 
of World War I.3 Most of this work has focused upon the 
relationships among great powers. However, throughout history 
a great number of international conflicts have originated as con­
troversies among small nations or as a result of their relations 
with more powerful neighbors. It therefore seems highly justi­
fied to focus attention—as Professor Burgess has done—upon 
small nations. 
The methods applied may be less elaborate in the present 
work than in several other studies of elite images. However, the 
author has added a new dimension to this type of study by 
focusing upon the relationship between elite images and policy 
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decisions. This book not only contributes to exploring Norwe­
gian foreign politics, it is also a contribution of a more general 
character to the study of foreign policy-making. 
HENRY VALEN 
Department of Political Science 
University of Oslo 
1. Foi a stimulating discussion of the role of naval powers in international 
politics, see Alfred T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History (New 
York: Hill & Wang, 1957); first published in 1890. 
2. J. David Singer, "Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Con­
tent Analysis of Elite Articulations," journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII 
(December, 1964), 482-85. 
3. Ole R. Holsti, "The 1914 Case," American Political Science Review, 
LIX, No. 2, 365-78. For a provocative discussion of images see Kenneth E. 
Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); and 
Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," in James 
N. Rosenau (e<£.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free 
Press, 1961), pp. 391-98. 
Acknowledgments 
Social scientists who venture outside their 
own countries for purposes of research incur many debts. I am 
no exception. Without the benefit of the Fulbright program this 
study could not have been undertaken, and without the sympa­
thetic understanding of the United States Educational Founda­
tion in Norway, which extended the grant period from nine to 
twelve months, the study would not have been completed. Fi­
nally, a post-doctoral fellowship at the Mershon Center for Edu­
cation in National Security at the Ohio State University permit­
ted me the time and resources necessary to revise my original 
study and offer it in its present form. 
Those in Norway who contributed to this study are too nu­
merous to be named. However, an acknowledgment of gratitude 
must be extended to the Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs, its Director, Dr. John Sanness, and Associates of the 
Institute, Arne Olav Brundtland and Per Frydenberg, who pro­
vided office space, tools of the trade, a pleasant atmosphere, and 
lively criticism. Also of great assistance in Scandinavia were Jahn 
Otto Johansen, then with the Oslo Morgenposten and now For­
eign Editor of Norwegian Broadcasting, Nils 0rvik at the Uni­
versity of Oslo, and Nils Andren of the University of Stockholm. 
In addition, I profited immeasurably from a weekly seminar with 
visiting and permanent research staff members at the Institute of 
Social Research in Oslo, especially seminar leader J. David 
Singer, and Henry Valen, Johan Galtung, and Mari Holmboe 
Ruge. I also benefited from numerous indulgences of operating 
policy-makers in the Foreign Office and from discussions with the 
many knowledgeable people who attended the various functions 
sponsored by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
xvi • Acknowledgments 
These people have all prevented many errors of judgment and 
fact from being included in that which follows. 
A word of appreciation must also be extended to the library 
staffs at the Nobel Institute and the Foreign Office, who per­
formed many thankless tasks with dispatch and thoroughness, as 
well as to Mr. Kjell Frank of the Storting's Library and to Diana 
Vidnes of the Conservative Party's Press Archives, both of whom 
provided the author with many valuable leads and relieved him 
from much of the drudgery of scholarship. 
A special note of appreciation must be acknowledged to Pro­
fessor H. P. Krosby of the University of Wisconsin, who pro­
vided a page-by-page critique of an early draft, and to three late 
friends and colleagues of the author: Mr. Helge Groth, of the 
Norwegian Foreign Service, who was an invaluable critic in the 
final stages of this project; Professor Edgar S. Furniss, Director 
of the Mershon Social Science Program, who encouraged the 
revision of the original draft and who first suggested publication; 
and Dr. Charles O. Lerche, Jr., who first suggested Norway as a 
research site and who provided guidance on an early draft, serv­
ing as chairman of my dissertation committee at the American 
University's School of International Service in Washington, D.C. 
The author is grateful to Foreign Affairs for permission to 
quote from Halvdan Koht's "Neutrality and Peace: The View of 
a Small Power" in the January, 1937, issue. 
Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my wife, 
who performed beyond the call of duty, learning a new lan­
guage, checking bibliography, typing drafts, infusing relevant 
criticism, and insuring (with coercion now and then) good work­
ing conditions; and to Mrs. Vicky Lankamer and Misses Donna 
Copen, Sandra Lindemood, and Karin Lissakers for typing 
and editing the manuscript. As usual, however, the author ac­
cepts responsibility for errors of omission and commission in that 
which follows. 











Foreign policy analysis 3





Data sources and problems 5

The nature of a strategic image 6

The utility of image analysis 7

 Norwegian Foreign Policy in Perspective 13

A country profile 13





 The Emergence of New Axioms in 
Norwegian Foreign Policy 47

World War II and the London government 47

The emergence of new concepts 50

Norway's relations with Norden in





Norway and the United Nations Organization 64

 The Search for Security:

Bridgebuilding in the United Nations 75

The strategic image at the beginning of

the postwar period 75

The policy of bridgebuilding 79

 The Search for Security:

Scandinavia and the Atlantic 101

xviii • Contents 
The security problem in perspective 
Prelude to the Scandinavian 
defense negotiations 
The position of Sweden and Denmark 
The period of the Scandinavian 
defense investigation 
The period of the Scandinavian 
political negotiations 
The move toward the Atlantic Pact 
Chapter Five: The Trend of Norwegian Foreign Policy 
The evolution of the 
Norwegian strategic image 
































Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes 




Foreign policy analysis.—Foreign policy 
case studies, single-country texts, texts on comparative foreign 
policy, and monographs on foreign policy analysis have been 
largely dominated by an "input-output'' mode of analysis (al­
though only a few of the authors would use those terms).1 The 
emphasis in most studies of foreign policy are on the "factors" 
that "determine," or the ''elements" in foreign policy-making. 
These usually include the "quantifiable" factors such as military 
capability, industrial capacity, and manpower and the "soft" 
factors such as national morale, diplomatic skill, and technical 
competence of the population. Many of the studies then describe 
the foreign policy objectives, interests, and outcomes of a specific 
country either with reference to other nations in the system or 
with reference to selected issues. Only occasionally are the policy 
outcomes linked in some way to the factors that have been 
selected a priori as relevant variables in the determination of 
foreign policy outcomes. 
Two recent (i.e., postwar) developments have modified the 
emphasis in foreign policy research. First, the emergence of 
"peace research" resulted in the execution of research on foreign 
policy by psychologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts, anthropolo­
gists, and economists, each of whom brought his unique skills 
and points of view to his research on problems of foreign policy 
and international politics, skills and points of view that were 
alien to many of the political scientists, historians, and lawyers 
who had previously dominated the field.2 Second, the advent of 
the decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy 
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raised a whole series of "process" questions that seldom had been 
asked by previous researchers.3 Although the work of peace 
researchers and the decision-making analysts have very little in 
common, there is a convergence of interests in their research on 
the role of social-psychological factors in the foreign policy ma­
trix.4 However, the peace research orientation tends to examine 
mass attitudes and focus on problems of irrationality, hostility, 
and other Freudian and neo-Freudian variables that fit in "the 
problem of human conflict" framework.5 The decision-making 
analysts, on the other hand, have not given much of their time to 
the study of the "definition of the situation" as one of the 
important variables in the decision-making framework.6 Rather, 
decision-making analysis has tended to emphasize process prob­
lems within and between organized decisional units, on recruit­
ment, and on the role of planning and budgeting in policy-
making. Consequendy, the images of "men at the top" have been 
largely ignored by both groups of researchers who are most 
familiar with the place of psychological variables in foreign 
policy-making.7 
It is hoped that this study will make a small contribution to 
the study of elite images and the relation of elite images to 
foreign policy choice situations. For the purpose of probing the 
relationship between elite images and foreign policy outcomes, 
Norway was selected as a case study. The analysis is limited to a 
critical nine-year period of Norwegian foreign policy, from April, 
1940 (the German invasion of Norway), to April, 1949 (Norwe­
gian accession to the Atlantic Pact), during which time cardinal 
foreign policy decisions were made by the Norwegian govern­
ment. 
The strategic image as an analytical concept.—The concept 
strategic image will be used in this study to refer to the organized 
representation of the important features of the foreign policy 
environment as articulated by the authoritative decision-makers 
on foreign policy issues in Norway during the period under 
investigation. The attempt is made to reconstruct the strategic 
images of the two Norwegian foreign ministers during the pe­
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riod selected by an analysis of their public statements of policy, 
followed by an attempt to link the strategic image with subse­
quent policy choices. The descriptive portions of this study, then, 
are aimed at reconstructing in context the strategic image, and 
the thrust of analysis is to test the correspondence of policy 
choices to the reconstructed image. Thus, the strategic image is 
viewed as the independent variable of the analysis, although 
attention is given in passing to the process by which the image is 
acquired, reinforced, or modified. 
Data sources and problems.—The data for the study were 
drawn from major statements of Norwegian foreign ministers 
during the nine-year period. A "major statement" is defined as a 
statement to the parliament (Storting) or a "major'' speech as 
defined by, and reflected in, the press. In addition, some major 
statements of other relevant actors (defense ministers, prime 
ministers, and monarchs) are occasionally used, and reference is 
made during World War II to a working paper circulated in the 
Norwegian Foreign Office in London. Only those portions of 
public statements revealing of the characteristics of the compo­
nents of the strategic image are used; thus many major speeches, 
especially during World War II, do not supply data relevant to 
this inquiry. 
Two genuine problems of validity are encountered in a study 
of this kind. First, it must be asked if images studied are those of 
the authoritative decision-makers. In other words, if it is argued 
that behavioral responses to the environment are predicated on 
the subjective evaluation and appraisal of the environment (the 
image), then for the proposes of foreign policy analysis it does 
make a difference whose images are studied. Because it would 
require a study longer than that presented here to demonstrate 
that the de facto decision-makers have been selected, this aspect 
of the validity problem must be recognized as a limitation of this 
study.8 The second aspect of the validity issue is the ubiquitous 
problem of confidence that an analysis of articulations is, in fact, 
tapping real beliefs, appraisals, and evaluations. And there is the 
related question regarding the sufficiency of public articulations 
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as reliable indicators of private beliefs.9 In an attempt to mitigate 
the difficulties posed by these aspects of the validity problem, all 
statements, including those which are somehow inconsistent 
with the mold of the analytical development, are presented in con­
text and related one to another and to subsequent behavior. 
The nature of a strategic image.—As used in this study, a 
strategic image is assumed to have two analytically distinguish­
able components: the cognitive and the affective. The cognitive 
component of a strategic image refers to the policy-maker's view 
and definition of the central features of the international envi­
ronment. These characteristics of the environment constitute, 
from the point of view of the policy-maker, ''objective reality," 
and are independent of his response to it. The affective compo­
nent of a strategic image refers to the valuational dimension of 
the policy-maker's image structure. Here he assigns his liking or 
disliking, his approval or disapproval to those conditions, persons, 
or entities that he "knows" exist. Foreign policy actions refer to 
the response (or set of responses) that the policy-maker thinks is 
required by, or appropriate to, the environment as defined by the 
cognitive and affective components of the strategic image.10 
The term strategic image, then, is used to summarize the way 
in which a policy-maker organizes, structures, evaluates, and 
relates to his environment. In addition, a strategic image has a 
selecting function, filtering the many bits of information that are 
continually emitted by the environment. Both the cognitive and 
affective components, for example, will "accept" information that 
reinforces the policy-maker's view of the environment, while 
they will tend to reject information that would require image 
modification. Although some images are probably more suscepti­
ble of modification or revision via feedback process than others, 
that is, some are less rigid or more "open" than others, one of the 
characteristics of an image is its stability over time. An image 
may be revised, for example, by a traumatic experience or a series 
of image-denying events demonstrating its lack of correspond­
ence to reality and thereby undermining its stability. Or, in the 
specific case of images affecting foreign policy behavior, a change 
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in top personnel may result in a new operational strategic image, 
since images are associated with individuals.11 Whatever the 
image is, however, it is the image through which stimuli are 
filtered (not the stimuli themselves) on which behavior is predi­
cated. In performing this function, the strategic image is a more 
comprehensive concept for that which has been identified as the 
'psychological environment." 12 A strategic image has an inte­
grating function, permitting the policy-maker to "make sense'' 
out of and thereby organize and integrate the information he 
daily receives. And it has an orienting function, clarifying expec­
tations about the future for the policy-maker and thereby linking 
the cognitive and affective components with action. This permits 
the policy-maker to plan for contingencies and select courses of 
action designed to modify, deter, accommodate, or accelerate 
subjectively probable trends or perceived conditions. For the 
purposes of foreign policy analysis, the orienting function may 
be among the most important justifications for image analysis. 
Because policy-making is future-oriented, courses of action are to 
a large extent determined by the policy-maker's subjective calcu­
lations of future configurations and their relation to postulated 
goals. Viewed in this way, foreign policy might be defined as 
courses of action selected by decision-makers that are designed to 
facilitate, accommodate, modify, or prevent predicted future con­
figurations and conditions. 
The utility of image analysis.—An image is a dynamic con­
cept; that is, images are continually subject to redefinition as a 
result of the operation of interactive and feedback processes. 
Therefore, it is somewhat artificial to view an image as either a 
dependent or independent variable. (In fact, it will be noted in 
this study that the strategic image will be presented in a series of 
"cross sections'' permitting a description of changes that may 
have occurred in cognition, or affect, and thereby make the link 
to subsequent choices.) With this caveat in mind, however, it 
can be noted that most image analysis in political science and 
international politics treat the image as a dependent variable." 
The modal studies with this focus are those dealing with aspects 
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of political socialization. Related to this, it should be noted that 
most studies deal with the images of attentive or expressive 
publics and not with authoritative decision-makers. One reason 
for this, undoubtedly, is the increase of data made available by 
improved survey methods; also, analysts take added comfort in 
working with samples of larger, less ephemeral populations. Al­
though a few studies do deal with images as independent varia­
bles,14 they are, for the most part, limited to what has been 
identified here as the affective component of the strategic image, 
focusing on factors such as threat or hostility,15 and very few of 
these focus on top echelon decision-makers. 
In addition to the methodological problems acknowledged 
above, the utility of image analysis remains to be demonstrated, 
but systematic research might lead to some of the following 
payoffs. First, the reconstruction and analysis of strategic images 
might lead to reliable "negative prediction," that is, systematic, 
longitudinal analysis of the cognitive and affective components 
might permit foreign policy analysts to predict with confidence 
courses of action that will not be selected, alternatives that will 
not be chosen (or even considered), and options that will not be 
explored. Second, strategic images may prove to have considera­
ble explanatory power. That which appears "irrational" to the 
outside observer might be quite consistent with and rational 
when viewed in the framework of the strategic image of the 
actor. In any case, the utility of image analysis for explaining 
foreign policy outcomes probably will not be less than that 
provided by analyses of capability or ideology and might prove to 
be a useful supplement to the more conventional concepts. 
Third, strategic images are especially susceptible of comparative 
analysis, as will be demonstrated in a portion of this study. 
Finally, the accumulation of hard knowledge by a rigorous and 
reliable elaboration of the strategic images of "other' national 
elites and aspiring elites might be a powerful policy tool. Like all 
knowledge, it could be used for good or ill, but accumulated 
systematically such knowledge would provide a good indicator of 
those aspects of the friend or adversary's image that require 
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modification or reinforcement as a prerequisite to attainment of a 
goal, and it would aid in the anticipation of conflict, impasse, or 
agreement among elites over different issue areas. 
There are also limitations to image analysis in addition to 
those of a methodological nature already acknowledged. In the 
absence of research, it might be suggested that the connection 
between a strategic image and policy outcomes might vary from 
country to country, from time to time, and perhaps even over 
different issue areas. This "hunch" is proffered because it is 
probable that in many cases the strategic image of authoritative 
decision-makers is mediated by other agencies of the decision-
making process and by competing strategic images among deci­
sion-makers. Further research, however, may demonstrate that 
the mediation of strategic images occurs in a systematic way 
when associated, for example, with different issues or political 
systems. 
Interesting and important as many of these questions are, most 
of them will not be examined in this study. As mentioned in the 
beginning, the study is an exploration. It attempts only to probe 
the utility of strategic-image analysis as a negative predictor and 
as a tool for explanation. Tentative judgments can be based on 
that which follows. 
The first chapter of this study is devoted to placing Norwe­
gian foreign policy in context by a brief review of societal and 
governmental factors followed by a survey of Norway's historical 
role in the international system. The following chapters attempt 
to show the evolution of the Norwegian strategic image and to 
relate the image to subsequent policy outcomes. 
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Norwegian Foreign Policy 
in Perspective 
A country profile.—Norway, situated on the north and west 
littoral of the Scandinavian peninsula, is Europe's fifth largest 
country in land area and, after Iceland, its most sparsely popu­
lated nation. Norway is located next to the Atlantic and the 
North Sea on its western, northern, and southern flanks and has 
a coastline, punctuated by deep, ice-free fjords, of more than 
17,000 miles. On its eastern flank it shares a long common 
frontier with Sweden and mutual borders with Finland and the 
Soviet Union.1 In addition, Norway has overseas island posses­
sions, the most important of which is her Arctic possession of 
Svalbard,2 which have a total land area one-fifth the size of 
Norway itself.3 
Norway's population, slightly exceeding three and one-half 
million, is concentrated along the coastal areas and around the 
deep inland fjords, with three quarters of the people living 
within ten miles of the sea.4 With one exception,5 there are no 
important minority groups, and all share the same Lutheran 
religion, yet the important sections of the country are relatively 
isolated as a result of two intersecting mountain ranges, a sec­
tional isolation that is only beginning to be overcome with an 
improved communications system.6 The population distribution 
of the country has been characterized by a movement toward the 
urban districts and a propensity to settle in the area around the 
Oslofjord.7 
The segregation of the Scandinavian peninsula as a conse­
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quence of its historical remoteness from the main currents of 
European life has resulted in the phenomenon of a highly indivi­
dualized ethnic composition referred to as "Nordic." The Nordic 
peoples are found in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and 
Finland,8 but the least departure from the idealized type is found 
in Iceland, Norway, and Sweden 9 as a result of the absence of 
intrusion of other ethnic elements that have penetrated Den­
mark and Finland. In addition, the term Nordic also has cultural 
overtones in that the Nordic peoples share a common political 
history, revolving around the hub of either Sweden or Den­
mark,10 common living conditions and welfare norms, a language 
affinity,11 and they subscribe to many common viewpoints with 
regard to economic and political questions, both domestic and 
international. 
With the exception of water resources, Norway is a country 
poorly endowed with natural resources, and less than five per 
cent of her total land area is fit for cultivation. Although Norway 
is self-sufficient in some of her agricultural requirements, her 
economy, the backbone of which is industry and commerce, has 
been marked by a steady decline in the number of people en­
gaged in agriculture.12 Norway remains a net commodity 
importer,13 and the high living standard enjoyed by the nation 
depends on a substantial foreign trade. 
A major factor in Norway's international trading position is 
her merchant fleet, which is today the fourth largest in the 
world.14 Every year commodity imports greatly exceed commod­
ity exports, and international payments are only balanced (when 
they are) by earnings from the shipping fleet. Norway, there­
fore, is very sensitive to international trade patterns, to conditions 
which affect international trade, and to the shipping policies of 
the great export nations of the world.15 That Norwegian living 
standards could not be maintained without the "invisible earn­
ings" of her merchant marine cannot be doubted, and it is in this 
sense that Norway is a maritime nation.16 
In addition to the revenues earned by shipping, Norway has a 
large export trade in commodities, the most important of which 
are, in order, the products of the electrometallurgical and electro­
Norwegian Foreign Policy in Perspective • 15 
chemical industries, fish products, and lumber products. Her 
primary export customers are, in order, the United Kingdom, 
West Germany, Sweden, and the United States. 
Norway's present political system is based on the Eidsvoll 
Constitution of 1814," drawn after the four-hundred-year-old 
union with Denmark was dissolved in the wake of the Napo­
leonic wars (and before Norway was forced to accept a union 
with Sweden as a separate kingdom under the Swedish royal 
house). During the period of the union of Norway-Sweden,18 
however, the Constitution was operative and Norway thus has a 
long, unbroken history of constitutional stability even though it 
is a de jure sovereign state only since 1905. 
Norway is a unitary state with a hereditary constitutional 
monarch exercising power in concert with a parliamentary sup­
ported Cabinet.19 Legislative power is vested in the Storting, a 
modified unicameral parliament20 consisting of 150 members 
elected for four-year terms21 by a system of proportional repre­
sentation from twenty geographically demarcated electoral dis­
tricts. 
Norway has a multiparty system with seven parties having 
secured parliamentary representation in the seven postwar elec­
tions.22 The major socialist party is the Labor party, followed by 
the Socialist Peoples' party and the Communist party. The major 
non-socialist party is the Conservative party. The other non-
socialist parties are the Center party (formerly the Agrarian 
party), the Christian Peoples' party, and the Liberal party. Ar­
ranged on the political spectrum from left to right, the Norwe­
gian party system would appear thusly: socialist—Communist, 
Socialist Peoples', Labor; non-socialist—Liberal, Center (Agrar­
ian), Christian Peoples', Conservative. 
Although important differences in outlook, policy, and ideol­
ogy exist among all Norwegian parties, the most important divi­
sion in terms of the general domestic political debate is that 
which exists between the socialist and non-socialist parties.23 
However, even this dichotomy loses relevance when it comes to 
the conduct of Norwegian foreign policy, for, with the exception 
of the Moscow-oriented Communist party and the neutralist 
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Socialist Peoples' party,24 the other Norwegian political parties 
are in fundamental agreement on the main lines of Norway's 
foreign and defense policies, i.e., participation in the Western 
alliance system, support for the United Nations, and experimen­
tation in economic co-operation in Western and Northern Eu­
rope.25 In terms of foreign policy, the more meaningful division in 
Norwegian political life is to be found within the Labor party 
and, since its formation in 1961, between the Socialist Peoples' 
party and the other Norwegian political parties.26 Apart from its 
commitment to doctrinaire socialism in domestic affairs, the So­
cialist Peoples' party is committed inter alia to extricating Nor­
way from NATO, unilateral disarmament, a formalized nuclear 
free zone in Northern Europe, and aloofness from Continental 
economic experiments. 
With regard to the institutional arrangements affecting for­
eign policy, it should be noted that Norway, during the period 
1935^65, had only three foreign ministers, all members of the 
ruling Labor party.27 Norway has a conventional ministerial es­
tablishment with the Department of Foreign Affairs, divided 
into seven bureaus2S and manned by both career civil servants 
and professional Foreign Service personnel numbering around 
two hundred,29 playing the primary role in the planning, admin­
istration, and implementation of foreign policy. 
The parliament's competence in foreign affairs (e.g., treaties 
and finance) is exercised ultimately in the plenary sessions but 
operationally through its Standing Foreign Affairs and Constitu­
tion Committee.30 
The Foreign Affairs Committee acts as a consultative organ 
for the government and disposes of all the preliminary work on 
foreign affairs with which the parliament must eventually deal. 
In addition, there is the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
constituted by the membership of the Standing Committee and 
supplemented by the President and Vice-President of the Stort­
ing and up to nine other members. This committee is activated 
whenever matters of great importance in either foreign or de­
fense policy must be decided by the government. Because of the 
confidential nature of the discussions in the Enlarged Commit­
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tee, it normally meets in executive session. The point is, how­
ever, that the Enlarged Committee, consisting as it does of mem­
bers of the opposition parties, permits the leading members of 
the Storting to have more detailed and intimate knowledge of, 
and familiarity with, the important and vital questions of Nor­
wegian foreign and defense policy problems.31 
As in other parliamentary systems, Norwegian foreign policy 
is a product as well as a responsibility of party and a prerogative 
of the prime minister. Norwegian foreign policy, however, has 
been largely shaped by strong and esteemed foreign ministers 
who have enjoyed wide reputation throughout the country. This 
has been particularly the case during the postwar period, during 
which time Norwegian foreign policy has been marked by a 
persisting "multipartisanship" and has displayed a remarkable 
continuity, reflecting, undoubtedly, the unparalleled continuity 
of leadership, both in the person of the Foreign Minister and his 
party.82 
An overview of Norway in world affairs.—For more than four 
hundred years, from the fourteenth century until the conclusion 
of the Napoleonic Wars, Norway had little opportunity to assert 
her independence in either her domestic or foreign policy: Co­
penhagen was the center of Norwegian political, economic, and 
cultural life.*3 During the course of the Napoleonic debacle, 
however, Denmark became involved on the side of France as a 
result of a conflict with Great Britain and subsequently paid for 
its error in political judgment with the loss of Norway. Thus the 
Napoleonic Wars had their impact in Northern Europe too,3* 
and while Norway gained in the long run from the imbroglio on 
the Continent, Sweden was the immediate benefactor of the 
Continental turbulence and Danish misfortune. 
Sweden, under the de facto leadership of a former Marshal of 
Napoleon,35 was given title to Norway by the Treaty of Kiel in 
1814 as compensation for the loss of Finland to Russia in 1809.39 
The transfer of sovereignty as demanded by the treaty and 
supported by the great powers was not, however, to be easily or 
quickly effected.87 The Norwegians considered themselves 
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independent38 and accordingly called together a constitutional 
convention which subsequently wrote and adopted a liberal and 
progressive basic law for an independent Norway.39 A previous 
Swedish offer of a constitution had been rejected, and Sweden, 
with the diplomatic support of the great powers, crossed the 
Norwegian border in the summer of 1814 for the purpose of 
forcing Norwegian submission. After a war of less than three 
weeks, an armistice *° was signed, and, in the fall,41 the Norwe­
gian Storting agreed to the election of the Swedish King to the 
Norwegian throne. Later42 the Swedes accepted Norwegian 
modifications of the terms for union, and Norway was declared 
by the Act of Union to be a "free, independent, and indivisible 
kingdom, united with Sweden under one King." ** Thus Nor­
way succeeded in escaping the harsh terms of the Treaty of Kiel 
and in gaining a measure of independence (if not sovereignty) 
for the first time in four centuries, although she was tied to the 
Swedish crown and exercised no control over her external affairs. 
The period of the union was not always satisfactory for either 
of the parties: 44 the Swedes were determined to exercise their 
authority over the Norwegians, while the Norwegians, looking 
to the Eidsvoll Constitution and the terms of the Act of Union, 
were determined to exploit to the maximum the freedom of 
action which had been secured.45 
During the period of the union, Norwegian nationalism, ex­
pressed in language disputes, literature, and political demands, 
bloomed. Although the underlying issue between the two coun­
tries was status (that is, complete independence for Norway), 
the cause celebre of the non-violent, quasi-constitutional dissolu­
tion of the union in 1905 46 was the issue of control over foreign 
policy focused on the specific issue of a separate Norwegian 
consular service to enhance Norwegian commerical and shipping 
interests, which had grown rapidly during the nineteenth cen­
tury, especially after the repeal of the British Navigation Acts in 
1849.47 
Two other developments worthy of note occurred during the 
period of the union. First, the century was an era of rising 
sentiment embracing "Scandinavianism." The movement, tied to 
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the liberal forces awakening in Europe, began to assert itself in 
the early 1840's.48 Although the Scandinavian movement was to 
founder on the rock of Bismark's "blood and iron1' policies dur­
ing the Schleswig-Holstein crisis,49 it turned thought in Scandi­
navia to concepts and action so transcending mere co-operation 
and collaboration, nourishing proposals for a Northern customs 
union, political amalgamation, and a defense union among the 
three Scandinavian countries. After the failure of Norway-
Sweden to come to the aid of Denmark in 1864, even though 
diverse motivations existed in the three countries favoring "Scan­
dinavianism," and notwithstanding the fact that support for a 
pan-Scandinavian union was weakest in Norway, it is important 
to recognize that there existed in Norway even during the period 
of Swedish "subjugation" a latent Scandinavianism which has 
continued, reinforced, into the middle of the twentieth century, 
based on geographic propinquity, common culture, race, religion, 
common laws, institutions, and language, and similar political 
and commercial interests. As one distinguished student of the 
North has observed, although the attempts toward political amal­
gamation were unsuccessful, they left a "weighty heritage"61 
which was to surface time and again in their future relations.62 
A second important development during the period of the 
union was the emergence of Norwegian liberalism and national­
ism. Norwegian nationalism, partly as a result of her affiliation 
with a less progressive Sweden, can be viewed largely as a 
response to democratic ideas,53 and it expresses a repugnance of 
great power politics that so often appeared to work to the disad­
vantage of Norway. These ideas were given perhaps their clear­
est expression by one of Norway's literary giants M who worked 
indefatigably for the cause of peace among nations, and who also 
enjoyed considerable political influence in Norway. Conse­
quently, in 1890, the Norwegian Storting passed by a large 
majority a resolution supporting general arbitration treaties, be­
coming the first national assembly to do so.85 In the same year, 
achieving another first, it sent delegates at public expense to the 
first Interparliamentary Conference. There emerged in Norway 
an undeniably pacifist national ideology which, as far as relations 
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among nations were concerned, anticipated international law as 
the rule, adjudication as the means, and political non­
involvement as the strategy for peace. This approach was not 
entirely shared by Norway's Scandinavian neighbors however. 
The Swedes possessed a relatively recent glorious past and 
deep-rooted military traditions; the Danes, tied, as it were, to the 
Continent were forced to learn the admonitions of balance-
of-power politics; the Norwegians, however, enjoying the isola­
tion afforded by geography and lacking either a recent glorious 
past or a military tradition, became the spokesmen for a new and 
growing movement in international relations.68 
After Norway achieved independence from Sweden in 1905, 
her participation in international affairs, as would be expected in 
view of her political ideas and her world-wide shipping interests, 
was largely in the commercial arena. Norway's primary goal in 
the political arena was to secure a great power guarantee of her 
neutrality. In 1898 and again in 1902, prior to the dissolution of 
the union with Sweden, Norway alone attempted to obtain a 
great power guarantee of perpetual neutrality, but these attempts 
were blitzed on both occasions by the objections of Sweden.57 
During the period of the union, Norway-Sweden did succeed in 
obtaining a guarantee of integrity from France and the United 
Kingdom in the so-called November Treaty of 1855, but inde­
pendence in 1905 terminated the November Treaty. Norway's 
search for a substitute guarantee of both her integrity and neu­
trality finally reached fruition in 1907 when she received a 
guarantee of integrity (but not neutrality) from France, Ger­
many, and the United Kingdom.58 
Norway's concern for neutrality has many sources. One of 
these is rooted in the long union with Sweden. Sweden, under 
the leadership of Karl Johan, determined after the Napoleonic 
Wars to forego both her former great power pretentions and her 
claims against Russia in Finland.59 In addition to the above-
mentioned November Treaty, Sweden made several neutrality 
declarations on behalf of both countries during the period of the 
union. As one student of the North has observed, the nineteenth 
century was the "century of success" for the neutrality policy of 
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Norway-Sweden;eo thus a policy of neutrality had a pragmatic 
appeal to the Norwegian people. 
Another source is to be found as a consequence of Norwegian 
shipping interests, income from which was a sine qua non for 
her continued livelihood at home. As a shipping nation, Norway 
was concerned with maintaining the prerequisites of wide com­
mercial intercourse and thereby increased earnings for her mer­
chantmen. In the event of war, on the other hand, Norway was 
concerned with maintaining neutrality and being recognized as 
such in order to enjoy the rights and privileges that neutral 
nations possessed in times of international conflict. 
Norwegian neutrality is also rooted in the liberal and peace 
movement of the latter part of the nineteenth century. A strong 
movement with a pacifist orientation emerged in Norway, advo­
cating international arbitration treaties and other international 
legal arrangements, often with the official support of the Norwe­
gian government. Thus, the Norwegian concept of neutrality 
differed fundamentally from the concept of armed neutrality 
practiced by the Swedes: the Norwegians looked more to the 
international status of states like Belgium and Switzerland than 
to the international posture of her former overseer.61 
Finally, during the nineteenth century the Norwegians had 
become, understandably, an intensely nationalistic people whose 
concern for sovereignty was enveloped in much emotion and 
linked to a profound skepticism for, and mistrust of, the great 
powers specifically and alliance systems generally. As one stu­
dent of Norwegian foreign policy has observed, 
as an independent nation Norway wished to keep far away from the 
politics of the large nations and anything that smacked of alliances. 
Instead, it based its policy on rigorous and impartial neutrality. This, 
in the opinion of the people and their leaders, was the best and most 
effective way to keep out of future conflicts between the major powers. 
Military preparedness . was allowed to lapse. International law 
and world opinion, not physical force, were to ensure peace and 
independence.62 
In summary, Norway, after independence, adopted a posture 
of strict neutrality. Her immediate objective, universal recogni­
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tion of her neutral status, was not achieved; therefore Norway's 
neutral status was based primarily on her own unilateral declara­
tion, and it was supplemented by a policy of non-involvement in 
political affairs outside Scandinavia. 
In the few years following the acquisition of independence by 
Norway, very little of a concrete nature was achieved in intra-
Scandinavian co-operation. To most Norwegians "Scandinavian 
co-operation'' was little more than a euphemism describing a 
coerced relationship with her neighbors to the east and south 
that always worked to Norway's disadvantage. Norway, after 
independence, assumed an international posture of non­
involvement and isolation; she certainly did not rely on her 
Scandinavian neighbors to help her maintain her newly-won 
freedom. 
If the Norwegians searched anywhere for protection and secu­
rity, they looked west and primarily to Great Britain. The inter­
est was mutual. The British had given diplomatic support to the 
Norwegian government during the union dissolution crisis of 
1905. The British had a strategic interest in Norway and a 
concomitant fear that in the event of war Norway might be 
involved in the conflict on the German side because of the 
German orientation of Sweden, particularly the Swedish royal 
house. That Britain would not permit, insofar as she could shape 
events, German control of the strategic southern and western 
Norwegian coastal areas (and thereby the North Atlantic and 
the North Sea) was axiomatic in British policy. And this issue 
was especially pronounced in view of Germany's expanding 
naval capability.63 Thus the British had little to gain from pro­
moting a Scandinavianism in which the Swedes would necessar­
ily wield great influence. Moreover, after the break with Swe­
den, the relationship between Norway and Great Britain was 
further strengthened by the election to the vacant Norwegian 
throne of Prince Charles of Denmark (Haakon VII), who was 
married to Princess Maud, the daughter of Edward VII.64 How­
ever, the potential for a close alignment between the two coun­
tries was not to manifest itself for many decades. 
It should be remembered that the mystique of Scandinavian­
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ism, which became unusually compelling around the middle of 
the nineteenth century in Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, al­
ways had less support in Norway than in any other of the 
Scandinavian countries. It is generally supported by historians 
that Scandinavianism has its strongest proponents in Denmark, 
even though (or perhaps because!) politically Denmark is re­
quired to be very sensitive and responsive to the policies of her 
southern and eastern neighbors. Sweden, on the other hand, was 
primarily a Baltic country, and enjoyed very friendly relations 
with, and had concrete ties to, Germany, while her relations with 
her eastern neighbor, Russia, have never been especially good, 
with both nations, at one time or another, having exercised 
hegemony over the other. Norway, however, was long oriented 
toward the Atlantic. Her relations with Germany were less than 
satisfactory, dating back as far as the Hanseatic period in Nor­
way, although Norway's relations with Russia have always been 
proper, and her ties with England, as suggested above, have been 
especially close. 
With the approach of World War I, the Scandinavian states 
began to rely on each other in order to maintain and, if possible, 
co-ordinate their separate neutrality policies in the event of war 
among the Continental powers. As early as 1907, a northern 
inter-parliamentary union was formed to further concerted ac­
tion, to consider questions of international law, and to develop, 
maintain, and channel a higher level of responsiveness among 
the elites in Scandinavian states.65 Thus, with the war approach­
ing, the groundwork for co-operation, and particularly the co­
ordination of foreign policies, had been laid, even though intra-
Scandinavian relations were not entirely free from suspicion.66 
In 1912, the three countries issued identic notes of neutrality, 
agreeing at the same time not to block the passages to the 
Baltic,67 and finally in August of 1914, the three countries again 
declared in identic notes their neutrality, Norway and Sweden 
having added to their declarations a mutual pledge not to attack 
each other.68 Scandinavian co-operation in the flush of war was 
possible since all three had similar needs, fears, and complaints. 
In the winter of 1914,69 there occurred a dramatic meeting of the 
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three monarchs of the Scandinavian states in Malmo, Sweden. 
The meeting was the first among the sovereigns of the three 
countries since 1363 when their predecessors met in Copenha­
gen. The meeting was called at the initiative of the Swedes, and 
the three kings affirmed their determination to keep out of the 
hostilities. Thus the Scandinavians attempted to isolate them­
selves from the war by a primitive form of collaboration in a 
policy based on the impartial, disinterested, and passive concept 
of neutrality, supplemented by an intra-Scandinavian "peace 
entente" symbolizing the unanimity of the Scandinavian peoples 
in upholding the policy of neutrality.70 
Throughout the war, the monarchs, prime ministers, and for­
eign ministers of the three countries co-operated closely in their 
relationship to the on-going war. They held annual meetings, 
assumed common positions, issued joint statements,71 and in the 
process they mitigated much of the animosity that had marred 
their relations over the preceding years. The experience was not 
without great significance, and one Norwegian has suggested 
that it was in World War I that the idea that Norway and 
Sweden should never come in conflict with each other became 
an operational assumption of Norwegian foreign policy.72 
Too much, however, can be made of intra-Scandinavian co­
operation during World War I. Even though co-operation was 
intimate in the areas of economic and security (i.e., neutrality) 
policy, contemporary observers noted that even this form of 
collaboration was not 'sufficiently binding to place all Scandina­
via in alignment with either of the belligerent groups in case one 
or the other becomes involved." 73 
Notwithstanding the fact that an articulate group of activists 
in Norway wanted to side with the Entente during the war, 
Norway, like the rest of Scandinavia, succeeded in keeping out 
of the conflict.74 And notwithstanding the fact that Norway 
several times came very close to involvement in the conflagra­
tion—challenged by the Germans, the British, and the Ameri­
cans, the lesson of World War I appeared to the Norwegian to 
be that his country would be able to maintain its independence 
and non-participation in future great power contests. 
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The majority of the Norwegians felt that this stood in connection 
with other nations' special respect for Norway as a small, peace-
loving, and highly cultured nation.75 
Another historian of the Norwegian experience in World I 
stated optimistically, 
In her ability to remain neutral, Norway demonstrated to the world 
that it is possible for a nation to maintain peace with honor even 
under the most extreme provocation, if one has the will to do so.76 
Others, however, have observed (with the benefit of hind­
sight) that the Norwegian experience in the war was hardly a 
cause for hope. In a study of neutrality, the Scandinavian experi­
ence was characterized thusly: 
The small neutral countries were not given much of a choice as to 
the maintenance of their neutrality. Squeezed, battered, and beaten 
from both sides, they were compelled to do what was expedient 
rather than what was desirable from their own point of view. 
The Scandinavian countries were almost completely at the mercy 
of the Allies as far as trade was concerned.77 
Norway's position was especially vulnerable since she could not 
claim self-sufficiency to the degree demonstrated by Sweden, and 
"her trade and commerce had for centuries been tied up with 
Great Britain and the Western world." 78 One observer of the 
period has summed up Norwegian policy in World War I as 
follows: 
It is obvious that the neutrality Norway claimed to maintain was not 
a real one. Although Norway must be recognized as a non­
belligerent . how much was left of her declared status. . ? She 
was not impartial, nor was she passive; thus what remained of her 
neutrality? Because war as an instrument of practical politics 
was out of the question, Norway was left with one alternative: to 
keep peace at the sacrifice of her full sovereign status. She had to take 
what she was given, and what little bargaining power she had did 
not prove sufficient to preserve her right of self-determination in her 
economic life.78 
26 • Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes 
Nevertheless, Norway's neutral policy, regardless of the degree 
to which it deviated from legal norms, was successful in the 
pragmatic sense: it kept the country out of war, and most histo­
rians and politicians writing at the time saw no reason to doubt 
that it could work again in the event of future conflict. 
Prior to the conclusion of World War I, the Scandinavian 
states, in sympathetic response to the declared intentions of the 
Allies, established government commissions with jointly drafted 
proposals for an international juridical organization, clearly re­
vealing their bias in favor of any new form of organized interna­
tional co-operation. Although the Scandinavian states were not 
invited formally to present their views during the formative 
stages of the League of Nations, it was nonetheless evident that 
they preferred an international arrangement providing proce­
dures for conciliation and arbitration, and not a political organi­
zation that might pose a threat to a national policy of neutrality.80 
In addition to their substantive content, their common proposals 
are significant indications of the emergence of a co-ordinated 
foreign policy in peacetime by the Scandinavian states, making 
the first halting steps toward "bloc politics" in international 
organization.81 
The Scandinavian states, with some caution and skepticism, 
accepted their invitation to join the League, becoming members 
in March, 1920.82 The Scandinavians, and particularly the Nor­
wegians, were as skeptical about the initial absence of an interna­
tional court of justice and of concrete institutionalized proce­
dures for conciliation as they were concerned about the inclusion 
of provisions for military and economic sanctions. The skepti­
cism regarding great power intentions and idealism voiced by the 
Norwegian Labor party was echoed throughout much of Scan­
dinavia,83 and these doubts were often given official expression in 
the repeated efforts of the Scandinavian states "to transform [the 
League] from a political organization into an instrument for the 
peaceful solution of all disputes." "* Furthermore, in view of the 
sanctions system embodied in Article XVI, many asserted that 
the Scandinavians had placed in jeopardy the basis of their 
traditional foreign policy, questioning both the efficacy and legal­
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ity of neutrality when squared with the Covenant.85 Although it 
might appear that neutrality was incompatible with the obliga­
tion of League membership, members, including Norway,88 
acted as if neutrality remained an efficacious option, notwith­
standing Article XVI and the opinion of many legal analysts. 
As has been suggested, then, the post-World War I foreign 
policy of Norway was largely co-ordinated with the other Scandi­
navian states, and it was, for the most part,87 focused on develop­
ments in the League of Nations.88 The policy of Norway (and 
the Scandinavian states) in the League can be divided roughly 
into three periods: from 1920 to 1933 and the rise of Hitler and 
the failure of the disarmament conference; from 1933 to 1936 
and the total disillusionment wrought by the Ethiopian crisis 
and subsequent fiascos; and from 1936 to the outbreak of World 
War II, during which period Norway attempted to re-establish 
the prerequisites for a security policy based on strict and tradi­
tional neutrality.89 Though no attempt will be made here to trace 
to the story of the "Scandinavian bloc" at Geneva, in sum­
mary fashion, their individual aims in the League were primarily 
focused on its legal functions and its jurisdictional base. In this 
regard, they jointly advocated, supported, and lobbied for (1) 
universality, (2) a declaration of rights for national minorities, 
(3) codification of international law, (4) wider competence for 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, (5) the creation 
of permanent institutions for inquiry and conciliation, (6) radi­
cal reduction of armaments, and (7) increased authority for the 
League Assembly. 
However, the tensions of 1933-36 and the failure of the 
League to prevent aggression and to provide redress for a 
wronged small country only confirmed the worst suspicions of 
the Norwegians about the "politically-inspired" machinations of 
the great powers and, in their view, the total bankruptcy of 
collective security. The Italo-Ethiopian War was a turning point, 
affirming past suspicion and skepticism and "proving" that the 
League could not provide security to the small states.90 Earlier 
Norway had strongly affirmed the "idea1' of the League, and had 
even permitted herself to be drawn into the Ethiopian affair, but 
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by summer of 1936 the leaf was turned: Norway had too much 
to lose acting as a producer of security and little to gain, in her 
view of her favorable geographic position, as a consumer of 
security.91 
In the summer of 1936, Norway declared jointly with six 
other states 92 that because of the incomplete and inconsistent 
application of the Covenant and the failure to make progress in 
disarmament,93 she no longer felt any obligation to honor the 
sanctions clauses. This fundamental change of policy was 
summed up as follows: 
The small powers had entered the League of Nations hoping for 
general security in a Universal League; but the League was not 
universal and was not likely to become so, and in a conflict the system 
might work to the disadvantage of the small states. Thus they wanted 
recognition of the fact that they no longer considered themselves 
bound by the obligations of Article 16.94 
Consequently, Norway, along with the other traditionally 
neutral states began to discuss new approaches to security. Dur­
ing 1936 many advocated regional pacts for the application of 
sanctions. Norway, however, opposed regional arrangements. 
The Norwegian Foreign Minister pointed to the danger of their 
evolving into military alliances: 
If I said we do not want to see the League of Nations take the shape 
of a big military alliance, we will still less like to see such alliances 
arising within the League.95 
If Norway were not going to be involved in a war under League 
sponsorship, neither would she be involved through a regional 
alliance. 
In a speech to the Storting in the summer of 1937 the Norwe­
gian Foreign Minister again asserted without equivocation Nor­
wegian freedom of action. 
Norway does not consider herself under any obligation to participate 
in military sanctions. . Article XVI leaves to each state the right 
decide for itself. . Norway is resolved to remain mistress of her 
own decision in the matter.96 
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In his speech from the Throne in the beginning of 1938 97 at the 
opening session of the Storting, the Norwegian King stated that 
"The task of Norwegian foreign policy must always be to keep 
the country out of war." 98 That this formulation of policy was 
supported by the other Scandinavian countries was affirmed in 
the spring of 1938 when they stated in a joint communique^9 
that they were unanimous that 
Now as before the Northern states ought and desired to remain out­
side any bloc of powers constituted in Europe, and in case of war 
between such blocs would do everything in their power not to be 
drawn into such a war.100 
Norway, though still in the League, had thus made it absolutely 
clear by these and subsequent statements 101 that she viewed the 
sanctions system as both dangerous and meaningless and now 
looked to neutrality and not collective defense as the basis of her 
security policy. 
The new Norwegian neutrality policy was nonetheless typi­
cal: unlike Sweden, Norwegian neutrality manifested itself pri­
marily via verbal declarations. The Norwegian Foreign Minister 
spoke seldom of military preparations; all that was required was 
the declaration of one's intention to remain outside of war: 
, there is one primary condition absolutely indispensable to the 
possibility of remaining neutral, and that is the firmly stated will of 
the nation, even before the war, to maintain perfect neutrality.102 
While the Swedes employed military capability and prepared­
ness (what is referred to as "armed neutrality" or "total de­
fense") as a technique to communicate their intentions, the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister did not attach significance to arma­
ments as a vehicle for communicating political will. Rather, he 
stated: 
the proof of such will is [keeping] clear of all alliances with any 
bloc of powers forming itself in the world.103 
Although there is some evidence that the Norwegians proba­
bly viewed their geographic position as a depreciating asset,104 
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they nevertheless obviously felt sufficiently protected by their 
physical isolation to decline a proffered non-aggression pact with 
Berlin in the spring of 1939;105 the Danes, however, felt unable 
to refuse and signed. 
At the same time, the Norwegian government came under 
strong domestic criticism, with the opposition parties challenging 
the wisdom of the unarmed neutrality pursued by the govern­
ment. In the debate on the Speech from the Throne in February, 
1939, the Opposition charged that 
the Government has refused to discuss such strengthening of our 
national defense as is necessitated by considerations for the preserva­
tion of neutrality and full independence for the country.106 
The opposition parties, and especially the Conservatives, fully 
supported neutrality as a policy,107 but they did not agree with its 
implementation: they looked more to the Swedish brand of 
armed neutrality and rejected the antimilitaristic and pacifistic 
basis in which the ruling Norwegian Labor party rooted its 
neutrality. The Conservative Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee stated that 
Our policy of neutrality cannot be based on the false feeling of 
security which might result from alliances, but solely on our own 
willingness and preparedness to protect our unconditional neutrality 
on every side. Our will to neutrality should be mainly demon­
strated by our strengthening the national defense that we may be 
prepared to repel any violation of our territory. Only thus can we 
contribute to strengthening the feeling of security in Europe.108 
This view of neutrality, this concept of communicating political 
will, and this theory of military capability as stabilizing inputs in 
international politics were not, however, shared by the Labor 
party elite and thus were not reflected in Norwegian foreign 
policy prior to World War II. 
Summary.—As the above indicates, Norwegian foreign policy 
after World War I very actively anticipated transforming the 
international system, and, when that failed in the late thirties, 
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the Labor government chose non-involvement in the politics 
among the great powers and a status of non-belligerency—or 
neutrality, in the event the unwanted war occurred. Their objec­
tive corresponding to this latter policy was to persuade the other 
European powers of their intention not to allow themselves to 
become involved in the war. The commitments undertaken by 
the Norwegian leadership to achieve this objective were largely 
legal and symbolic and took the form of unilateral and multilat­
eral declarations of intentions coupled with protests, once the 
war began, to the major belligerent powers regarding alleged 
violations of Norwegian neutral rights. Some commitments of a 
concrete nature were undertaken. Most dramatic among these 
was the Norwegian refusal to permit Allied troops to cross Nor­
wegian territory in order to aid the Finns during the winter 
war109 and small increments in the defense budgets of 
1938-39.110 In short, the Norwegians were adhering to the admo­
nition of the poet Bj0rnson, who had argued that "the best 
foreign policy is no foreign policy," m meaning by this that 
Norway should avoid political ties to foreign nations as a means 
of achieving security.112 
In order to contrast that which follows with this brief over­
view of Norway's role in world affairs up to the outbreak of 
World War II, a summary description of the Norwegian strate­
gic image is required. 
First, Norway perceived her geographic location as peripheral 
—in "Europe's quiet corner.' Although Norway might become 
involved in a war for political reasons (e.g., mismanagement 
of political affairs), Norwegian policy-makers saw no compelling 
reasons for Norway to become entangled in a "European" 
war as a consequence of her geographic location.113 Thus, her 
geography permitted a policy of non-involvement, for it did 
not present the problems that had to be faced by countries like 
Denmark and Belgium. 
Second, the important division of the international system was 
between the small states and the large states. To this image of 
the international system was attached a valuation dimension: the 
large states were "politically" oriented and pursued only their 
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own narrow national interests.114 This evaluation was revealingly 
expressed by the Norwegian Foreign Minister thusly: 
In Norway the Labor Party had voted against entrance of their 
country into the League of Nations just because of their distrust of 
the idealism of the Great Powers. Personally, I had been in favor of 
trying the experiment of the League, but of course I was aware of 
the inherent dangers of power policies. ,UB 
On another occasion, the Foreign Minister wrote, expressing the 
same idea, that the small neutral bloc at Geneva upheld 
the general principles of international justice as opposed to the con­
siderations of political opportunism urged by most of the Great 
Powers.118 
Thus is revealed both the cognitive and affective elements of the 
image: the international system was composed of the larger, 
opportunistic states together with the small, justice-seeking 
states, whose work for peace and the rule of law was often 
undermined by the power orientation of the large. In short, the 
small states were, in the Norwegian view, sorts of Latter Day 
Saints, pleading the cause of rectitude and acting as the collec­
tive conscience of the great powers.117 
This leads to a fourth dimension of the strategic image, the 
image of process. The Norwegian policy elite perceived a great 
power "cabal" in which decisions were made by and for the 
benefit of those nations that possessed large increments of mili­
tary capability.118 This process image was not revised during the 
entire period of Norwegian foreign policy from independence 
till World War II. However, Norway's attitude toward and 
response to the process she perceived did undergo fundamental 
revision. From 1905 until the end of World War I, Norway 
accepted the "reality" of the great power cabal, best shown by 
her (unsuccessful) attempts to obtain a great power guarantee 
and endorsement of her permanent and absolute neutrality. 
However, Norwegian discussion of, and entry into, the League 
presaged the change in attitude: Norway now attempted to 
transform the process she perceived as operational from one 
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governed by considerations of power to one founded on justice, 
equality, and international law. When this proselytizing attempt 
to change the rules of international interaction and decision-
making failed,119 Norway announced her withdrawal from the 
game. 
With regard to the events immediately preceding Norwegian 
involvement in World War II, it should be noted that the 
Norwegian policy elite perceived the threat to Norway in a 
generalized manner.120 In other words, although Norway viewed 
fascism with unmitigated antipathy, ideological considerations 
were not highly operational. The Foreign Minister himself noted 
that moral and material considerations, democratic ideals, and 
seafaring interests attracted Norway to the side of Great Brit­
ain,121 but these considerations would become controlling only if 
Norway were forced to choose sides, that is, only if Norwegian 
foreign policy failed. Thus the threat to Norway was war in the 
system and its concomitant dangers. 
Finally, regarding the armaments issue in Norway, the Nor­
wegian Labor party leadership in the government had a negative 
attitude.122 The Foreign Minister clearly perceived armaments as 
a cause of war and felt that Norway had little to gain from 
increased defense expenditures.123 It could never be argued that 
the Labor party leadership viewed armaments as potentially sta­
bilizing as well as destabilizing. Armaments were costly, useless, 
and dangerous. 
Thus, the Norwegians felt relatively safe and were fairly 
confident of their ability to exercise prudence and properly man­
age their political relations on a unilateral basis and thereby 
escape involvement should a war "on the Continent" occur. 
Norway was a peace-loving, cultured nation with no territorial 
ambitions nor revanchist motivations.124 Norway was well-
protected by geography and could avoid war by declarations of 
neutrality and a posture of impartiality. Norway's history had 
demonstrated this fact: Norway had lived in uninterrupted 
peace for a century and a quarter, since the seventeen day war 
with Sweden in 1814. Moreover, Norwegians like Bj0rnson and 
Nansen epitomized the peace movement that had its source in 
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the latter half of the nineteenth century, and, even more re­
cently, the Norwegian government itself had demonstrated its 
commitment to peaceful relations among nations governed by 
the rule of law by its acceptance of the PCIJ decision in the 
Greenland case.125 In short, the peace traditions of the Norwe­
gian people were extraordinarily deep-rooted and were of such a 
nature that they would surely be respected by other nations.126 
Indeed, Norway had demonstrated in World War I that even 
under extreme provocation and the most adverse circumstances 
she would not permit herself to be drawn into war127—just as 
World War I had demonstrated to Norway that a small nation 
could maintain peace in the midst of conflict. In short, history 
and experience had "taught" the Norwegians that peace was 
divisible, that war was an affair of the great powers into which 
the small nations need not be drawn if only they exercise pru­
dence, demonstrate will with the proper verbalizations, and intel­
ligently manage their political affairs. 
1. The frontier with the U.S.S.R., only 122 miles, is a result of Finnish 
territorial concessions to the U.S.S.R. in World War II. Norway, thus, is the 
only original NATO member to share a border with the U.S.S.R. Her 
boundaries with Sweden and Finland are 1,020 miles and 445 miles respec­
tively. For a good discussion and a detailed map (p. 594) of the Norwegian-
Soviet frontier, see Gordon W. East, "The New Soviet Frontier," Foreign 
Affairs, XXIX (July, 1951), 595-96. 
2. Often referred to in English as Spitzbergen, it is important primarily 
because of its strategic location in the Arctic Ocean on the northern route from 
the Soviet Union to the North Atlantic and as a consequence of its coal 
deposits, the only major deposits to which Norway has access. See John J. 
Teal, "Europe's Northernmost Frontier," Foreign Affairs, XXIX (January, 
1951), 263-75; and Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard in the Changing Arctic COslo: 
Gyldendal, 1954), chaps, vi, vii. 
3. Norway proper has a total area of 125,064 square miles; her two Arctic 
possessions, Svalbard and Jan Mayen added to her two Antarctic possessions, 
Peter I Island and Bouvet Island, total more than 24,000 square miles. On 
these points see Axel S0mme, A Geography of Norien (Oslo: J. W. Cappe­
lens Forlag, 1961), pp. 288-91; and Elisabeth Lundevall and Per Hagen, 
Facts about Norway (Oslo: Chr. Schibsteds Forlag, 1964), p. 3. 
4. S0mme, op. tit., p. 236. 
5. There is one minority group, the Lapps, with an estimated population of 
20,000-25,000. This group, however, is isolated in the northern part of the 
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country and has its own language and cultural traditions. It is a minority 
group which is receiving more attention in Norway as a result of humanitarian 
and domestic political considerations as well as in consideration of their 
position in strategic northern Norway. 
6. Norway is divided into five distinct geographical regions: 0stlandet, 
S0rlandet, Vestlandet, Tr0ndelag, and Nord Norge. East Norway is an 
agricultural and industrial area, largely urban in composition. The capital, 
Oslo, is located in this region. South Norway is largely agricultural and rural. 
West Norway is dominated by Norway's second largest city, Bergen, and is a 
fishing and fish processing center, although it is rapidly becoming a manufac­
turing center. Tr0ndelag, lying in the north-centraT region of the country, and 
north Norway are the most sparsely populated regions and are dominated by 
fishing and agricultural enterprises. There are great variations among all of 
these regions, especially in language and in cultural and political values. See 
James A. Storing, Norwegian Democracy (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1963), 
pp. 4-11; Harry Ekstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of 
Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), esp. chaps, iii, iv; and 
S0mme, op. cit., pp. 238-44, 283-86. 
7. Efforts are continually being made to provide incentives to people to 
settle in the regions other than the Oslofjord area. For example, subsidies are 
provided to fishermen, in part, to help keep the coastal areas inhabited; 
industrial enterprises are constructed inland with government subsidies to 
encourage a more stable population distribution (even though they may 
operate at less than maximum efficiency); and internal communications sys­
tems are under improvement, ranging from a more extensive and efficient 
railway system to expansion of the state-owned and operated television in the 
remote regions—even traveling theaters and ministerial-level politicians are 
venturing into the isolated areas. 
8. A terminological issue should be settled here. The term Scandinavia is 
often employed loosely, referring to various groupings of the countries of 
Northern Europe. The term Scandinavia shall be employed herein to denote 
only Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, while the term Fenno-Scandinavia will 
be used in reference to Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. The term 
Nordic should be used only in reference to the peoples and socio-cultural 
aspects of the five Nordic countries, i.e., Fenno-Scandinavia plus Iceland, and 
the term Norden is normally used by political geographers to refer to the 
region of the Nordic countries. The term Scandinavian peninsula is employed 
only to denote the area occupied by Sweden and Norway. On these points see 
S0mme, op. cit., pp. 11-17. 
9. Walter Fitzgerald, The New Europe: An Introduction to Its Political 
Geography (New York: Harper, 1946), pp. 39-44. 
10. See, for example, Karen Larsen, A History of Norway (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 208-40, 343-95, 484-95; John Mid­
gaard, A Brief History of Norway (Oslo: Johan Grundt Forlag, 1963), pp. 
46-104; and Franz Wendt, The Nordic Council and Cooperation in Scandi­
navia (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1959), chap. i. 
11. Elias Wessen, "The Scandinavian Community of Language,*' Le 
Nord, IV (1941), 221-36. Gunnar Leistikow, "Cooperation between the 
Scandinavian Countries,1' in Henning Friis (ed.), Scandinavia between East 
and West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 308-10, suggests that 
while the kinship among the Scandinavian countries is less intense than 
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nationalism and allegiance to the individual countries, it is nevertheless 
stronger than the feeling which persists among Anglo-Saxons. Leistikow 
further hypothesizes that the "community of speech seems to be the root idea 
of kinship and solidarity, [and] one of the basic elements of Scandinavian-
ism." 
12. Norwegian agriculture is very inefficient, and there are no great tracts 
of fertile farmland; only 43 farms have more than 250 acres. Norway is 
self-sufficient in livestock products (although feed-stuffs must he imported) 
and in eggs, butter, cheese, and milk. 
13. The primary imports are bread grain, textiles, fuels, metals, machinery, 
and ships. The shipyards of Sweden, West Germany, Great Britain, and Japan 
provide the bulk of the Norwegian fleet. 
14. The Norwegian shipping fleet totals over fifteen milliongross tons, or 
10 per cent of the world's tonnage of 140 million gross tons. Thus, Norway 
ranks fourth after Britain, the U.S., and Liberia. On a per capita basis, 
Norway has the world's largest shipping fleet. More than 90 per cent of the 
fleet is engaged in international trade and nearly one-half the tonnage is in 
tankers, the strategic value of which was evident (especially for Great Britain) 
in World War II. 
15. Norway is especially sensitive to the disadvantages created by flag 
discrimination, a practice which gives a nation s own ships certain preferences 
over ships of other nations, apart from considerations of cost or efficiency. 
Norway will always be found protesting such departures from the principles of 
free competition in international shipping, as in the case of the U.S. and 
Soviet agreement regarding wheat shipments in U.S. bottoms. Norwegian 
shipping requires access to international markets, which flag discrimination 
limits. 
16. For a good yet brief discussion of the structure of the Norwegian 
economy see Ole Knudsen, Norway (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964), 
passim, which deals entirely with the major sectors of the Norwegian econ­
omy. 
17. An English text of the Constitution can be found, along with other 
documents related to the Constitution in T0nnes Andenaes Ced.), The 
Constitution of Norway (Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 1962). 
18. See Raymond E. Lindgren, Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and 
Scandinavian Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 
8-131, for perhaps the best treatment in English of the political aspects of the 
Union period. 
19. The supremacy of the Storting was achieved in 1884 with the accept­
ance by Swedish King Oscar II of the principle that the Norwegian Cabinet 
should enjoy the continuing confidence of the legislative organ. See, for 
example, T. K. Derry, A Short History of Norway (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1960), pp. 173-80; and Kristian Bloch, Kongens Rid (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1963), pp. 15-21. 
20. The Storting is elected as a single group, afterward dividing itself for 
legislative purposes into the Lagting and the Odelsting, with one-fourth 
serving in the former and the remaining three-fourths serving in the latter 
"chamber." See Storing, op. cit., chap. v. 
21. One of the unique features of the Norwegian parliamentary system is 
the absence of a royal dissolution authority. That the term of parliament is 
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fixed is a potentially destabilizing feature of the Norwegian system of govern­
ment, especially when, as was the case after the 1961 elections, the govern­
ment's parliamentary support is tenuous. 
22. See Appendix A. 
23. For a good discussion of the ideological and policy commitments of the 
various Norwegian political parties see Storing, op. cit., pp. 135-43. For a 
discussion dealing only with the bourgeois parties see Sven Groennings, 
"Cooperation among Norway's Non-Socialist Political Parties" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1962). See Henry Valen and Daniel 
Katz, Political Parties in Norway, (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1964), pp. 
22-41 for the development of the Norwegian party system. 
24. For a discussion of the Norwegian Communist party, see Jahn Otto 
Johansen's chapter on Norway in William E. Griffith (ed.), Communism In 
Europe, Vol. II, (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966), pp. 321-69. On the 
Socialist People's party see Finn Gustavsen, "Utenrikspolitikken i Foregrun­
nen" in Per 0yvind Heradstveit's Partiene og utenrikspolitikken (Oslo: 
Aschehoug, 1965), pp. 65-78. 
25. The most heated discussion of foreign policy since Norway joined the 
Atlantic alliance came in 1961-62 on the question of Norway's application to 
the Common Market. The Storting finally approved the application, but there 
were thirty-seven dissenting votes, primarily from the Socialist People's party 
and the Center party with a few dissident votes from Labor, Liberals, and the 
Christian People's party. 
26. Storing, op. cit., p. 221; Valen and Katz, op. cit., pp. 31-32. The 
Communist party is not mentioned here since it has no parliamentary repre­
sentation. 
27. Halvdan Koht (1935-41), Trygve Lie (1941-46), and Halvard 
Lange (1946-65). Exception is made to the short interregnum in the fall of 
1963 when the Conservatives led a coalition government for less than a 
month. National elections were held in the fall of 1965, however, and ended 
thirty years of Labor rule in Norway. The new government was formed in 
October, 1965, headed by the Center party with Conservative John Lyng 
serving as Foreign Minister. 
28. General (administrative), Political (subdivided into five functional 
offices), Trade, Protocol, Law, Press, and Cultural Relations. 
29. See Storing, op. cit., pp. 109-12 for a brief discussion of recruitment, 
appointment, and training practices in the Norwegian Foreign Service. For a 
discussion of the history of the Norwegian Foreign Service see Reidar Omang, 
Utenrikstjenesten, (Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 1954). 
30. Erik Colban, Stortinget og Utenrikspolitikken (Oslo: Universitets­
forlaget, 1961), pp. 18-48; normally the Storting committees reflect the 
political balance of the Storting itself; however, in the critical 1948-49 period 
Communists were excluded from the Foreign Affairs Committee even though 
they had eleven members in the parliament. For a discussion in English of 
parliamentary participation and control in the area of foreign policy see Einar 
L0chen, Norway in European and Atlantic Cooperation (Oslo: Universitets­
forlaget, 1964), pp. 67-83. For an explication of the constitutional compe­
tence of the Storting in foreign policy see Einar L0chen and Rolf N. 
Torgersen, Norway's Views on Sovereignty (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens' Insti­
tutt, 1955), pp. 13-20. 
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31. "The fact that there is an enlarged Foreign Relations Committee 
strengthens the possibility of parliamentary control over the government's 
foreign policy. It is also of importance for the government to have such a 
committee, where it is able to talk more freely on confidential or secret matters 
than is the case in open sessions of the Storting. The Committee may be used 
by the government as a sounding-board for new ideas on foreign policy. No 
votes or decisions are taken by the committee, and the constitutional responsi­
bility of the government for conducting foreign policy is not af­
fected."—L0chen, op. cit., p. 69. 
32. The power of the governing party in foreign affairs is substantial. In 
the postwar era there have been wide divergencies between the Labor party 
leadership and its rank-and-file on foreign policy questions. According to 
Valen and Katz, op. cit., pp. 87-88, "It is highly probable that if the stand of 
the national leadership on membership in NATO or on the rearmament of 
Germany had been put to the test of a referendum of all Labor party members, 
substantial majorities would have been registered against the position of the 
national leaders." However, the government party's near-monopoly of in­
formation and its concomitant ability to "pose the problem and define the issue 
[make] it difficult for the membership organization to assert its own wishes." 
33. Larsen, op. cit., pp. 243-369; and Derry, op. cit., pp. 68-108. Between 
1319 and 1360 a personal union existed between Norway and Sweden. 
Norway and Denmark were united in 1380 in a union which lasted until 
1814. During this period the two were joined by Sweden from 1397 until 
1521 in the so-called Kalmar Union. 
34. The impact of the Napoleonic Wars on Northern Europe was clearly 
expressed by Franz Wendt, op. cit., pp. 17-19, where he states, "The 
cataclysm caused by the Napoleonic wars was one of the most important and 
revolutionary events in the nistory of the Nordic peoples. It severed ancient 
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The Emergence of New Axioms in 
Norwegian Foreign Policy 
World War II and the London government.—Following the 
German invasion * in the morning of April 9, 1940,2 the govern­
ment and the Storting fled the capital after having rejected a 
German ultimatum3 demanding Norwegian co-operation in the 
German occupation of the country.4 The King and the govern­
ment carried on the struggle in Norway against the Germans 
until June,5 when they were finally forced to flee the country and 
establish a government-in-exile in London. Although this two-
month period is very interesting in itself, two developments 
relevant to subsequent outcomes of Norwegian foreign policy are 
important. 
The first involved the establishment of the legal base for the 
government in London. Before the government left Norway, the 
Storting granted the Council of State, i.e., the King and his 
ministers, full powers to govern the country for the duration of 
the war. This was achieved through the instrument of the so-
called Elverum Authorization of Full Powers" and was further 
necessitated by a provision of the Norwegian Constitution which 
prohibits the King, without parliamentary consent, from residing 
outside the kingdom for more than six months.1 Thus, some 
weeks later, when the government established itself in London, 
in possession of the total gold reserves of the Bank of Norway 
and in control of the fourth largest merchant fleet in the world, 
its legal basis was solid; and its international status was enhanced 
when it was accorded full diplomatic status by the British.8 
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The second development involves the impact made on govern­
ment leaders by the absence of military preparations and of prior 
provision for external aid in case of international conflict. Al­
though the British immediately pledged aid to Norway, it was 
not until mid-April that Allied troops were on Norwegian soil.9 
Had external military assistance been more readily available or 
had the government more adequately provided for its domestic 
military capability, there is a possibility that a neutral zone could 
have been established in north Norway, thereby permitting the 
government to remain on Norwegian soil. As it was, the negotia­
tions on this matter with the Germans dissolved as the Norwe­
gian military position deteriorated rapidly. This first-hand experi­
ence of the utility of military power gained by the political 
leaders during the early months of the German-Norwegian war 
left impressions and attitudes to which reference would be made 
often in the years to come. 
The government had established itself in London by the 
mid-summer of 1940, succeeded in gaining recognition from 
other states, and proved to be financially stable and independ­
ent.10 Although it is often asserted that Norwegian foreign policy 
had changed fundamentally with the German invasion, this 
view is somewhat superficial and misleading. Once Norway's 
neutrality had been irrevocably compromised, Norway's prewar 
foreign policy had, of course, been willy-nilly altered. And once 
the government decided to resist the German invasion and, later, 
to carry on the war from London, Norwegian foreign policy 
became functionally related to the requirements of liberation. 
However these changes, as far as foreign policy is concerned, 
reflect more decisions made by others (i.e., the Germans) than 
decisions made by Norwegians. In fact, Foreign Minister Koht 
retained his position in the Foreign Office in London,11 and there 
is nothing to indicate that his views of Norway's role in world 
affairs had been altered in any way beyond the tactical require­
ments imposed by the determination of the government to co­
operate with others in the liberation of Norway from the Ger­
mans. 
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The Foreign Minister was soon to encounter resistance, how­
ever, as foreign ministers whose policies have failed so often do. 
Most important was the continued disagreement, soon to become 
disenchantment, with Koht among a hard-core element12 of the 
Norwegian government and politically relevant elite in exile. 
Several prominent members of the Norwegian community in 
London were advocating a more active foreign policy, and in 
July of 1940 they petitioned the government to promulgate and 
pursue a more vigorous and well-defined policy. In a later peti­
tion they requested the government to sign an alliance with the 
United Kingdom, to clarify Norwegian aims in the war, and to 
take measures to build up the morale of the home front.13 
These petitions represented frontal assaults on Koht's foreign 
policy, but he stood his ground and in September of 1940 
strongly defended his policy and denied the efficacy of closer ties 
with the Allies in the form of an alliance with Great Britain. 
Koht's basic position was the same as prior to the war: the great 
powers would determine the peace, and in this determination 
there was no room for the small powers. Regarding the libera­
tion, his view was that the British had great incentives to expel 
Germany from Norway; thus a treaty with the U.K. was at best 
redundant. In addition, Koht was fearful that a close alignment 
between Norway and Great Britain could be injurious to Norwe­
gian relations with the U.S.S.R., a country, in his view, also 
having an interest in preventing another great power's influence 
in the North.14 
The Foreign Minister's position was substantially undermined 
in November of 1940 when the Norwegian Cabinet decided 
unanimously that an agreement should be made with the U.K. 
to insure Norwegian independence and freedom after the war,15 
and for all practical purposes this vote marked the end of Koht's 
leadership and influence in Norwegian foreign policy. He con­
tinued to adhere to the old doctrines of neutrality and the dog­
mas of the moral superiority of the small powers, but the others 
in London began to view the experience of the immediate past 
and Norway's role in the future in a different light. It was 
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decided by the Cabinet that a new course in foreign policy 
would have to be charted, and the burden of navigation was 
turned over to Trygve Lie.16 
Thus a new leadership possessing new views and making 
different judgments both with regard to ends and means in 
foreign policy took command. Obviously, the Norwegian For­
eign Office was primarily concerned with doing its part as a 
member of the United Nations in prosecuting the war. On the 
other hand, the Norwegian foreign policy leadership spent a 
great deal of time, energy, and talent thinking about and plan­
ning for Norwegian participation in the postwar world to which 
all looked.17 Thus an analysis of the verbal manifestations of this 
process, as well as Norwegian diplomatic activity during the 
course of the war is revealing of the new intellectual basis and 
the emerging assumptions of the Norwegian foreign policy elite. 
In this regard attention will be drawn to (1) the general enun­
ciations of policy and aims by the Foreign Minister, the King, 
and other members of the government in London, (2) Norwe­
gian relations with, and views toward, Fenno-Scandinavia, (3) 
Norwegian relations with the U.S.S.R., and (4) Norwegian 
policy toward the evolving United Nations Organization. 
The emergence of new concepts.—In a broadcast to the Nor­
wegian people on the evening of December 15, 1940, over the 
BBC, Lie stated in general terms the revolutionary 'new look" in 
Norwegian foreign policy thinking. Lie indicated that Norway 
would co-operate closely with "other free nations" in order to 
realize the liberation of Norway. The Acting Foreign Minister, 
however, did not limit himself to a discussion only of immediate 
war aims; he looked to the future and attempted to identify 
Norway's place in it. He spoke of co-operation with other Nordic 
peoples, but rejected any ideas of limiting Norwegian participa­
tion within the confines of Northern Europe. 
Something more than a purely Nordic unity is, however, now needed. 
Cooperation, both political and economic, with all free nations is 
necessary—not only to rebuild all that has been destroyed, but to 
create security and prosperity in the future. This is an important 
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and difficult task. It has been tried before without success. The 
League of Nations was such an effort. It was based on a great and 
promising idea, but it failed.18 
The Acting Foreign Minister indicated that Norway would seek 
a broad-based relationship with other countries for the duration 
of the war and after; he rejected outright the idea of Norwegian 
participation in a Continental bloc, emphasizing the fact that 
Norway is a "seafaring nation, an old Atlantic people." Thus if 
Norden was too small a base for postwar Norwegian economic 
and security policy, so was Continental Europe. He emphasized 
that Norway must seek closer ties to the West "to whom we from 
old are connected by natural economic ties," because, he said, 
'our prosperity is entirely dependent on this." Lie also empha­
sized the ideological as well as the economic attraction of the 
West when he stated that "The nations to whom we have been 
the most firmly bound economically are peoples with the same 
traditions of freedom as ourselves." In particular he mentioned 
specifically the need for closer ties with the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
Lie also spoke of the need for political ties to the West in the 
postwar years, saying, 
This is a mighty alliance and it is a world which at the same 
time is forming the basis for a relationship which must and shall 
endure after the war; a political cooperation which will secure our 
national freedom, protect us against attacking tyrants, and which 
economically establishes social security and prevents financial crises 
from destroying economic life and stopping social development.19 
Furthermore, Lie suggested that a secure future for Norway 
required Norwegian involvement in the war against Germany in 
order to acquire a position to exercise influence in the postwar 
world. He closed his address to the Norwegian people with a 
statement which presaged things to come (and which sounded 
strange from the lips of a Norwegian Foreign Minister): 
Our future is not being shaped by our wishes and plans but our 
active share in the war to liberate Europe. We used to take our in­
dependence for granted. Now we have learnt that we cannot have 
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it for nothing, and that we must be prepared to defend it. If we want 
to be given influence in the new world after the war, we must do our 
duty and shoulder our share in this war as far as our strength goes.20 
That this speech represented a radical departure from tradi­
tional Norwegian foreign policy can hardly be denied. While 
Lie urged those at home to fight for the liberation of the country, 
he also informed them that the end had come to the years of 
isolation in the foreign policy of their country. That political 
collaboration with great powers was no longer taboo was clear; 
indeed, such collaboration was now viewed as instrumental in 
the economic well-being and political security of the nation. 
Perhaps most important however, is the thrust of the entire 
speech, a formulation which clearly revealed that the leading 
Norwegian policy-maker was acting on the basis of calculations 
about the nature of the political universe in which he found 
himself rather than on the basis of a priori assumptions and 
normative assertions. This is clearly revealed in Lie's analysis of 
the economic and security potentialities of Scandinavia, in his 
assertion that Norway's future was not shaped by "wishes" alone, 
and in the total absence of any great power-small power argu­
mentation (with its attendant moral trappings). In a very real 
way, Lie was acting on the basis of unobscured internationalist 
assumptions, viz., the only foundation for economic stability and 
progress and political security was broad-based international co­
operation. Lie's first major public statement from his new posi­
tion in the Foreign Office reveals in a paradoxical and ironic 
fashion the rudimentary internationalism of his predecessor. 
The significance of this major address by the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister was not missed by those in London. The day 
following the speech a lead editorial in the Times of London 
observed that "the present war has virtually destroyed the 
reality of neutral status," and that Norway was the first govern­
ment to recognize this. The Times also commented on Lie's 
recognition that "Scandinavian unity and Scandinavian neutral­
ity which had seemed an adequate bulwark in the past were no 
longer enough," and the Foreign Minister's commitment to co­
operation beyond the immediate tasks imposed by the war. In 
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short, the Times inferred from the speech (and not without 
reason) a statement to the Norwegian people signifying a 
clear-cut break with the past.21 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the new line taken by 
the Foreign Minister was not without its opponents. It was 
opposed, first, by a hard-core group of Norwegians in London 
and Stockholm who continued to look to a postwar Norwegian 
neutrality,22 and second, from the Central European bloc of 
nations headed by Poland. The basis of opposition of the latter 
was the fear that a grouping of nations around the Atlantic basin 
would place them outside the area of its interests and thus would 
not serve the security needs of the Central European countries. 
Lie's explicit rejection of a Norwegian inclusion in a Central 
European bloc especially troubled the Poles: above all they 
feared the absence of a Western commitment in Central Europe 
which would leave them to the designs of the Germans.23 
The new Foreign Minister had only just begun, and by the 
beginning of 1941 he was firmly in the saddle in the Foreign 
Office when Koht resigned. A concrete manifestation of Lie's 
new foreign policy was seen in the spring when he signed a 
military agreement with the British containing an important 
political clause.24 Thus, for the first time in modern history 
Norway had entered into a political and military alliance with 
another nation, and a great power at that.25 
The next major statement of Norwegian foreign policy came 
in the fall of 1941 in the form of an article by the Foreign 
Minister in the London Times.26 Lie began his article, entitled 
"A Community of Nations," with the statement that "the Nor­
wegian people have been convinced that the policy of neutrality 
is bankrupt." Lie stated that Norway had no frontier problems 
nor territorial ambitions, yet he proceeded to restate a conviction 
expressed in his first major statement: "Intimate international 
cooperation will be needed after the war in the political, military, 
and economic fields." He indicated that Norway intended to 
participate, and then addressed himself to a consideration of the 
direction of and conditions for Norwegian co-operation in the 
postwar world. 
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As an Atlantic people we want above all a strong organized collabora­
tion between the two great Atlantic Powers: the British Empire and 
the United States. This is our primary concern and the very condition 
of our participation in any international order in Europe.27 
Then, in what is undoubtedly the generic conceptualization of 
what became the basis of Norwegian foreign policy in the early 
postwar period, Lie stated that the prerequisite to any extended 
international co-operation would depend on "an amicable rela­
tionship between the British Empire, the United States, the 
Soviet Union, and China." 28 He then observed, again breaking 
with the norms of Norwegian foreign ministers, that interna­
tional co-operation must beget 'practical results." 
Regarding future security arrangements, Lie made it clear that 
here too he anticipated collaboration. 
As far as the small states are concerned these duties should be pri­
marily regional. For Norway, it seems natural to think of the defense 
of the Atlantic and strongly to emphasize our desire to see the US 
participating in this task. Military and political questions being 
closely connected we must also work together in the political tasks 
which will have to be tackled after the war. 29 
The Foreign Minister also made oblique reference to the other 
Scandinavian states in this article when he stated that unlike the 
other Northern countries, whose ideological and strategic consid­
erations are often in conflict, Norway's strategic, economic, and 
ideological interests "all point in the same direction.'' He said 
that he hoped that "the relations of good neighborliness" could 
be maintained after the war; beyond that, however, he did not 
The only new political assertion in this article was the Foreign 
Minister's reference to the long period of friendly relations be­
tween the Soviet Union and Norway and his hope that these 
would continue; otherwise, the article is an elaboration, an affir­
mation and expansion of his earlier thinking: Norway was fin­
ished with neutrality and looked to collaboration with the great 
powers in the postwar period; Scandinavian relations were im­
portant, but their strategic problems were different and Scandi­
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navia as an economic unit was too restricted; security could be 
realized only through the instrument of an international organi­
zation, the basis of which would have to be an amicable relation­
ship among the great powers; and finally, Norwegian leaders 
postulated the Atlantic region, including the U.S. and Great 
Britain, as the primary basis of their collaborative efforts. 
By this time, the Foreign Minister's position in the Foreign 
Office was unassailable; opposition to his new policy had with­
ered; close collaboration with the British government had been 
effected; and all the major governments, including the U.S.30 
and the U.S.S.R.,31 now recognized the Norwegian government 
in London, a government which was financially independent, 
playing a major role in the Allied war effort, and planning for an 
active participation in the postwar period. The subsequent devel­
opment of Norwegian foreign policy can be usefully observed by 
examining her relations with Sweden. 
Norway's relations with Norden in World War 11.—As a 
political entity neither Norden nor Scandinavia existed during 
World War II, much unlike the experience of Scandinavia in 
World War I. Denmark, of course, was occupied by the Germans, 
and the Danish government was forced by the Germans to break 
off relations with the Norwegian government in London. Al­
though unofficial relations between the two countries existed, 
official communication was of little significance. Iceland, soon 
after the German invasion of Denmark, declared her independ­
ence from Denmark, but was for all practical purposes an 
occupied country during the course of the war32 and Norwegian-
Icelandic contacts were of little consequence. Finland was un­
fortunate enough to have fought two wars with the Russians, 
losing both of them, and was thus hardly in a position to play an 
important role in wartime policy development.33 
Thus, Norwegian relations with Norden during World War 
II were largely limited to her relations with Sweden. Norwe­
gian-Swedish relations were often strained during the course of 
the war, and the issues of conflict were both concrete and sym­
bolic. The major concrete issues involved the refusal of the 
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Swedish government to accept a new Norwegian Ambassador 
when the Norwegian Minister in Stockholm died in the fall of 
194034 and Sweden's policies toward the Germans, the most 
significant being the Swedish-German "leave transit 
agreements" 35 and the "horseshoe traffic"38 arrangements, both 
of which were concluded in July of 1940. Norway forwarded 
numerous protests to the Swedes, and the Swedes, in reply, often 
indicated duress and the limitations of their neutrality policy.37 
While the Norwegians were undoubtedly distressed with the 
Swedish government's action in these and other matters, the 
government was also of the opinion that Sweden's continued 
neutrality was essential to Norwegian interests, and that the 
Allies must refrain from any action which might tend to compro­
mise Swedish neutrality. This view was prompted not only by a 
concern for the resistance movement in Norway but was also an 
expression of sensitivity (prior to German invasion of the Soviet 
Union) for Soviet views of a great power foothold in the 
North, a sensitivity often expressed by former Foreign Minister 
Koht38 and not unrecognized by Lie. 
In addition, fundamental disagreement emerged between 
Sweden and Norway regarding the symbolic issue of the nature 
of postwar relationships in the North. As mentioned previously, 
the Poles were concerned about the emerging Atlantic orientation 
of the Norwegian government in London, and they were vigor­
ously lobbying their plans for European regional pacts following 
the conclusion of hostilities. Many Swedes were favorably dis­
posed toward the plans of the Poles, which would have included 
a northern defense arrangement. As early as 1941 former Swed­
ish Foreign Minister Sandier published a booklet in which he 
advocated a northern confederation with common military, eco­
nomic, and foreign policies; and in 1943 Stockholm's Governor-
General Thorsten Nothin argued in support of a neutral postwar 
northern union. At the same time, Swedish Defense Minister 
Skold also spoke of the utility of a Northern defense arrange­
ment, but he too maintained that it would have to be one of 
armed neutrality. He asserted that those who wanted Sweden to 
join in with the great powers were only insuring that the North 
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would be involved in any future war.39 Thus future Nordic 
co-operation was a topic of lively discussion in Sweden as well as 
in London. Many projects were discussed, and one went so far as 
to propose a federation with the Swedish city of Drottningholm 
as the capital.40 
During 1942 these discussions in Sweden particularly irritated 
the Norwegians: the Allies were having great difficulties and the 
Norwegians were of the opinion that it was, at the least, tactless 
of the Swedes to sustain discussion of such a delicate issue.41 
Complicating matters was a statement by a member of the Brit­
ish government42 in June of 1942, expressing publicly the ad­
vantages of a Nordic alliance as an effective means of controlling 
the entrance to the Baltic. In short, these views, which conven­
iently corresponded to those advocated by the Poles, were 
sharply attacked by the Norwegian government in London.43 
The Norwegians continued to resist all ideas and commitments 
that would tie Norway closely either to the Continent or to her 
Northern neighbors in the postwar period. The Government in 
London continued to insist that Norway was an "Atlantic na­
tion," and it persisted in its so-called Atlantic policy. 
It is against this immediate background and the fundamental 
reorientation of Norwegian policy that had occurred since No­
vember, 1940, that the Foreign Office in the summer of 1942 
circulated a document entitled The Main Principles of Norwe­
gian Foreign Policy. 
This document, first of all, denounced neutrality as a sound 
basis for Norwegian foreign policy, and declared that only uni­
versal co-operation with other nations would insure peace in the 
postwar world. The document indicated that the creation of a 
new League was desirable and that Norwegian interests were 
best served by co-operation with the Atlantic powers. The docu­
ment did not reject outright intra-Scandinavian co-operation, but 
it limited it largely to the economic, social, and cultural fields, 
pointing out that economic co-operation among the Scandina­
vian countries had always been weak and their economies were 
competitive, not complementary.44 The document also affirmed 
earlier Norwegian rejection of any close association with the 
58 • Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes 
European continent, especially in the area of military security, 
pointing out once again that strategic considerations required 
Norway in the future to secure co-operation with the Atlantic 
powers in order to protect her long and vulnerable coast line. 
Finally, it stated the desirability of a regional Atlantic defense 
arrangement within the framework of a multifunctional world 
organization. 
Thus The Main Principles was a general recapitulation and 
reamrmation of the various policy statements that had been 
made by the government since Trygve Lie had assumed the top 
job in the Foreign Office. Its basic assumption was that the 
strategic position of Norway was fundamentally different (i.e., 
more vulnerable) from that of the other Nordic countries, and 
that Norway's economic problems could not be solved within a 
Scandinavian framework; on the contrary, in both cases, Nor­
way's future, taking into consideration both economic and strate­
gic factors, lay with sustained ties to the Atlantic countries.45 
The Main Principles was never made public, but it was ap­
proved by the government in London and later sent to the 
home-front leadership, whereupon it received comment by Hal­
vard Lange 46 and others. The home-front leadership also empha­
sized the need for a world-embracing organization, but it indi­
cated less enthusiasm for the regional plans. In general, the 
home front, having acquired a different perspective in the war, 
was somewhat more favorably disposed toward closer relations 
with Sweden after the war, and it was more skeptical of commit­
ments to the great powers.47 
In the summer of 1943, one year after the writing of The 
Main Principles the government sent out a note to all of its 
legations for the purpose of clarifying its policy toward Sweden. 
The note pointed out that while Norway wished good relations 
with Sweden after the war, it was not going to sever its close 
connections with the Allies. The note quoted Foreign Minister 
Lie's speech of January 1, 1943, in which he said, 
We believe in Nordic cooperation, but we are opposed to Nordic 
isolation. The Nordic countries' freedom is dependent on the United 
Nations victory and we will not in the future be able to exist as self­
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sufficient nations if we do not seek cooperation with other free 
people.48 
The note further pointed out that Norway would be compelled 
to co-operate with the Allies after the war, both with respect to 
the peace negotiations and with respect to its future security. 
"The Norwegian Government cannot after the war break with 
the United Nations and isolate itself in a neutral Nordic bloc." 
The note did not preclude future agreements between Norway 
and the other Nordic countries, but it pointed out that "such 
agreements must be concluded within the framework of coopera­
tion among the United Nations," in this context referring to the 
Allies. The government also felt that the other Nordic countries 
would join the organization that would be established at the 
conclusion of the hostilities, and it rejected, pointedly, any form 
of co-operation among the Nordic countries except that based on 
the continued sovereignty of each of the states. The note said, 
The Government is therefore not a party to thought about a union of 
states. And it is believed that proposals concerning the establishment 
of a new common Nordic constitutional organ will only interfere 
with Nordic cooperation in the future. 
The note added, 
We have the impression that those in responsible positions in Sweden 
are also gradually beginning to understand this.49 
Thus, the Norwegian government, without equivocation, ex­
pressed its position regarding its future political orientation. An 
institutionalized constitutional arrangement with the Nordic 
countries was rejected outright, while the government left the 
door open for the expansion of Nordic co-operation in the cul­
tural and social fields. Although the government refrained from 
making a commitment to a political entity following the war, it 
likewise refused to preclude Norwegian inclusion in future 
agreements with the great powers. 
Of relevance at this point is an article which appeared in the 
United States in the fall of 1943 written by Edvard Hambro, the 
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son of the previously mentioned influential C. J. Hambro.50 
Hambro gave expression to the new foreign policy conceptualiza­
tions that have been examined above; in addition, however, he 
wrote of the need for a new League following the war and of 
Norway's participation in it. He said the Norwegians, advocating 
universality, "do not mean that sub-groups within the larger 
framework cannot be both possible and desirable." Hambro 
added, 
Certain problems can in fact be settled well and effectively by groups 
of states, if these groups are the natural result of practical need and 
entirely loyal to the aims of the universal organization.51 
Thus, seeming to open the door to a Scandinavian arrangement, 
he quickly shut it, arguing that "the Scandinavian situation is 
not as simple as it was supposed to be before the war 
started." He pointed out that Norway was the only state that was 
actively participating in the cause of the Allies, since Iceland was 
essentially an occupied country, Finland was in the camp of the 
enemy, Denmark was not fighting the Germans, and Sweden 
was successfully remaining neutral, notwithstanding that "she 
has violated the classical laws of neutrality and given the Ger­
mans certain concessions in order to keep the peace." Further­
more, in looking to the future Hambro explicitly ruled out 
institutionalized co-operation among the Scandinavian countries 
as the answer to the problems that Norway would face: 
There has been a strong revival of Scandinavian sentiment . . in 
Sweden during the war. There are circles who talk about a "Nordic 
Defense League," and others who talk even more strongly of a 
"United States of the North"—very often with an open or hidden 
presumption of Swedish leadership. There are even Swedes who 
talk openly of leading Norwegian foreign policy. The answer to the 
speculations is, first of all, that the Norwegians like the Swedes, but 
do not wish to be united with them.52 
Hambro did not discount the utility of Scandinavian collabora­
tion, and he pointed out that the Norwegians continued to be 
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rather sentimental about the North. He quickly added, however, 
that 
the post-war world will have very little use for sentimentality; and 
the Norwegians will not forget that they have fought this war and 
fought it with the Allies. Norway belongs with them.53 
Collaboration on the cultural level with the other Nordic coun­
tries was to be expected, but Hambro wrote that political priori­
ties would be different than they had been prior to the war, 
politically the order of importance for Norway's role must be a 
(1) United Nations state, (2) Maritime state, (3) Atlantic state, 
(4) North sea state, and (5) Scandinavian state.54 
His use of the term "United Nations state" is probably with 
reference to a future international organization rather than to 
the Allies, for later he writes that if the United Nations "should 
not become a reality after the war" then Norway would have to 
look for "other solutions," of which he cited two: an Anglo-
Saxon bloc or a Scandinavian bloc. 
Thus Hambro expressed the dominant attitudes that provided 
the intellectual basis of current thinking in London regarding 
the main course for Norway to follow at the war's end. Norway 
would not turn her back on Scandinavia, but at the same time 
the government did not feel that a Scandinavian bloc could offer 
satisfactory solutions to the major political, economic, and secu­
rity problems that would face the country in the postwar 
period. 
Norwegian-Soviet relations.—Norwegian-Soviet relations,55 
unlike Swedish-Soviet relations, have generally been good. 
There has long existed in Norway an appreciation of Soviet 
interests in the North and in the area surrounding the Baltic. 
Former Foreign Minister Koht was always sensitive to the Soviet 
view in world politics, and his belief, often expressed, that the 
U.S.S.R. had a vital interest in preventing a great power foot­
hold in the North formed a major dimension of his thinking 
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about Norwegian foreign policy.58 The view expressed by the 
Norwegian Minister in Moscow during the period of the Winter 
War, when Sweden and Norway were aiding the Finns, indicates 
the sympathy of the Norwegians for Soviet interests. 
The Scandinavian countries erased the dividing line which pre­
viously existed between them and Finland, and brought upon them­
selves the ill-will and suspicion of the Soviet Union and in this way 
urged Finland to pursue a policy which is leading it to disaster. The 
results for the Scandinavian states themselves may be very serious.57 
In other words, Finland, as a border state of the Soviet Union, 
was susceptible to special influence and should be left to solve its 
own problems; the Scandinavians should respect Soviet views 
and should take no action that would put themselves in the same 
political orbit as Finland. 
The Norwegians continued to be cognizant of Soviet interests 
after arriving in London. Even before the Soviets entered the 
war as an Allied power, the Norwegians cautioned the Allies not 
to take any action against Sweden which might force her to 
choose sides, for regardless of what choice she made, it was 
bound to be undesirable from the Soviet viewpoint.58 The Soviet 
interest in Sweden's neutrality was not missed by the Norwe­
gians. 
Two concrete issues did develop during the course of the war, 
however. One involved alleged Soviet desires for port facilities in 
northern Norway, and the other was concerned with the Sval­
bard archipelago. Throughout the war, rumors, mentioned above 
in connection with Poland, abounded in London regarding So­
viet intentions in north Norway. The government recognized 
that they were undoubtedly inflated and politically motivated, 
but in any case, the Norwegian bargaining position was weak, 
especially since the government realized, as the war wore on, 
that it was likely that Russian troops would be involved in the 
liberation of Norway. Finally the Norwegian government at­
tempted, and succeeded in, coming to an explicit agreement with 
the Soviet government regarding its role in and after the libera­
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tion. This agreement, however, did not seem to reduce the fre­
quency of alleged Soviet intentions in north Norway. 
When Foreign Minister Lie visited Washington in 1943, the 
U.S. President informed him of Soviet desires for the use of 
Norwegian port and rail facilities, indicating that he was hopeful 
of reaching a compromise solution, which might, for example, 
involve making Narvik an internationally-administered port. 
Thus, for the first time there was official confirmation of Soviet 
interest in Norwegian port facilities. Lie was opposed to the 
suggestions made by the President and informed him that only 
the Norwegian people could make such a decision. The issue 
was never pressed further by the President, however, and the 
Soviet government failed to make its interests known directly to 
the Norwegians; thus the matter never reached crisis propor­
tions.59 
Later, in 1944, a question was raised directly by the Soviet 
government concerning Svalbard. The Russians desired a modi­
fication of the Treaty of 1920 that had placed Svalbard under 
Norwegian jurisdiction.60 The Soviet view was that the Soviet 
Union had not been in a position in 1920 to protect its interests 
in this vital area of the world, and consequently the Treaty 
ought to be modified.61 
The Norwegians, surprised by the raising of the issue, were in 
a very poor bargaining position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at this 
time: Norway was still occupied by German troops with the 
exception of those parts in the North which had already been 
liberated by the Russians. Furthermore, the Norwegians were 
very much dependent on the good will of all their allies, and 
especially the Soviets, in order to bring about the hasty liberation 
of the entire country. Thus, the Norwegians trod lightly: they 
recognized the legitimacy of Soviet strategic concern for the 
northern area, if not the legitimacy of Soviet claims; they did not 
want to precipitate a crisis with the Soviet Union. The govern­
ment responded by appointing a blue-ribbon committee62 to 
study the problem and, in effect, bought time. The matter was 
raised on several occasions in succeeding years, but the question 
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of revising the Treaty of 1920 was never pressed to any conclu­
sion by the Soviet Union (although there were times in the 
postwar period when Soviet intentions were dangerously hazy), 
and the Soviets eventually dropped the Svalbard matter. The 
Norwegian government thus succeeded in postponing indefi­
nitely a decision in a situation where its bargaining position was 
inherently weak and further complicated by the high priority it 
placed on continued good relations with the U.S.S.R. During 
the course of the discussion of the issue, until 1947 when it was 
finally dropped by the Soviets, it became clear that the primary 
Soviet concern was strategic, and reciprocal Norwegian concern 
for Soviet strategic interests was clearly revealed.63 
Norway and the United Nations Organization.—That Nor­
way was anticipating the postwar organization of the interna­
tional community became clear with Lie's first major address in 
December, 1940, and continued to be stated as the war years 
drew to a close. The Main Principles had referred to the need for 
a comprehensive international organization as had Hambro's arti­
cle in the fall of 1943. In the summer of 1944 King Haakon 
delivered a speech to the Foreign Press Association in London 
where he recounted the contributions the small powers had 
made to the defeat of Germany and where he repeated that 
international collaboration, and not neutrality, would be the only 
hope for national security in the postwar world. He again re­
vealed the new attitude of the Norwegians toward the role of the 
great powers in the postwar world: 
the small states must be consulted. We must participate in the 
actual making of decisions, and not be presented only with accom­
plished facts. We do not ask for the small states the right to veto de­
cisions or to paralyze the international organization. We are prepared 
to let the great powers play the leading role they have the right to 
play-
The King postulated a major role for an international organiza­
tion in future Norwegian foreign and security policy and re­
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vealed the degree to which distrust of the great powers no longer 
occupied a central position in Norwegian official thinking. 
The Foreign Minister re-emphasized these and other major 
points in a broadcast in January, 1944, to the Norwegian people 
reflecting the new concepts that now prevailed in the Foreign 
Office in London. He cited again the need for collaboration with 
the democratic states around the North Atlantic basin and the 
importance of continued good relations among the great 
powers. 
Norway's interests would best be served by an agreement embracing 
the lands around the North Atlantic, presupposing that this would be 
subordinate to an international organization, and accompanied by 
an extension of our good relations with the Soviet Union. The 
starting point must be the United Nations. Mutual trust and 
cooperation among the Big Four is the first prerequisite of lasting 
65 peace.
Thus, when the four sponsoring powers of the inchoate United 
Nations Organization met in San Francisco in April of 1945, the 
new principles and priorities in Norwegian foreign policy were 
revealed in bold relief in a concrete situation. 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which were presented as the 
working papers for the conference, contained provisions for a 
great power veto in the Security Council of the new organiza­
tion, the organ that was to be responsible for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The Norwegian government 
had already declared on several different occasions during the 
war that Norway's security could be founded only on a compre­
hensive world organization. And now, with the chips on the table, 
Norway was willing to give that organization the freedom of 
action necessary to maintain peace and meet the threats to the 
peace. This new policy comprehended a fundamentally revised 
view of the role of the great powers, a view succinctly revealed 
by the Foreign Minister: 
The great powers will have to shoulder the burden of providing the 
military and material means for maintaining the peace, and we are 
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prepared to grant them an international status corresponding to their 
responsibility.66 
Of course, the two important sections that gave the great powers 
the "international status corresponding to their responsibility" 
was the protection (to all) granted under the veto system, con­
tained in Chapter V of the Charter and the power granted to the 
Security Council to undertake appropriate preventive or enforce­
ment action in the name of the United Nations. The endorse­
ment of such a radical proposal by a Norwegian Foreign 
Minister six years previously would have been unthinkable. 
Commenting on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals the Norwegian 
Royal Commission stated, 
In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals we face a novel conception. They 
aim at creating an international institution of action instead of an 
organization that is primarily deliberative. They try to create inter­
national security through an international concentration of power 
. . [because freedom of action is restricted the Commission is faced 
with the question]: Is the security offered worth the sacrifice one is 
asked to make? Can a small state risk placing its destiny in the hands 
of the proposed Security Council? We are tempted to reply: It can­
not risk not to do so.67 
The Commission then opined that World War II proved that 
"under the technical conditions of our time no state is alone 
capable of defending itself against an aggressive power." The 
Commission also noted that the proposals had the support of the 
great powers and argued that this was significant because "ex­
perience has shown that no political organization can fulfill its 
tasks satisfactorily without including them among its 
members." 
The Norwegian Commission then turned to the question of 
security for Norway and suggested that only three alternatives 
existed. Norway could (1) follow an independent course in 
world affairs: go it alone; (2) work for a weaker form of interna­
tional organization, such as the League represented, and still 
retain freedom of action; or (3) support the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals and the kind of international organization and collabo­
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ration they represented. The Commission concluded its analysis 
with the opinion that only a strong international organization 
"can lead the small states to any hope of security." 68 
Thus, Norway was placing all of its "security eggs" in one 
basket, the United Nations. This was the policy Trygve Lie had 
been pursuing since the Foreign Office came under his leader­
ship, and Norwegian support for the veto specifically and the 
concept of the Security Council generally only underscored the 
successful culmination of that policy in a concrete situation. It 
represented a fundamental change not only in the image of the 
great powers, but also in the purpose of Norwegian foreign 
policy; for under the veto system in the United Nations, and 
with the power of the Security Council to maintain peace and 
security, a state whose fundamental concern was for freedom of 
action could not support the proposals nor would it desire great 
power unity. Freedom of action, which previously had been a 
hallmark of Norwegian foreign policy, would be possible under 
the UN system only if great power disunity prevailed. On the 
other hand, a state which looked to the new international organi­
zation as the basis of its security policy would desire amicable 
relations among the great powers, since the utility of the security 
system was contingent on the ability of the great powers to 
concert their actions.69 Thus, Norway's efforts to lubricate great 
power relationships and mitigate their differences revealed her 
interest in the UN as a security instrument. 
1. It is interesting to note that the German invasion of Denmark and 
Norway was the first combined air-sea-land operation in military history. 
2. The Germans simultaneously invaded Denmark and gained control of 
the country within a few hours. The Danes, their government, and their King 
accepted the German terms, and Danish resistance was not substantial until 
1943. Sweden was determined to remain neutral, and this determination was 
conveyed to Hitler in a message from King Gustav; Hitler, in reply, affirmed 
his determination to respect Swedish neutrality. Thus, the concerted policies 
of the Scandinavians were at their end: Sweden was neutral, Denmark had 
capitulated, and Norway was at war with Germany. (In fact, Norway held out 
against the Germans for 63 days, longer than any other nation on the western 
European mainland). See Rowland Kenney, The Northern Tangle (London: 
J. M. Dent, 1946), pp. 131, 156-77, 180-84. 
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role played by the King during the crisis see Maurice Michael, Haakon, King 
of Norway (New York: Macmillan, 1958), especially pp. 154-55. 
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"The Nordic Countries and the European Balance of Power," Cooperation 
and Conflict, I (1965), 46-50. For an account of the invasion, the reaction of 
the government, the establishment of the Quisling regime, and the under­
ground movement, see Kenney, op. cit., pp. 109-49; for an account of British 
intentions see Koht, op. cit., pp. 47-50. For a brief description of the domestic 
situation see Chr. A. R. Christiansen, Norway and World War Two (Wash­
ington: Norwegian Information Service, 1961), pp. 1-12. On British inten­
tions from their side see Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (The 
Gathering Storm, I [London: Cassel, 1948]), pp. 490-92. 
5. The circumstances surrounding the government's decision to depart the 
country on June 7, 1940, are discussed in C. J. Hambro, I Saw It Happen in 
Norway (New York: Appleton-Century, 1940), especially pp. 113-20. 
6. See Instilling fra unders0kelses Komtnisjonen av 1945 (Oslo: Asche­
houg, 1947), I, 114; and Hambro, op. cit., pp. 28-29. 
7. Reference here is to Article Eleven of the Norwegian Constitution. For 
a discussion of other constitutional problems involved in carrying on the war 
see Hambro, op. cit., pp. 13-14, 28-31, 182-94. 
8. Trygve Lie, Med England i lldlinjen (Oslo: Tiden, 1956), pp. 115. 
9. British, French, and Polish troops were landed in Norway, inadequately 
equipped and unfamiliar with the terrain, only to be withdrawn due to the 
deterioration of the Allied position on the Continent. See Hambro, op. cit., 
pp. 80-81; and Kenney, op. cit., pp. 122-27. 
10. The most important factor in the financial independence of the 
government was income accruing from its continued control over the merchant 
marine, which was immediately put at the disposal of the Allied war effort. Its 
strategic importance can be seen in that in excess of 30 per cent of British oil 
requirements were carried in Norwegian bottoms for the duration of the war. 
British MP Philip Noel-Baker said in April, 1942, that "Norwegian tankers 
are to the battle of the Atlantic what the Spitfires were to the Battle of 
Britain." For details see 0yvind Lorentzen, Norway, Norwegian Shipping, and 
the War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942) pp. 21-25; Kenney, op. 
cit., pp. 150-51, 233; for a very interesting account of the problems encoun­
tered in maintaining control over the fleet during the chaotic period following 
the invasion and the establishment of the Norwegian Shipping and Trade 
Mission ("Nortraship") in London see Koht, op. cit., pp. 177-82. 
11. Koht, however, largely for personal reasons, was not well-received by 
many members of the British government and there was a noticeable absence 
of contact between him and his peers in the host country. See Lie, op. cit., 
p. 99. 
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C H A P T E R I I I

The Search for Security: 
Bridgebuilding in the United Nations 
The strategic image at the beginning of the postwar period.—As 
the preceding has suggested, the German invasion demonstrated 
the inefficacy of neutrality, but this evaluation did not reflect 
itself in Norwegian foreign policy until the winter of 1940 when 
the leadership in the Foreign Office changed hands. The new 
leadership, however, came to power with a totally revised strate­
gic image providing the basis for fundamental policy changes. 
The strategic image that evolved during the course of the war 
was complex and comprehensive, and it seems that the most 
immediate cause for the total revision was the impact of the 
German invasion, even though that event had at the time little 
influence on the perceptions of the old leadership.1 
The new policy elite continued to perceive the structure of the 
international system in terms of great powers and small powers; 
however, the affective component which had supplemented this 
perception prior to World War II dissolved during the course of 
the war. No longer were the great powers to be condemned for 
their "political" orientation and charged with a lack of concern 
for, if not intention to undermine, the rights and dignities of the 
small powers. 
Related is the alteration of the process image. No longer a 
'cabal," the international system was now perceived as a "com­
munity of nations" where the great powers would necessarily 
play a decisive and dynamic role. The small states were a part of 
this international "community" and would have to refrain from 
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obstructing the international political process and give to the 
great powers a status corresponding to their encompassing re­
sponsibilities. Thus power and responsibility were now perceived 
as linked, if not synonymous. 
The process of international politics was now viewed as one 
greatly influenced by the great powers in consultation with the 
small, and the international system was perceived as an inchoate 
community from which isolation was impossible, requiring, on 
the contrary, involvement and responsibility by all, both for 
national security and economic stability and progress. The most 
significant axiom deriving from this new image was the assertion 
that the dilemma of national security could not be solved on a 
national basis. Relative to this perception was a partial rejection 
of the traditional liberal tenets that postulated the attainment of 
peace from the discussion and understanding achieved through 
international institutions such as arbitration and conciliation 
commissions. While the Norwegians continued to value proc­
esses of peaceful settlement, conflict prevention and resolution 
tended to be viewed in more Machiavellian terms: "the peace 
must be maintained with power." 2 
The action component of the strategic image was also modi­
fied. History now "proved" the bankruptcy of neutrality. Al­
though Norway had been able to avoid war for more than a 
century and a quarter, it was now asserted that the successes of 
the past were perhaps fortuitous, and consequently the lessons of 
the distant past were refuted by the lessons of the immediate 
past. Directly linked was the revised judgment of Norway's 
geographic location. Norwegian policy-makers were sensitive to 
what they called the changing "technique" of warfare, referring 
primarily to the advent of strategic air power. Also they were 
cognizant, perhaps earlier than most, of the emergence of two 
new power centers, for they often spoke of the postwar political 
world in terms of "Britain and America on the one side and 
Soviet Russia on the other." Further, perhaps resulting from 
their experience with the problems connected with Svalbard late 
in the war, the Norwegians indicated an awareness of the signifi­
cance for them of the emerging political pattern when coupled 
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with the new "technique" and the resulting polar strategy.3 In 
short, the Norwegians perceived their geographic location no 
longer as "peripheral" but rather as potentially exposed or "stra­
tegic, which, in the event of war, would provide little opportu­
nity for a posture of non-involvement or the status of a non­
belligerent. Thus a small state could no longer hope to insure 
unilaterally its own security nor long endure a general war. 
The foregoing basic revisions of the Norwegian strategic 
image corresponded to a fundamental reorientation of expecta­
tions about the nature of the postwar world as far as Norway was 
concerned: in the future, peace would be indivisible, and secu­
rity for any nation would be dependent on the ability and 
determination of all nations to co-operate in promoting new 
forms of international organization having the ability to prevent 
violence and to control and localize armed conflict should it 
nevertheless occur. 
Thus is encountered a response flowing from the structure of 
the strategic image. Even though the traditional great power-
small power stereotype had been displaced, the Norwegians 
indicated that the small states, limited as they were in their ability 
to mold the course of events in international politics, still retained 
influence which could be exploited. It was this final judgment 
coupled with the other components of the strategic image that 
formed the basis of the immediate postwar foreign policy of 
Norway. 
In this regard, it should be noted that ideological preferences 
became more salient in Norwegian policy enunciations during 
the first years of the war (as compared with the immediate 
prewar years). Norwegian leaders spoke of "free nations'' and 
the "Atlantic democracies. Although many of the pronounce­
ments can be attributed to the special circumstances created by 
the war, the Foreign Minister in several of his early statements 
indicated that he was referring to the influence ideological fac­
tors would inevitably have on postwar Norwegian policy. How­
ever, ideological references became less frequent as the war 
continued. The German attack on the U.S.S.R. and the latter's 
emergent status as one of the Allies undoubtedly was influential 
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and was reflected in a policy statement by the Foreign Minister 
in the fall of 1941. Most influential, however, was the evolution 
of the United Nations Organization, for after it became clear 
that a comprehensive world organization with security functions 
would be created, Norwegian policy enunciations tended to be­
come more focused and specific, concentrating on concrete prob­
lems rather than on symbolic issues. It will be recalled that early 
in the war the Norwegians emphasized, with reference to the 
postwar world, (1) the need for a universal international organi­
zation, (2) the desirability of regional organization, and (3) the 
ideological (and economic) attraction of the Atlantic basin coun­
tries on Norway. However, as the postwar world drew nearer 
and as the international organization began to take concrete 
form, the Norwegians spoke less of regional arrangements and 
hardly ever in ideological terms. In other words, the establish­
ment of an international security organization and its success 
became the most important single objective of Norwegian policy 
during the war's final years, and in this concern few expressions 
giving priority to ideological factors can be discerned. Thus by 
the end of the war, ideological factors were not noticeable in the 
articulations of Norwegian foreign policy. 
With regard to the early assertion of the need for regional 
arrangements, two developments in Norwegian thinking during 
the war should be noted. First, the rejection by the Norwegian 
policy elite in London of a Norwegian tie to an isolated Scandi­
navian political or economic arrangement following the war con­
tinued to be affirmed throughout the course of the war, as did 
the unconditional rejection of Norwegian ties to a Central Euro­
pean bloc. In the first case the Norwegians perceived the Scandi­
navian area as too small to provide solutions to either economic 
or security problems, and an isolated European bloc was rejected 
outright as irrational and unthinkable. Second, and related, the 
Norwegians early in the war talked often of a postwar political 
and economic arrangement among the nations around the Atlan­
tic basin, their so-called Atlantic policy. However, in the later 
war years statements referring to an Atlantic arrangement were 
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less frequent, and when the Atlantic region was considered, it 
was always within the framework of, and supplementary to, the 
embryonic United Nations Organization.4 
Thus, two generalizations derive from the above 
observations: one, the Norwegian strategic image (especially 
the image of process and geography) was redefined in a funda­
mental way and second, Norwegian policy statements, derived 
from the strategic image and oriented toward, and based on, 
predictions about the nature of the postwar world, revealed the 
high, indeed almost exclusive, priority attached to the establish­
ment of an international security organization. In this respect, it 
should be noted that the Norwegian government made many 
symbolic and concrete commitments to the embryonic United 
Nations Organization even before the war was concluded, and 
this continuing commitment in the postwar world is what has 
been called the Norwegian policy of "bridgebuilding." 
The policy of bridgehuilding.—The Norwegians suffered 
very heavy losses in World War II. More than one-half of their 
prewar shipping tonnage had been destroyed, the entire north­
ern third of the country lay in waste as a result of the 
scorched-earth policies of the Germans, and the economy was 
severely undermined and weakened as a result of the economic 
policies of the occupation authorities.5 
Thus in the first months following the liberation, the govern­
ment was almost totally occupied with innovating and imple­
menting a reconstruction and stabilization program.6 These 
points are mentioned because most analysts of postwar Norwe­
gian foreign policy have inferred from this preoccupation with 
domestic problems a "return to neutrality' (sometimes hedged 
with the use of the enigmatic term "quasi-neutrality") by the 
Norwegian foreign policy elite.7 As the foregoing analysis would 
suggest, such a characterization of Norwegian foreign policy 
would border on gross distortion, confusing, perhaps, inactivity 
with calculated non-involvement. As will be demonstrated 
below, Norwegian foreign policy continued in the early postwar 
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years as the policy elite indicated it would in the latter war years, 
and this policy can hardly be classed as neutrality, regardless of 
the qualifying adjective. 
In the fall following the liberation 8 the Norwegians held a 
general election in which the Labor party secured an absolute 
majority in the Storting for the first time,9 and in which the 
Communists won eleven seats, reflecting in part the important 
role they played in the home front, but reflecting also the great 
store of good will which existed toward the Soviet Union as a 
result of its major role in the liberation of north Norway.10 The 
feeling toward the Communists in general and the U.S.S.R. in 
particular is relevant to postwar Norwegian foreign policy, for it 
demonstrates the absence in Norway, unlike in many other 
countries, of a deep-rooted fear of a Communist coup, nor was 
there evidence in Norway of the Russophobia which existed in 
many other Western nations.11 
It should also be emphasized in this regard that Russian for­
eign policy during the first months of the postwar period was 
viewed by Norway largely in the framework of the Soviet search 
for security. While the Norwegians were aware of the Soviet 
desire for an outlet to the sea, they did not perceive a threat to 
themselves from the Soviet side,12 and this sanguine view of 
Soviet intentions was reinforced in the spring of 1947 when the 
Soviets dropped the Svalbard issue almost as unexpectedly as 
they raised it in 1944. 
To return to the major point, however, in the immediate 
postwar period the Norwegians, far from returning to a policy of 
neutrality, pursued without reservation a policy that was clearly 
predicated on, and consistent with, the evaluations and percep­
tions that emerged during the war. As the tensions and differ­
ences of view between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. became mani­
fest, the Norwegians exerted every effort to mediate and mitigate 
these differences and antagonisms. Trygve Lie had stated as 
early as 1941 that in the Norwegian view the only basis for 
security in the postwar world would be that founded on a com­
prehensive international organization and on the basis of co­
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operation among the great powers. Once the UN had become a 
reality the Norwegians resisted all attempts toward bloc-building 
inside the organization, especially the early attempts to set the 
small powers against the great powers and, later, the tendency of 
the great powers to separate. In a speech to the First General 
Assembly, Lie stated clearly that the basis of Norwegian foreign 
policy had not changed. He said, reflecting on the experience in 
the interwar period, that Norway had long believed that the only 
hope for peace was a world organization; therefore, Norway 
supported all efforts toward international collaboration, but 
At the same time it was based on an earnest desire to keep out of any 
conflict and on the assumption that a declaration of neutrality con­
stituted a guarantee of being kept out of the war.13 
Lie went on to say that 
The German invasions dispelled the idea that one can keep out of 
war by staying neutral . [Thus] Norway has hoped for and ad­
vocated the formation of an organization such as the United Nations. 
He then stated the basis of, and reasons for, contemporary Nor­
wegian foreign policy: 
Not only will our participation in [the UN's] work be the basis of 
our foreign policy the time has passed when the initiative rested 
with the small states alone. The Norwegian delegation now 
shares the opinion that peace is one and indivisible. Unless we 
realize this fact, no useful results can be hoped for. That is why those 
who really wish to further the cause of world peace . . should not 
try to divide the world into separate blocs. 
With reference to the great powers, the Foreign Minister said 
that they had greater responsibilities than the other members, 
and that 
without confident and sincere cooperation between all the great pow­
ers, our work would utterly fail and world peace would be a fiction 
. if this first and essential condition of peace and security did not 
exist. 
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This, Lie concluded, was the reason the Norwegian government 
did not object to the formal and constitutional influence given to 
the great powers, a status which reflected political reality and 
corresponded to their greater responsibilities. He then went on to 
explain the meaning of "bridgebuilding." 
The smaller nations have a great part to play in cementing the peace. 
They are disinterested in many political disputes; their ambitions are 
cultural and economic. And so, in the opinion of the Norwegian dele­
gation, their foreign policy should aim at making a sincere contribu­
tion to the mutual understanding and confidence of the great powers. 
This, then, was the essence and rationale of the early postwar 
policy of "bridgebuilding." The Norwegians realized that great 
power agreement was a sine qua non for an effective United 
Nations; therefore, political responsibility required them to make 
all attempts to work for great power consensus in order to insure 
great power unanimity. Likewise, they opposed all actions that 
did not hold the promise of practical results and that might lead 
to the formation of great power blocs within the Organization or 
that might result in great power enmity. This policy within the 
UN was required because the security policy of Norway was 
based on the effectiveness and success of that Organization. 
When Trygve Lie was elected the first Secretary General of 
the United Nations,14 most observers interpreted the outcome as 
a vote of confidence in the national policy he had authored and 
successfully implemented, for the Norwegian government had 
been able to gain the trust of the Soviet Union without simulta­
neously forfeiting the confidence of the United States and the 
other Western powers. His successor in the Foreign Office, Hal­
vard Lange,15 reaffirmed the political goals of his predecessor.18 
Thus the basis of Norwegian security policy rested in the United 
Nations, and Norway continued to exert all efforts toward creat­
ing political unity among the great powers, a unity without 
which the UN could not function as an effective politico-
security instrument. Therefore, great power co-operation was the 
highest priority in Norwegian foreign policy and the essential 
prerequisite of Norwegian security policy. 
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Before proceeding further with the foreign policy of Norway, 
it should be noted that Scandinavian co-operation, which had 
been largely destroyed during the war years, began anew follow­
ing the conclusion of hostilities. Denmark and Norway spon­
sored Swedish membership in the United Nations and, follow­
ing Swedish acceptance, consultations occurred regularly among 
the Scandinavian governments prior to General Assembly ses­
sions, and continuous consultations took place among the delega­
tions at the meetings.17 The Scandinavian voting bloc at the 
United Nations from the beginning has been one of the most 
cohesive, and it is not unusual for one of the members of the bloc 
to act as spokesman for all. 
Following the war proposals continued to be forwarded re­
garding the establishment of a Scandinavian customs union and 
favoring a Nordic defense arrangement. The Norwegian govern­
ment did not respond directly to those suggestions for a defense 
arrangement1S because its foreign policy, based as it was on the 
United Nations, not only did not require regional defense ar­
rangements, but always opposed explicitly the establishment of 
regional defense alliances.19 In an interview in January, 1946, 
the Foreign Minister (Lie) said that Norway did not favor a 
Scandinavian defense bloc, although everyone hoped for contin­
ued Scandinavian co-operation. Security today, he said, de­
pended exclusively upon harmonious relations among the great 
powers.20 However the government did publicly and officially 
oppose suggestions for the establishment of a Scandinavian cus­
toms union, arguing, as it did during the war, that the small 
market area and the non-complementary nature of the Scandina­
vian countries' economies, made a customs union economically 
irrational.21 
Nevertheless, Scandinavian collaboration in foreign policy 
must be recognized as important. The Swedes continued to 
assert their policy of neutrality, or, as they more frequently 
referred to it, their policy of "non-alliance." The Norwegians 
and the Danes were pursuing essentially the same policy, and in 
both countries it was referred to as "bridgebuilding." 22 The 
three countries, however, were pursuing the same policy in prac­
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tice even if the intellectual foundations were different, for if the 
Swedes were opposed to blocbuilding because of their neutrality 
or non-alliance policy, the Norwegians and the Danes were 
likewise opposed to politico-military blocs in order to strengthen 
the foundations of the United Nations. Nevertheless the co­
operation that did exist was not institutionalized nor did it in­
volve any future commitments on the part of any. It was rather a 
co-operation based on political expediency and on the sense of 
community that existed among the Scandinavian states and, 
later, their common Social Democratic (Labor) governments.23 
A turning point in the early postwar period came in June, 
1947, with General Marshall's speech at Harvard offering Amer­
ican assistance to the European reconstruction effort. Norway, 
along with the other Scandinavian countries, accepted the invita­
tion to attend the meeting of the Committee on European Eco­
nomic Assistance in Paris in July of 1947, although their partici­
pation was cautious, as is indicated by the fact that they sent 
ambassadorial level representatives to the first preparatory meet­
ings (unlike the other participating countries, which sent their 
foreign ministers). Although the three later became members of 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and were 
recipients of Marshall aid,24 it is clear that they were concerned, 
at least in the beginning, that through economic co-operation 
they might compromise the prerequisites of their respective for­
eign policies.25 
Other events of significance were also occurring in the inter­
national milieu. Churchill, early in 1946, delivered his famous 
"Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri.28 One year later the 
U.S. President announced the Truman Doctrine,27 and through­
out this period it was obvious to most observers that serious 
differences existed among the great powers as witnessed by their 
failure to achieve results at the peace conferences, the denuncia­
tion of the Marshall Plan by the Soviet Union accompanied by 
the refusal of the Soviet bloc countries to participate, and the 
establishment of the Cominform.28 
These and many other "objective" environmental events 
would seem to indicate that all was not well among the great 
Bridgehuilding in the United Nations • 85 
powers. Both the British and the Americans and the U.S.S.R. 
had by late 1947 recognized the formation of politico-security 
blocs, and even the Swedes had made similar public observa­
tions. The new Norwegian Foreign Minister, however, refused 
to recognize the 'reality" that was affirmed by most journalists 
and politicians around the world, and he continued to perceive 
international political conditions in a manner that would permit 
the United Nations to function as a security organization. 
On January 20, 1948, in a general debate occasioned by the 
Foreign Minister's report to the Storting in December, 1947, For­
eign Minister Lange restated clearly the Norwegian perception 
of international events, an evaluation that had prevailed since 
the end of the war. Although some members of the Storting 
were concerned about the state of affairs in international politics, 
Lange said that, viewed in a historical perspective, the tension 
that was felt by all and reported daily in the newspapers was 
"more a post-war tension than a prelude to a new order." 29 Thus 
there was no need for change in the main lines of Norwegian 
foreign policy and the greatest contribution that Norway could 
make toward a stable international situation would be continued 
progress with the program for reconstruction, or, as he said, 
"putting our own house in order.'' 
Although the Foreign Minister recognized that the times were 
difficult, he said that there was no question of Norway's choosing 
sides because such a question "assumes that one believes that a 
warlike settlement is not to be avoided, and that cannot and must 
not be the basis for Norwegian foreign policy.30 
Two weeks following Lange's statements to the Storting, the 
Defense Minister,31 in a policy statement to the Storting on the 
state of Norway's defenses and related budget problems, quoted 
Lange's admonition that the Norwegian contribution to interna­
tional stability would best be served by putting its own house in 
order32 and in general reaffirmed the broad evaluation of the 
international situation as made by the Foreign Minister, viz., 
that Norway was not threatened and that the bases and assump­
tions of Norwegian defense planning remained valid.33 
These two speeches are all the more significant when it is 
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recalled that two days after Lange's evaluation and prior to the 
Defense Minister's, Foreign Minister Bevin made his now fa­
mous speech in the House of Commons evaluating the contem­
porary international situation and proposing the unification of 
Western Europe. He said that the trend of events in Europe was 
now clear beyond doubt and that the Western nations were 
faced with a fait accompli in Eastern Europe and therefore "the 
free nations of Western Europe must draw closely together 
(and) we are thinking now of Western Europe as a unit." M 
The asymmetry between the Norwegian and British percep­
tion of the present and predictions about the future are here seen 
in bold relief, but, in view of what has been said above about 
Norway's foreign policy, it is obvious that an interpretation by 
the Norwegian government of the many environmental events as 
anything other than "temporary tensions" would have under­
mined the entire basis of its foreign and security policy and 
would have required a complete re-examination and modification 
of the three-year defense plan.35 
It should be noted here that the Bevin speech made quite an 
impact in Scandinavia, and especially in Sweden. Many at first 
linked the Bevin proposals to the Marshall Plan. This interpreta­
tion was made by some in Scandinavia and by the Russians. The 
Russians held that the Bevin speech was an affront to the Soviet 
Union, and they stated in Pravda on January 25, 1948, that the 
Americans were behind the ideas presented by Bevin since 
American strategic plans, as proposed by Defense Minister 
Forrestal, envisioned a well-organized Western Europe to pro­
vide military bases for the U.S.36 The Russians further charged 
that the Bevin Plan intended to draw in the Scandinavian coun­
tries through the instrument of the Marshall Plan.37 Although 
Bevin did not name any of the Scandinavian countries in his 
talk, it was suggested in Norway, and it had been reported 
unofficially in London, that the Nordic countries could have a 
place in the inchoate arrangements if they wanted it.38 Some of 
the bourgeoise papers in Norway began to suggest that the 
Scandinavian countries were now required to take a hard look at 
their foreign policies and perhaps revise them; some, in fact, 
indicated that the time had come to choose sides.89 
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Although the first official reaction from Scandinavia came 
from Denmark,40 the most important reaction was that of the 
Swedish Foreign Minister because of the response it elicited 
from Foreign Minister Lange. Swedish Foreign Minister Unden 
stated in a foreign affairs debate in the Riksdag on February 4, 
1948, that Sweden did not wish to join any bloc.41 If the United 
Nations fails, Unden said that Sweden must have the option of 
choosing the way of neutrality.42 
Unden later denied that his speech was in any way directed 
toward Bevin's proposals; nevertheless his remarks were widely 
interpreted as Sweden's (and probably Scandinavia's) answer to 
Bevin. It is within this context that Lange's speech to the Stort­
ing on February 12, 1948, is significant. There the Foreign 
Minister affirmed that Norway had not been invited to take part 
in the European arrangement envisioned by Bevin, but he also 
went to great lengths to convince the Storting (and probably his 
other publics, both domestic and foreign) that Unden had not 
necessarily spoken for Norway. Lange said, with reference to 
Unden's speech in the Riksdag and to the interpretation that it 
had been given in the American and British press, that "Nordic 
cooperation is not of the variety that one speaks for all." ^ 
He said that on many questions the Scandinavian countries were 
able to take the same position, and he admitted that there was 
much in their histories that was common. But he warned that at 
the present time important "nuances' existed in their respective 
policies and that the countries' historical experiences had been 
different, "not the least in the latest years." In the same speech 
the Foreign Minister duly chastised the press for irresponsibly 
creating apprehension and fear that tended to create tensions, 
making more difficult wise judgments concerning the "genuine" 
risks in the present situation. 
Thus, while Lange did not by any means endorse the Bevin 
Plan, he clearly indicated that he did not want to foreclose in 
advance any particular future course of action, and he stated 
without equivocation that Sweden did not speak for Norway. 
Lange concluded his views with a statement about the United 
Nations. He recognized that the UN, as a result of the tensions 
that existed among the great powers, had "little ability to solve its 
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central political problems.1' He added however that Norway 
must work from the assumption that the UN would succeed in 
overcoming its contradictions, making co-operation possible.44 In 
the meantime Norway must seriously consider and re-examine 
its position, but such deliberations take time and require respon­
sibility. Lange thus affirmed that Norwegian foreign policy, 
based on the UN, had not changed, although he gave no indica­
tion that it would not and agreed with those who suggested that 
it required serious reconsideration. So, even though Norwegian 
policy was clearly based on calculated judgments (however dog­
matically adhered to) about the nature of the political circum­
stances in which Norway found herself, the Foreign Minister, 
while placating his critics, was not going to be forced into aban­
doning his chosen policy by admitting the political demise of the 
UN or by recognizing a grave threat to Norwegian security that 
would seem to call for arrangements more concrete and depend­
able than those provided by the United Nations. 
It is interesting to note here parenthetically that both of these 
judgments were central to Norwegian foreign policy. For (1) if 
the UN were perceived as irrevocably paralyzed or (2) if the 
policy elite perceived a direct threat to the country, a new secu­
rity policy would be required since Norway's defenses, as the 
Defense Minister had earlier admitted openly, were inade­
quate.45 In passing, it is also interesting to note that such judg­
ments were not central to Swedish foreign policy planners since 
the Swedes' policy of armed neutrality did not require (although 
it did not preclude) a strong and effective United Nations play­
ing a central role in Swedish security policy. The effectiveness of 
the UN was central to Norwegian security policy however, and 
now even the Foreign Minister had publicly recognized its weak­
nesses; nevertheless, he maintained that Norway would continue 
to work for great power co-operation, i.e., continue the bridge-
building policy. On the other hand, with this public recognition 
of the situation in the UN, it is clear that a perception of a threat 
to Norway would completely undermine the basis of Norwegian 
policy. 
It is against this background that certain events in the interna­
tional milieu must be seen. On February 23, 1948, the Commu­
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nist party in Czechoslovakia gained control of the government 
through a coup d'etat. This event had a great impact in Norway 
for several reasons: CO Czechoslovakia, like Norway and Den­
mark, was an exponent of the bridgebuilding policy, (2) Jan 
Masaryk had only recently visited Norway, where he made a 
profound impression and was admired and respected throughout 
the country, and (3) a deep-rooted cultural relationship existed 
between the two countries, dating back to the nineteenth cen­
tury when the Norwegians struggling for independence identi­
fied closely with the Czechoslovakian independence movement.46 
In addition, late in February the Soviet Union initiated talks 
with Finland that led to the signing in early April of the Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,47 and in the 
middle of March48 the pact creating the Western Union was 
initialed in Brussels, and on March 31 the Soviets imposed strict 
controls on the movement of traffic to and from Berlin after 
having withdrawn from all Allied administrative committees in 
the city. Finally, on the domestic front Norway found itself in 
the midst of a crisis, stimulated in part by the events in Finland 
and to some extent press-inspired, involving alleged rumors 
about Soviet intentions to request a non-aggression pact with 
Norway (the so-called Easter Crisis of 1948).49 In the meantime 
the government and the Storting had reacted to events by provid­
ing in March an extraordinary defense appropriation 60 and by 
appointing in April a "Special Committee for Foreign Policy and 
Defense Preparedness' that excluded the Communist Parlia­
mentarians and for all practical purposes assumed the consulta­
tive and decision-making functions of the regular Foreign Affairs 
Committee.81 
It is in this politically charged atmosphere that the Foreign 
Minister addressed the Oslo Military Society on April 19, 1948, 
providing an extensive evaluation of the international situation. 
In his speech to the Military Society Lange engaged in a very 
subtle and complex argumentation, which involved Norway's 
view toward the United Nations, an evaluation of the events in 
Czechoslovakia and Finland, and an indication of future inten­
tions. 
Because of the acknowledged weakness of the UN in his 
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previous major address, most important in the immediate context 
was the view expressed of events in Czechoslovakia and Finland. 
With regard to the former, the Foreign Minister said that the 
coup had not altered the situation in Europe from the strategic 
point of view, but rather its significance lay in its political and 
psychological impact. He said that it showed that the Czech 
Communists, in accordance with the constituent meeting of the 
Cominform, "had abandoned the idea that it should be possible 
to build a bridge between East and West, between Communism 
and Democracy," 52 and that the European Communist parties 
supported the coup demonstrated that they were not committed 
to democracy. 
Next, he turned to the events in Finland, imparting a defensive 
motive for Soviet action, saying that the note "showed that the 
Soviet government was re-examining the question of securing 
itself militarily on its northern flank." 53 Lange said that because 
of these developments Norway had felt certain pressures, and he 
recognized that "rumors about Norway" abounded. He said that 
he did not think that Norway would be requested to sign a 
military agreement with the U.S.S.R., notwithstanding the 
sharp attack on the country in Izvestia on Easter evening.54 
Nevertheless he felt constrained to add that he "was certain that 
the Norwegian people are in agreement with the government 
that Norway cannot enter into a special military agreement with 
the Soviet Union." Thus he made clear Norway's position vis­
a-vis the Soviet Union, and it is in this total effort to explain the 
Norwegian attitude and perhaps to pre-empt the Soviets diplo­
matically that he said, "There can be no doubt that we are a part 
of Western Europe, economically, geographically, and culturally, 
and we shall continue to be a Western European democracy." 55 
That Lange saw a potential threat to Norway is suggested by the 
above and unquestionably implied by the following. 
In the course of examining the Soviet-Finnish discussions and 
the "new risks" for Norway, the Foreign Minister said that he 
did not think that a general war was probable in the near future. 
However, real dangers did now exist for Norway, for it was 
always possible that a war might break out because of mutual 
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fear or because one of the great powers might incorrectly evalu­
ate the limits of provocation.56 And in this regard an especially 
large danger existed in the possibility that a great power might 
"occupy a strategically important area which is undefended." In 
view of this fact, he said, Norway had recently increased its 
defense appropriation.57 Again revealing the nature of his strate­
gic thinking, Lange refused to condemn the Western Union as 
aggressive. Rather, he said, 
such a consolidation can become a step in the direction of stabilizing 
relationships, a contribution to the shaping of a new equilibrium and 
basis for an independent contribution which can be able to counter­
act the severe tensions between the two leading great powers.58 
Regarding the main lines of Norwegian foreign policy, the 
Foreign Minister said that Norway must continue to work for 
peaceful relations among states with different social systems and 
different ideological views.'' Lange said that the UN continued 
to be the basis of Norwegian foreign policy, 
and the main line of our foreign policy must continue to be our con­
tribution in the United Nations and through its organs for peace, 
security, and international cooperation. We must continue to hope 
and work for a UN which shall be able to become an effective secu­
rity organization. 
But that the United Nations was not at this time an effective 
security organization was also clear: 
we must not shut our eyes to the fact that the UN today does not 
provide the member states with complete security. 
Thus the Norwegian Foreign Minister's position was clarified. 
What began as an examination of the international situation 
concluded with a weak affirmation of Norway's bridgebuilding 
policy. Norway would continue to work for a strong United 
Nations, but dangers were now perceived to exist for Norway in 
view of her inadequate military capability and her strategic loca­
tion. Although Lange did not mention the Soviet Union directly 
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in connection with the threat to Norway, there is little room to 
doubt that he was thinking of the Soviets when he spoke of the 
danger created by inadequately defended strategic areas. He 
rejected, directly and explicitly and indirectly by implication, 
Norway's involvement in a security agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Such a position was consistent with, and could be pre­
dicted from, the policy of bridgebuilding, but earlier in his 
speech Lange declared, referring to the Bevin Plan, that "we will 
not preclude for ourselves the possibility of discussing a closer 
relationship with the West, both culturally and politically." 59 
Thus while Lange rejected any such relationship with the So­
viets, he left open the development of Norway's relationship 
with the West. In this regard, the Foreign Minister seriously 
compromised, at least verbally, the policy of bridgebuilding. At 
this point the remarks of the Foreign Minister about Scandinavia 
should be noted, for in a subtle way he indicated that Norway 
might not, unlike in past periods of tension and crisis, confine 
itself to Scandinavia. He said it was imperative "to search for a 
policy on which the three Northern countries can stand to­
gether," adding that 
It shall take very weighty reasons before we shall choose a policy 
which can separate us from Denmark and Sweden or from one of 
them.60 
That separation was a possibility, however, was clear, for the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister warned that the "politico-military 
problems of each of the three Scandinavian countries were not 
identical, and this fact can cause certain difficulties in the effort 
to find a common solution." 
Thus, it appears that "bridgebuilding" remained in name 
only. Norway was watching closely international events and 
configurations. She had unambiguously articulated her posture 
and attitude toward the Soviet Union, and although she would 
not foreclose a future relationship with the newly-formed West­
ern Union, she first hoped to find a common Scandinavian 
solution to her problem. 
Norway was now committed to a search for new alternatives 
Bridgebuilding in the United Nations • 93 
in her foreign policy. The United Nations had always been 
perceived as weak, but this perception would not affect policy 
unless Norway were subjected to threats or danger. Lange in this 
speech defined, for the first time, the danger: a weak country 
occupying a strategically important area and thereby inviting a 
pre-emptive move by one or another of the major powers.61 The 
foreign policy elite had viewed Norway as a strategically located 
country since the early war years and had on many occasions 
since 1946 publicly observed Norway's inability to defend her­
self without outside aid. Rising tensions thus increased the 
emphasis placed on the strategic importance of Norway's 
geographic position, and although Norway did not want to 
exacerbate relations among the great powers, her priorities had 
changed, for now the Foreign Minister said, 
We want under all circumstances to defend ourselves against 
attack, and we have the problem in our foreign policy to provide for 
obtaining for ourselves the greatest possible security against the dan­
ger of aggression.62 
The United Nations was supposed to provide this security, and 
the policy of bridgebuilding was aimed at making the United 
Nations function as it was intended. Bridgebuilding had failed, 
from the beginning, but in the absence of specific threat Norway 
could continue to base her security on the United Nations Or­
ganization and bend all efforts toward making great power co­
operation a reality, refraining from any action that might exacer­
bate great power relations. Now, however, she could not afford 
such restraint. Norway would continue to work for a strong and 
effective United Nations and great power co-operation, but in 
her search for security she would not automatically and necessar­
ily refrain from actions that might increase tensions or that 
might be viewed unfavorably by one of the great power blocs. 
Also, Lange now revealed that he did not view blocs as necessar­
ily destabilizing, and his conception of "political and military 
vacuums'' indicated a concern for pre-emption and a concomitant 
primitive deterrent concept in his strategic thinking. A weak 
UN could be tolerated in the absence of a threat to Norwegian 
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security. In the Military Society speech the Foreign Minister 
denned the threat for the first time. The threat defined did not 
specify a particular country but rather was stated in terms of a 
situation arising out of Norway's particular geographic location 
coupled with prevailing international conditions. A weak UN 
and a threat situation together were intolerable. 
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The Search for Security: 
Scandinavia and the Atlantic 
The security problem in 'perspective.—As the preceding discus­
sion has suggested, by the spring of 1948 Norwegian leaders 
perceived their nation as threatened and perceived the United 
Nations as unable to provide the member states with a satisfac­
tory measure of security. Two points should be recalled. One, 
Norway had from the beginning looked to the UN as the basis 
of her security policy: the so-called policy of bridgebuilding was 
nothing more than an attempt to make the UN function as a 
security organization.1 That the Norwegians became almost to­
tally absorbed with their domestic problems, added to the imper­
atives of the bridgebuilding policy, tended to obscure the funda­
mental fact that they were determined to insure against 'another 
1940." In fact, the Norwegians prosecuted an active security 
policy that looked to the UN as the primary instrument. Second, 
the threat that was perceived by the Norwegian policy elite was 
expressed in terms of a "threat situation" (i.e., the danger to 
Norway resulting from her strategic location, her inability to 
defend herself, and the tensions that prevailed in international 
politics) rather than in terms of a "threat from" a specified 
country. In the development of the Norwegian strategic image 
during the spring of 1948 it is clear that the crucial variable was 
the presence or absence of a threat to Norwegian security;2 once 
such a threat was perceived, as it was by the Foreign Minister in 
his April address, the corner was turned. Now, if Norway were 
primarily concerned with national security, that is, if physical 
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security over the short run were her highest priority, a new 
security policy orientation would have to be found, and for the 
next twelve months the Norwegian government would be con­
cerned with finding an acceptable solution to its security di­
lemma. 
In this search the Norwegians had in theory at least six clear 
alternatives: (1) a return to an independent neutrality as in the 
years 1936-40; (2) a policy of collective security, based on the 
ability of the UN to function as a security organization; (3) an 
alliance or similar agreement with the Soviet Union; (4) an 
alliance with the Western bloc;3 (5) an alliance with the Scan­
dinavian bloc; and (6) membership in a Scandinavian bloc as a 
subsystem within a larger Western bloc. However, examined 
within the framework of the development of the Norwegian 
strategic image as well as in recognition of related policy state­
ments, it is clear that these options, which existed in theory, did 
not exist within the range of relevant alternatives. 
The first option, a return to an independent neutrality policy, 
was obviously impossible without a radical revision of her strate­
gic image,4 and there is no evidence that this revision had oc­
curred or was in the process of taking place. The second option, a 
continuation of her postwar foreign policy, had just been discred­
ited by the Foreign Minister as insufficient. The third option 
likewise had been rejected explicitly, when the Foreign Minister 
stated that Norway would not enter into a special military agree­
ment with the Soviets. On the other hand, the fourth option was 
open; Lange had observed that Norway would not exclude the 
possibility of a closer political relationship with the West. The 
remaining two options were problematical; very little had been 
said in public by anyone regarding the establishment of a Scan­
dinavian bloc within a larger Western arrangement. And al­
though much had been said in very general terms about the 
possibilities of an independent Scandinavian arrangement, an 
analysis of the Norwegian strategic image would seem to indi­
cate that such an arrangement was unlikely. 
Thus it must be concluded that the articulated image of the 
international political universe and Norway's place in it had 
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reduced the six theoretical options to two: Norwegian member­
ship in a Scandinavian bloc attached to a Western arrangement 
or direct Norwegian membership in the Western bloc. 
Prelude to the Scandinavian defense negotiations.—Notwith­
standing the fact that the Norwegian strategic image did not 
seem to encourage the option of an isolated Scandinavian defense 
bloc, much discussion prevailed in all three countries concerning 
the possibilities of such an arrangement. Indeed, Lange had 
seemed to encourage such speculation in April when he said 
that it would take "weighty reasons'' to make Norway choose a 
policy line different from Denmark or Sweden.5' 
In any case, it is now known that much was going on behind 
the scenes with regard to the possibility of a future defense 
arrangement among the three Scandinavian countries. Late in 
April, the Swedish government presented its proposals regarding 
the formation of a three nation defense pact to the Swedish 
Advisory Council on Foreign Affairs, which subsequently ap­
proved the plans.6 And in early May, when the Swedish Foreign 
Minister was in Oslo, the question of a Scandinavian defense 
alliance was discussed with Norwegian officials,7 although the 
first public suggestion that such discussions were in progress did 
not come until May 9, 1948.8 
It is against this background of events that Lange delivered his 
next major foreign policy address in June in Malmo, Sweden. 
Although the greater part of the address was focused on prob­
lems connected with Scandinavian economic co-operation, the 
Foreign Minister offered significant comment on Scandinavian 
foreign and security policy problems. In the course of discussing 
the difficult problems encountered in closer Scandinavian co­
operation the Foreign Minister observed that intra-Scandinavian 
differences were most sharply revealed when Scandinavians 
turned to questions of foreign policy and evaluations of security 
and defense problems.5" He pointed out that these differences of 
view, especially the value to be placed on defense, had long 
existed and were responsible for the fact that military co­
operation had never been "seriously considered." Lange observed 
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that the experience of the war was important, especially for 
Denmark and Norway, in leading them to view differently the 
sacrifices that were required for national defense. Lange then 
said that great advantages could be gained for the Scandinavian 
countries if they could achieve some form of peacetime "practical 
coordination in the defense of our three countries." 10 However, 
the Foreign Minister added parenthetically that 
I am not thinking in terms of a direct politico-military agreement, 
but of practical coordination.11 
The Foreign Minister added, moreover, that it is best to admit 
"that today a common Scandinavian policy cannot be found for 
the main questions of foreign policy, at least in the short run." 
This summing up of the political situation in Scandinavia fol­
lowed a very revealing evaluation which indicates that some 
discussion among the three countries concerning defense co­
operation and foreign policy had taken place, for the Foreign 
Minister had said, 
But nothing is gained by overlooking that the different experiences of 
our three countries during the war have created a different atmos­
phere regarding the attitude toward the main contemporary foreign 
policy questions in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. 
Apart from the impact of historical experience which was per­
ceived as having an effect on the different views of the three 
countries, the Foreign Minister stated another reason for the 
differences which prevailed (a reason and construction that was 
to be heard more often in the months to come). 
In addition there is a genuine difference in the strategic situation of 
our three countries. Both of these factors [i.e., historical experience 
and the strategic "situation"] lead to dissimilarities in the evaluation 
of the risk factors we face in the present and the near future inter­
national situation, and a different appraisal of which way we ought 
to follow in order to meet the dangers we face, of which way we 
ought to go for the best possible and most effective contribution for 
preventing war in the future. There are also differences in the ap­
praisals among our countries concerning the possibilities we have to 
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keep out of war, if the catastrophe we all see as the main task of pre­
venting should nevertheless come.12 
Thus Lange stated the Norwegian appraisal of the issues. 
Two factors were judged to be fundamental: historical experi­
ence and strategic location. From these two were derived judg­
ments about the present and predictions about the future, judg­
ments that apparently were not shared in the other Scandinavian 
foreign ministries. 
The position of Sweden and Denmark.—Although the central 
concern here is with the development of Norwegian policy and 
the evolution of the Norwegian strategic image, it is useful to 
examine briefly the views of Denmark and Sweden toward the 
evolving international situation in general and the possibility of a 
Scandinavian security alignment specifically. 
The position of Denmark can be dealt with most easily. Den­
mark, like Norway, had pursued a bridgebuilding policy since 
the war, and, again like Norway, had experienced disaster with 
her policy of neutrality in April of 1940.13 The Danes, however, 
did not react to the events of early 1948 in the same manner as 
the Norwegians, nor were they so quick to underwrite Western 
"bloc-building." The Danes have always been the strongest pro­
ponents of pan-Scandinavianism, and when it became clearer 
that the UN could not be depended on as a security organiza­
tion, and, perhaps more importantly, when the Norwegians 
began to equivocate their bridgebuilding policy, Denmark began 
a "Scandinavia lobby." If any blocs were going to be formed 
outside the United Nations, Denmark wanted a Scandinavian 
bloc. This aim was unconditional and expressed by the Foreign 
Minister in early June, 1948. 
The Government regards it as its foremost task to try to further 
Northern understanding and ensure that the ways of the Scandi­
navian countries shall not separate.14 
Although the Danes had little to offer a Scandinavian defense 
arrangement, the Danish Prime Minister16 became its most out­
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spoken advocate. As events unfolded, however, the differences of 
opinion in the North were between Norway and Sweden; thus, 
in short, it can be said without too much distortion that the 
Danish role was that of mediator between Norway and Sweden 
and that Danish views were not really germane to the decisive 
issues in the debate about "Scandinavia." 
It is interesting to note in passing that Denmark's position 
vis-a-vis Germany and her control of the Baltic exits place her in 
a position that would seem to preclude, from the point of view of 
military-strategic considerations, her inclusion in any attempt to 
solve the security problems of Norway and Sweden. This is a 
fact of life with which the Danes have always lived and is 
expressed by the old saw in Danish foreign policy thinking that 
"politically Denmark belongs to Scandinavia but strategically to 
the Continent." The ability of a Norwegian-Swedish alliance to 
"keep outside" a war might be argued, but with Denmark at­
tached, the probability of non-involvement seems to be much 
more remote.16 Important as this consideration is, however, no 
evidence exists to the effect that a bilateral Norwegian-Swedish 
arrangement without Denmark was ever officially contem­
plated.17 
As suggested above, the decisive issues in the Scandinavian 
debate of foreign and defense policies were between Norway 
and Sweden. As the Norwegian Foreign Minister had implied in 
his addresses, Sweden's experiences in international affairs had 
been much different from those of Norway. Sweden, since the 
first Bernadotte, had pursued successfully, although not without 
great difficulty,18 a policy of neutrality. Sweden's neutrality pol­
icy later was referred to as a policy of non-alliance in peace that 
looked to non-involvement in war.19 Regardless of how it is 
characterized, however, the "lesson" of history can be seen in 
that this policy kept the Swedes out of war for more than one 
hundred and thirty-five years, and it succeeded in World War II 
when Denmark's and Norway's failed. 
As previously stated, during World War II the Swedes en­
gaged in some discussion of the desirability of close Scandina­
vian co-operation, including political and defense co-operation, 
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following the war.20 These proposals, however, were spurned by 
Norway, and after the war they were given no official expression 
as Sweden joined the United Nations, continuing her policy of 
armed neutrality. The great debate that took place when Sweden 
joined the League was not repeated when she joined the UN. 
The Swedes favored the veto system in the Security Council 
because they saw it as a means of reconciling their non-
alliance-neutrality policy with UN membership, guaranteeing 
that they would not become involved in a dispute where the 
great powers disagreed. In this regard it is interesting to note that 
the Swedes maintained that any change in the veto arrangement 
or any change in the permanent membership on the Security 
Council (e.g., the withdrawal of one of the great powers) would 
require Sweden to re-examine the entire basis of her UN policy. 
The point is that the policy of neutrality continued to serve as 
the touchstone of Swedish action in international affairs, and it 
was a policy that was, at all costs, to be maintained. Thus, very 
much unlike Norway, the UN was not central to Swedish for­
eign policy, and, again, unlike Norway, it was the maintenance 
of a specific policy rather than the calculation of the effects of 
alternative policies that formed the basis of Sweden's behavior in 
the postwar world.21 These different bases of action were opera­
tionally insignificant as long as the Norwegians maintained their 
policy of bridgebuilding: both wanted to avoid entanglement in 
politico-military blocs. However, once the Norwegians began to 
search for a new security policy, the Swedes initiated discussions 
and finally offered a defense pact to Norway and Denmark in 
order to keep them out of a Western arrangement.22 
The Swedish position with regard to non-alliance was some­
what modified by this step, although the Foreign Minister main­
tained that it was not inconsistent since "non-alliance" meant 
essentially "non-alliance with great powers." Thus is gained an 
insight into the political character of the northern bloc envi­
sioned by the Swedes. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
Swedes were ever willing to compromise their attitude regarding 
the political orientation of a northern bloc, and the Foreign 
Minister left no room for doubt when he addressed the members 
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of his own party in May. He said that the question of a northern 
arrangement required a great deal of consideration before any 
concrete decisions could be made, but he stated without equivo­
cation that Sweden would not permit herself to be drawn into 
indirect relations with a great power grouping in a way that 
would require her to choose one side or the other in the event of 
a future war. The Foreign Minister stated, 
Among those today who are interested in a Scandinavian agreement 
on cooperation are some who think that cooperation shall really mean 
the inclusion of the Scandinavians as a regional group in a West bloc; 
but it is clear that the Swedish government, which does not wish to 
join a West bloc is no less unwilling to do so via a Scandinavian Al­
liance.23 
The kind of Scandinavian arrangement envisioned by the 
Swedes, as far as its political orientation was concerned, was 
clearly, as the Foreign Minister stated, "an independent group 
with a program to hold our countries outside of other power 
groupings." In short, the Swedish policy of neutrality was to be 
extended to Norway and Denmark. 
Although no attempt has been made here to examine system­
atically the Swedish strategic image, it is unquestionably clear 
that the Swedes thought it possible to remain in peace in the 
midst of war; this was, after all, the "meaning" of their historical 
experience.24 However, it was also a judgment based on their 
tradition and practice of armed neutrality, a self-confidence and 
sense of national efficacy expressed by the Defense Minister 
when he said that Swedish defense "justified the assumption 
that small states do not lack the prospects to keep outside of 
war." 25 It is more difficult to generalize regarding her perception 
of her geographic location, a crucial component of the Norwe­
gian image structure. However it does seem that the Swedes 
perceived themselves as occupying a strategically important part 
of the globe, but, as compared with the Norwegians, they drew 
different conclusions. Those responsible for foreign policy rea­
soned that if Scandinavia were of strategic importance, it would 
be so for both sides. Thus a foothold by one great power group­
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ing would have destabilizing political consequences and was 
therefore to be avoided.26 
Returning to the Norwegian Foreign Minister's Malmo ad­
dress, it will be recalled that he emphasized two factors that 
separated the Scandinavian countries: historical experience and 
strategic location. From these two perceptions derived judgments 
about the present and predictions about the future. It is clear 
that the Norwegians felt that they were exposed to serious dan­
ger, a view apparently not shared by Sweden. With reference to 
the future, two considerations seemed uppermost in the mind of 
the Norwegian Foreign Minister: (1) the optimal strategy to 
guarantee national security relative to the risks inherent in the 
Norwegian view of the situation and (2) the optimal strategy to 
prevent a general war from breaking out. It is obvious that the 
policies required by each of these two strategies might be mu­
tually exclusive, that is, the policy designed to provide maximum 
guarantees to national security in the event of war could very 
well involve courses of action that might exacerbate rather than 
mitigate the tensions in international politics. Lange's reference 
to the differences in historical experience suggests that Norway's 
primary consideration was with national security, and the For­
eign Minister's reference to the different appraisals in Scandina­
via regarding the best way both to meet the present dangers and 
to prevent war indicates that these two strategies were judged as 
mutually exclusive by the Swedes. However, it is clear that the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister did not judge the requirements for 
national security and peace to be mutually exclusive. He indi­
cated once again the low probability he attached to the ability of 
Norway to escape involvement in a general conflict (a view 
obviously not shared by the Swedes). Rather in Lange's view, if 
the probability of non-involvement in war were low, if Norway 
were threatened, and if politico-military blocs were not perceived 
as destabilizing, it was then possible for Norway to maximize her 
national security without jeopardizing international peace. Thus, 
if the Swedes were emphasizing the need to pursue political 
goals designed to mitigate political tensions, the Norwegians by 
the summer of 1948 seemed to be concerned with the military 
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weakness and vulnerability of a strategic area as itself tension-
producing. 
Still, notwithstanding the fundamental differences that ex­
isted between the two countries, on both the intellectual and 
policy levels, the discussion of a Scandinavian defense arrange­
ment continued until September when, in a communique clos­
ing a Scandinavian foreign ministers meeting, it was announced 
that a decision had been made to investigate jointly the possibil­
ity of Scandinavian defense co-operation.27 This concrete step 
was taken although the Norwegian and Swedish policy elites 
differed regarding (1) the seriousness of the current interna­
tional situation, (2) the probability that the Scandinavian coun­
tries, or any one of them, could remain aloof from a future war 
should it occur, (3) the optimal strategy to minimize the dan­
gers to their respective countries, and (4) the optimal strategy to 
minimize the possibility of another war in the system. 
The 'period of the Scandinavian defense investigation.—It 
should be noted that during the summer of 1948 the U.S. 
Senate passed the so-called Vandenburg Resolution which prom­
ised more than simply moral support from the United States 
with regard to the concerted efforts toward security arrange­
ments that were emerging in the Western world,28 and shortly 
after its passage exploratory negotiations opened in Washington 
concerning the establishment of an Atlantic defense system.29 
Undoubtedly this caused some anxiety on the Swedish side 
because it was not improbable that Norway might join with the 
Atlantic powers, an act which, in the Swedish view, would have 
unpredictable, adverse consequences for Sweden's neutrality.30 
Thus, it is in this context that during the summer of 1948 the 
officials in the three Scandinavian countries were attempting to 
determine the framework within which an investigation regard­
ing the possibilities of Scandinavian defense and military co­
operation could be conducted. And, as previously mentioned, a 
decision was made in September to proceed with an investiga­
tion. 
The communique which reported the decision of the Scandi­
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navian foreign ministers to establish a Scandinavian defense 
investigation was vague, especially with regard to the political 
assumptions that were to be made and the nature of the discus­
sions to be undertaken. 
In the exchange of views which has taken place among the govern­
ments, it has been determined that there prevails, among other rea­
sons owing to the different attitudes toward defense policy in the 
three countries, a certain dissimilarity of the view toward security 
policy questions.31 
This much was discernible from the public discussion that had 
taken place since the beginning of 1948 in Scandinavia; how­
ever, notwithstanding these differences of view the foreign min­
isters now determined that the time was ripe for serious discus­
sions of defense co-operation, for they added, 
The Foreign Ministers have found nevertheless that the prerequisites 
exist for initiating a common exploration of the question of military 
cooperation among the three countries. 
The nature of these prerequisites that were now judged to 
exist was not revealed by the communique nor by the discussion 
that immediately followed. It is absolutely clear that the Norwe­
gians had not endorsed at any time during the preceding eight 
months the idea of an isolated Scandinavian bloc based on the 
Swedish concept of neutrality, and on the day following the 
foreign ministers' meeting the Swedish Prime Minister removed 
any doubt that might have otherwise existed regarding the posi­
tion of the Swedes, saying that the political parties of Sweden 
were united on foreign policy and uncompromising in their 
opposition to participation in any European organization that 
would involve a military alliance with the Western powers.32 
Thus it is clear that the Swedes had not altered their political 
conditions for a Scandinavian defense arrangement, i.e., the 
condition of no connections with other great power groupings. 
Nevertheless, following the September meeting of the foreign 
ministers, the Scandinavian Defense Ministers met in Oslo in 
mid-October to inaugurate a joint examination of the possibilities 
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and conditions for defense co-operation among their three coun­
tries. There they appointed a joint exploratory committee, the 
Scandinavian Defense Commission, to carry on the investiga­
tion.33 
The next statement by the Norwegians that was revealing of 
their assumptions came several days later when the Prime Minis­
ter spoke of the dangers of political vacuums (indicating a close 
relationship between his assumptions and those of the Foreign 
Minister): 
In my opinion there is one way which the peace of the world can be 
secured, namely, through a Western Europe which is economically 
—and I would like to add, militarily strong. We must have a 
Western Europe which offers no nourishment for either social or po­
litical insecurity.84 
The ghost of 1940 was also referred to by the Prime Minister 
when he said, "We in Norway must now make a clear choice, 
and we must choose freedom. To the extent of our ability, we 
shall not again witness the ravaging of our land by foreign 
troops." 85 
Not until the end of October was there another major evalua­
tion of the international political situation by the Foreign Minis­
ter. The Foreign Minister addressed the Storting, offering a 
general review of world affairs since the war and providing 
additional insight into the work of the Scandinavian Defense 
Commission. Lange observed that the cold war was being inten­
sified and that Western demobilization trends had been re­
versed.36 The Foreign Minister then turned to a review of post­
war developments, noting that the tensions among the great 
powers had increased and indicating specifically his view that 
the American attempts to aid the reconstruction of Europe had 
been strongly opposed by the Communists. Lange then voiced 
solid support for the Marshall Plan and the Western Union, 
noting that the latter was entirely defensive, "shaped by the fear 
of Soviet expansion," and that the former hardly represented any 
motives of political or economic hegemony. 
The Foreign Minister then reinforced some of his previously 
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stated views regarding the postwar world. He said it was clear 
that 'modern war would bring devastation and ruin even for the 
victorious powers." Lange said that none of the great powers 
wanted war, and especially not the U.S.S.R., which had suffered 
so much in the last war. The danger rather was that the prevail­
ing tensions had a tendency to increase distrust and enmity and 
that the isolation of the Soviet Union might lead to a self-
fulfilling prophecy.37 On the other hand, Lange repeated in 
different words his concept of the danger of war, a concept that 
had been developed and refined since the end of 1947. 
There is reason to hope that the fear of the disaster which will attend 
another war will be strong enough to secure peace, but there is al­
ways the risk of an unexpected and unpremeditated explosion.38 
With regard to the United Nations the Foreign Minister said 
that Norway would continue to participate actively because the 
UN was able to solve many problems,39 but at the same time one 
of the problems it could not solve was the security dilemma of 
the member states.40 Therefore great interest was being mani­
fested by many countries in a system of regional agreements. In 
this respect Lange referred to the relationship of the Eastern 
European states to the U.S.S.R. and with each other, the West­
ern Union, the Inter-American Union, and the emerging North 
Atlantic arrangement. He then said, however, that "the coopera­
tion among the Scandinavian states does not today have the same 
character as any of those regional groups." Then, revealing some­
what the character of the Scandinavian Defense Commission's 
investigations, he said, 
We are now examining how and to what degree it may be extended 
in the economicfield, and also the possibilities present for cooperation 
in the area of military defense.41 
However, even if the Scandinavian defense investigation was to 
provide information to aid in the evaluation of the efficacy of a 
Scandinavian defense arrangement, Lange included the caveat 
that was contained in his spring evaluation, namely, that even 
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though it was "natural" for the Norwegians to think of defense 
co-operation with the other Scandinavian states in order to solve 
their security dilemma, their respective strategic positions *2 were 
different and they had all had different experiences in the last 
war; thus the others did not share Norway's evaluation of the 
"foreign policy situation'' and the implications of its security 
problems.48 
Finally some of the "determinants" of foreign policy cited by 
Lange should be noted. First, with reference to Norwegian par­
ticipation in the Marshall Plan and the Organization for Euro­
pean Economic Cooperation, the Foreign Minister said it was 
because Norway geographically, economically, and culturally be­
longed in Western Europe, reaffirming the observation made in 
his April address to the Military Society. Second, in an interest­
ing formulation, Lange said that Norway had a great interest in 
preventing war, citing four basic reasons: Norway's fundamental 
democratic view, its entire tradition in international politics, its 
dependency on international commerce and shipping for the 
maintenance of high domestic living standards, and Norway's 
exposed geographic position. 
Early in December Lange stated that "the evaluation of the 
international situation serves as the background for any foreign 
policy" M and that Norway's first interest was in peace, but that 
under the prevailing circumstances Norway could best serve this 
end by contributing to the work of the United Nations and by 
assuring that Norway did not become a political and military 
vacuum.46 With regard to the latter task the Foreign Minister 
asked, 
Is this a problem which Norway can solve alone or . can it only 
be solved in cooperation with others. And the next question which 
arises is "with whom?" Can we solve the problem in cooperation only 
with the Scandinavian countries or must the cooperation be more 
broadly based.46 
The Foreign Minister said that these were the questions that 
were to be answered by the Scandinavian Defense Commission's 
investigation, whose report would be ready by the beginning of 
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February. In short, he demonstrated once again his view of 
"military and political vacuums" as destabilizing and dangerous 
in times of tension, and the concomitant responsibility the gov­
ernment had to insure that Norway did not continue to be in 
such a vacuum.47 
These views expressed by Lange received the support of the 
Storting, and the foreign policy of the government enjoyed wide 
support in the press. In view of the Scandinavian defense inves­
tigations that were taking place simultaneously, it is particularly 
interesting to note remarks in the Labor party news organ, which 
took a much stronger line with regard to the questions that 
Lange raised in his statement to the Storting. The paper rejected 
the policy of neutrality "which led to the shipwreck of 1940" 
(and the policy which had been advocated by Sweden since the 
war and during the Scandinavian defense discussions). The 
paper added, referring to the exchange of views in the Storting, 
The debate showed that there exists doubt as to the value of an iso­
lated defense cooperation, or more correctly a Northern cooperation 
isolating Norway from lands to the West. . . It must be clear to all 
that Norwegian public opinion makes it absolutely impossible to ex­
tend the Swedish neutrality policy to include Norway as well.48 
It is clear that little modification of the strategic image of 
Norway had occurred since the spring re-evaluation that had 
marked the end of the policy of bridgebuilding. International 
tensions had undermined the possibilities for making the UN 
function as an instrument of international security, even though 
its other functions were important and should be supported. The 
Norwegian goal orientation was unmodified. Norway was 
searching for security in the event of war, looking for an arrange­
ment that would maximize the possibilities of precluding "an­
other 1940." Norway's "historical experience' was frequently 
mentioned in Norwegian policy statements and seemed to refer 
to the necessity to provide for defense in peace in order to help 
prevent war as well as to the strategic vulnerability of Norway. 
Norway continued to perceive her geographic location as "stra­
tegic' and "exposed," leading to the judgment that Norway had 
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little opportunity to remain aloof from another war should it 
occur. The Norwegian image of the structure of the system was 
somewhat modified with the Foreign Minister speaking often in 
terms of the Eastern and Western "blocs." Most spectacular was 
the refinement (not modification) of the process image which 
took place during the fall and winter of 1948. The Foreign 
Minister's fuzzy perception of the danger to world peace of 
undefended, strategically located areas became in the fall an 
unequivocal assertion that the primary danger to world peace 
was the existence of political and military vacuums. In other 
words, war was not viewed as a specified threat from one or 
another country or bloc, nor was it viewed as a consequence of 
one or another state's aggressive tendencies, but rather as an 
event that might occur as a result of the convergence of political 
tensions in areas of political instability and military vacuum. 
Thus, unlike the Swedes the Norwegian leadership did not 
•perceive an inconsistency between bloc-building and interna­
tional stability. Rather the action response for Norway was ob­
vious to both the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister: 
insure domestically that Norway complete its reconstruction pro­
gram in order to maintain political stability and take steps inter­
nationally to provide adequate defense arrangements. The judg­
ment had already been made that Norway could not provide 
"adequate" defense unilaterally; thus, as the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister had stated, the question became "with whom does 
Norway collaborate?" In order to answer these questions, the 
Scandinavian defense investigations had been instituted, not­
withstanding the fact that the "with whom" was not an open 
question for the Swedes as it was for the Norwegians.* 
In short the Norwegian image of process looked to the crea­
tion of competing centers of political, economic, and military 
* While the role played by economic considerations during this period were 
certainly important, the findings generated by this study (discussed in the 
final chapter) suggest they were not decisive. As the subsequent analysis indi­
cates, the question of international collaboration appears to have been clearly 
decided with reference primarily to political and strategic (and not economic) 
considerations. 
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viability on which mutual trust and confidence could be built in 
order that the United Nations could perhaps be made to func­
tion as a security organization. Fortunately, Norwegian long-run 
aims regarding the United Nations were not inconsistent with 
the requirements imposed by her short-run aims: physical secu­
rity in the event of war, the "unexpected and unpremeditated 
explosion," was consistent with strengthening the basis for great 
power collaboration in the United Nations. 
The 'period of the Scandinavian 'political negotia­
tions.—During the period of the Scandinavian defense investiga­
tions, political events continued to move at a faster pace both 
within and outside Scandinavia. The uncertainty on the Ameri­
can political scene, and especially with regard to U.S. foreign 
policy, was removed by the unexpected victory of President 
Truman in November, 1948, and late in the same month a 
preliminary draft of the North Atlantic pact was completed. On 
the Scandinavian scene the Scandinavian Defense Commission 
had met twice,49 and because of the speed with which other 
options to Norway were presenting themselves,50 it was decided 
on Norwegian initiative to hasten the completion of the work of 
the Defense Commission and to begin the political discussions of 
the possibilities of a Scandinavian defense arrangement even 
before the final report of the Commission was presented to the 
governments. 
During its final meeting in Oslo in the middle of January the 
Scandinavian Defense Commission made its findings known to 
the governments. Its conclusions stated inter alia: (1) military 
co-operation among the three countries would strengthen their 
total defense capability; (2) the defenses of Norway and Den­
mark were insufficient and required considerable beefing up; 
(3) external material aid, on reasonable terms, was essential if 
the alliance was to be effective; Sweden could not deliver the 
military hardware that was required; (4) external military aid 
would be required in the event an attack on Scandinavia should 
take place.51 Thus what began as purely "technical" discussions 
rapidly brought to a head the central political problem: what was 
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to be the relationship between a Scandinavian defense bloc and 
the Western powers? 
The political discussions among the Scandinavian govern­
ments commenced after the turn of the year in Karlstad,62 Co­
penhagen,53 and in Oslo.54 
Prior to the Karlstad meeting all the principal actors on the 
Norwegian side made important foreign policy statements in the 
form of New Year's messages to the Norwegian people. The 
Prime Minister said that Norway must make every effort to find 
a common policy for Scandinavia to deal with the dangers that 
can threaten peace and freedom, and he also declared that Nor­
way had an obligation to make a contribution to the larger 
responsibility that rests with all the Western European coun­
tries.55 
Two days later the Foreign Minister repeated that though he 
did not think that any of the great powers was planning aggres­
sion, the tensions that prevailed in the world made possible the 
unwanted and unplanned "explosion." He then stated, indicat­
ing more explicitly than ever in the past, a new criterion for 
foreign policy choices. 
Intensified great power tensions have made it more necessary than 
ever before that we be conscious of with whom we belong.58 
The Foreign Minister said that these circumstances were forcing 
Norway to strengthen its security 
through cooperation with countries which have the same political 
institutions as ourselves, a similar concept of democracy, and which 
live under somewhat homogeneous economic circumstances. 
While this formulation did not exclude co-operation with 
Scandinavia,57 Lange also made it explicit that he was not limit­
ing himself to Scandinavia, reasoning, 
But the more we consider these questions the more we will discover 
that we must find a way of expanding cooperation with peoples with 
whom we feel a kindred relationship, peoples outside the boundaries 
Scandinavia and the Atlantic • 119 
of Scandinavia, if we are to have full advantage of modern techniques 
and the possibilities they offer.58 
The Foreign Minister then declared, implying that certain policy 
judgments had already been made on the Norwegian side, that 
We must hope that Denmark and Sweden will come to these same 
conclusions so that we may stand together within the broader co­
operation which is pending just as we now work together for the 
economic rehabilitation of Europe. 
On the same day the Defense Minister made a statement 
which, although not revealing of Norwegian strategic thinking, 
should be noted because it was made so close to the opening of 
the political negotiations. Discussing the high costs of Norwe­
gian defense and predicting that they would continue regardless 
of the political choices that might be made regarding the basis of 
Norwegian security policy, he suggested that 
there is no reason to assume that participation in a larger security 
system which contains larger and richer powers would be the cheap­
est.59 
The Defense Minister then declared that it was economically 
most reasonable and effective to "seek security through coopera­
tion in a comprehensive security system which includes coun­
tries with greater resources and production capability than we 
have." In any case, the Defense Minister said, it was certain that 
in the absence of outside aid either (1) the time period for 
reconstruction would have to be extended or (2) the defense 
program would have to be reduced. 
Thus even before the political negotiations began, the Norwe­
gians were hardly speaking as if they shared the views of the 
Swedes. The Prime Minister talked of "dangers'" and "threats" to 
the peace, perceptions that were not shared by the Swedes; the 
Foreign Minister indicated that a policy decision had already 
been made (albeit with the hope that Sweden and Denmark 
would "come to the same conclusions"); and if the policy deci­
sion had indeed not been made, the Defense Minister indirectly 
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suggested that, at least in terms of the economic implications, it 
might be a good idea to make it! 
The first of the Scandinavian defense pact negotiations 
opened several days later in Karlstad and was attended by the 
Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of 
the three countries. Although the communique issued following 
the conclusion of the meeting was not very revealing, it is known 
that a fairly comprehensive proposal was considered by the par­
ties. The "Karlstad Plan" acknowledged the efficacy of a Scandi­
navian defense alliance, noted the desirability of Norway and 
Denmark's obtaining arms supplies from outside Scandinavia, 
limited the operation of the alliance to the Scandinavian area 
proper (i.e., Greenland, Svalbard, and the Faeroes would not be 
included), and established the principle of "freedom from alli­
ances" as the political basis of the proposed pact.60 
Thus were raised the two issues that were to dominate the 
political discussions: (1) the question of the military capability 
of the proposed alliance, and (2) the question of the political 
orientation of the alliance. 
With regard to the first question, Sweden had made it a 
condition on her side that Denmark and Norway should initiate 
a rearmament program on a substantial scale in order to bring 
their defense capability up to a level more comparable with 
Sweden's. This condition immediately raised the question of 
military supplies and created an issue between the Swedes and 
the Norwegians with regard to external aid, for it could not be 
questioned that Norway and Denmark would encounter great 
difficulties in attempting to undertake a comprehensive rearma­
ment program on their own. 
Because the Swedes, on the other hand, were unable to pro­
vide sufficient material aid to the Norwegians and the Danes 
making possible such rearmament, by the first Karlstad meeting 
the Swedes had accepted the idea of external military aid, and by 
the second meeting at Copenhagen the Swedes, like the Norwe­
gians and the Danes, made it a condition for their participation 
in the alliances that Norway and Denmark obtain equipment 
and other forms of military assistance from the Western powers 
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in order to complete the reconstruction of their defenses. By the 
time of the final Oslo meeting however, where the negotiations 
for a Scandinavian defense alliance finally failed, the Swedes 
were prepared to drop deliveries of Western armaments as a 
condition of their participation; the Norwegians, however, con­
tinued to insist that such aid was absolutely essential and this 
was accepted by Sweden, but the issue of arms supplies was not 
explicitly raised at Oslo because the discussions were dominated 
by political questions. 
Thus the separate but related rearmament and arms supply 
issues can be summarized as follows: Sweden at all times made it 
a condition of her participation in the proposed defense alliance 
that Norway and Denmark should rearm on a substantial scale. 
By the time of the meeting at Copenhagen both the Swedes and 
the Norwegians regarded arms deliveries from the West, and 
particularly from the United States, as a mutually accepted 
condition. Later at the Oslo meeting, Sweden was willing to 
relinquish American aid as a condition of her participation, but 
the entire question of military supplies had already brought to 
the surface the overriding political question. Thus the opportu­
nity did not exist for the Swedes to bring to the attention of the 
Norwegians the modification of their position regarding military 
aid because of the essential divergence regarding the political 
character of the proposed association.61 
With regard to the question of the political character of the 
proposed alliance, the Swedes continued to assert their unchang­
ing view that a Scandinavian defense arrangement ought to be 
formally and unequivocally a league of armed neutrality;62 any 
co-operation with the great powers in military matters was to be 
strictly prohibited. The Norwegians, on the other hand, felt that 
the Scandinavian bloc could not isolate itself from the West, 
especially with regard to military matters. That Sweden had 
agreed to Norway's receiving military aid from the West repre­
sented a major concession on her part, and although it was later 
charged in Norway that the government had not taken advan­
tage of this concession by the Swedish government, it seems 
obvious that the political differences were crucial, and only their 
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solution by agreement would have placed the question of de­
fense supplies in a central position with regard to the ultimate 
outcome of the negotiations. 
With regard then to the political issues, the next major state­
ment on the Norwegian side that should be noted came in a 
report to the Storting by the Foreign Minister on the Copenha­
gen meeting. Lange noted that "under certain circumstances" a 
possibility existed for reaching a mutually binding but otherwise 
isolated Scandinavian defense alliance."m In this regard the 
Foreign Minister declared that at Karlstad both the Norwegians 
and the Swedes had made great concessions: the Swedes were 
willing to modify their policy of non-alliances in favor of an 
alliance with Norway and Denmark, and the Norwegians made 
"substantial concessions' regarding 
the principal Norwegian view that we are willing, if the prerequisites 
are otherwise present, to accept a Scandinavian defense alliance with­
out a formal tie to a larger regional security system. .M 
He then went on to point out that the Scandinavian Defense 
Commission had concluded that a Scandinavian alliance would 
not possess the economic capability to provide sufficient military 
supplies from within and that a Scandinavian alliance would 
also require "military assistance in the event that one or more of 
the countries in the alliance were attacked." Lange said this led 
to the discussion of the more deep-rooted differences in the views 
among the three countries, differences that the communique 
following the Copenhagen meeting referred to as the "prerequi­
sites for and consequences of the alliance-free pact." Thus the 
negotiators found themselves locked once again on the political 
question, what Lange referred to as the "character of the pact." 
Lange then declared once again his now well-established view 
regarding the reasons for the different evaluations made by the 
three countries. 
Our security problems, in part because of the dissimilarities in our 
geographic situation, are not identical. During the last war our peo­
ple have had entirely different historical experiences. The genuine 
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differences in these two areas have led to the difference in our views 
of the central problems of our foreign and security policies.65 
Lange then proceeded to state again the Norwegian view of 
the current problem in international politics, declaring that 
We can best render our contribution to the stabilization of our part 
of the world, and thereby the peace of the world, on the basis of a con­
cept of the solidarity among the democratic peoples and of joint re­
gional cooperation within an area which is sufficiently large to repre­
sent a bona fide power factor. 
Thus is revealed once again Lange's view that the building of 
blocs under the circumstances would be a stabilizing factor in 
world politics. Lange clearly felt that stability in Northern Eu­
rope would contribute directly to the creation of general interna­
tional stability, and, further, that stability in Northern Europe 
could best be effected by its participation in a wider regional 
arrangement that would possess a more formidable potential for 
influence. Lange then added what is perhaps his most revealing 
statement of his view of the role of a Scandinavian bloc and thus 
his purpose in the Scandinavian defense negotiations. 
It is therefore our view that an isolated defense pact among Den­
mark, Norway, and Sweden, even in the absence of a formal tie to 
a greater security system, in its character and its substance must 
build on this more comprehensive concept of security. 
Lange added further that if such were the basis of the Scandina­
vian alliance, only then could it hope for the political and mate­
rial support of the leading democratic powers. On the other 
hand, the Foreign Minister declared this view was not shared by 
the Swedes. He said that the spokesmen for the Swedes in 
Copenhagen were adamant that the proposed pact "must be 
genuinely alliance-free and not in any form rely on the concept 
of a security policy of regional solidarity outside the borders of 
the three participating countries."66 
Because of the differences in political views, it was decided to 
conclude the meeting in Copenhagen and try again in Oslo at a 
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later date, providing the opportunity for additional consultations 
between the governments and the political parties in each of the 
countries. Lange stated, however, that all parties agreed that the 
establishment of a defense alliance that included nations with 
excessively dissimilar views of the central problems of foreign 
policy and of the best means to employ to reach the common goal 
of securing peace would be unjustifiable and would dissolve with 
the first serious crisis. Nevertheless the Oslo meeting would be 
held to determine whether a common political basis for the 
Scandinavian defense alliance could be found, but, as has been 
pointed out, the Oslo meeting failed to produce agreement.67 
After the failure in Oslo, the Norwegian Prime Minister said 
that if only good will had been sufficient to reach agreement, a 
Scandinavian defense pact would exist, but that the failure was a 
result of more fundamental causes, declaring that 
the reasons the discussions today did not lead to a positive result is 
that our security problems are inherently different, or that in any 
case today we evaluate them differently.68 
The move toward the Atlantic Pact.—Several days following 
the failure of the Scandinavian defense negotiations, the Norwe­
gian Foreign Minister reported to the Storting. He provided 
another of his general reviews of the course of events since the 
end of the war, noting that the failure of the UN as a security 
instrument forced all countries, including Norway, to look to 
regional security arrangements.69 Before providing his colleagues 
with an explanation of the reasons for the failure of the negotia­
tions, the Foreign Minister noted what he considered to be the 
two salient problems in Norwegian security policy. They were 
Norway is not and can never become on its own sufficiently 
strong militarily 
(a)	 to deter a great power from making an attack on the coun­
try or 
(b)	 to repel a great power's attack.70 
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For these reasons the Foreign Minister suggested that Norway 
must find a policy that would insure for itself by advance agree­
ment military assistance from other states both to preserve peace 
and for immediate aid in the event of war. 
Lange then declared that the second important problem was 
related to the question of external assistance. 
In order to be able to build up the defense of the country we 
must have supplies of weapons and other military provisions 
from abroad.71 
Lange then cited the geographic position of Norway, and its 
Western democratic values, suggesting that since the country 
was being forced to seek security through closer associations with 
other states rather than through the United Nations, "it is self-
evident that we must seek such cooperation more or less within 
the framework of this democratic circle of states."72 For this 
reason Norway had decided to discuss these problems first with 
her Scandinavian neighbors. 
After providing a long account of the negotiations, the For­
eign Minister declared that they failed because of (1) the ina­
bility of the Swedes and the Norwegians to agree on the political 
character of the alliance, (2) their different views as to the best 
means of preventing war, and (3) the low probability, in view 
of Western policy, of obtaining the necessary deliveries of mili­
tary supplies.73 
The Foreign Minister also noted in his speech that Norway 
had been approached by the Americans and the British concern­
ing Norway's inclusion in the discussions on the proposed Atlan­
tic Pact.74 At the time of the approach, however, Lange said 
Norway wished to explore in greater detail the possibility of a 
Scandinavian arrangement. 
At the conclusion of his speech he declared that the three 
Scandinavian countries must now attempt on their own to solve 
their individual security problems. He assured his colleagues 
that Norway had not yet received, nor had it requested, a formal 
invitation to join the Atlantic discussions. The Foreign Minister 
asserted that more information was required before a position 
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could be taken by the government and debated by the Storting. 
If it appeared to many in the Storting that Norway, notwith­
standing Lange's "need for more information," was about to join 
in the Atlantic Pact discussions, it also was of concern to the 
Soviet Union, for in the period between the beginning of the 
abortive Oslo meeting and the Foreign Minister's statement to 
the Storting, the Norwegians and the Soviets had had, on Soviet 
initiative, a significant diplomatic exchange.75 
A stern but polite Soviet note asserted that the Atlantic Pact 
represented a group of powers pursuing aggressive aims, includ­
ing the establishment of air and naval bases on the periphery of 
the Soviet Union. It reminded the government of Norway's 
common frontier with the U.S.S.R. and requested to be in­
formed of the Norwegian attitude toward the Atlantic Pact, 
whether reports of its intention to join were true, and whether 
obligations had been undertaken for the establishment of air or 
naval bases on Norwegian territory.76 
The prompt Norwegian reply was remarkably calm, especially 
in view of the impact that the Soviet note had made in Nor­
way and in the West. The Norwegians noted the failure of 
the UN as a security instrument and stated that Norway was 
convinced that "it is necessary to seek increased security through 
regional defense cooperation." The Norwegians established the 
failure of the Scandinavian negotiations and noted that they 
would 
make a closer investigation into the forms of, and under what condi­
tions Norway might be able to take part in, a regional security system 
comprising the countries around the Atlantic.77 
The Norwegian note then made an important commitment to 
the Soviets with regard to their future freedom of action. Noting 
the long period of peaceful relations between the two countries, 
the Norwegian asks the Soviet Government to be assured that Nor­
way will never take part in a policy with aggressive aims. She will 
never allow Norwegian territory to be used in the service of such a 
policy. The Norwegian Government will not join in any agreement 
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with other States involving obligations to open bases for the military 
forces of foreign Powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is 
not attacked or exposed to threats of attack.78 
Here is encountered the genesis of the so-called Norwegian 
base policy. Although the base policy is not within the scope of 
this inquiry, it is unquestionably a manifestation in a concrete 
situation of the deep-rooted Norwegian sensitivity to Soviet secu­
rity interests. It can also be said in passing that if the Norwegian 
government was attempting to assure the Soviets that they had 
nothing to fear in the event that Norway joined the Atlantic 
Pact, it was also attempting to reassure elements in its own 
domestic public that were strongly opposed to the stationing of 
foreign troops on Norwegian soil.79 One other factor of some 
importance that was undoubtedly operational in the base policy 
commitment is Norwegian concern for the fate of Finland under 
the terms of the 1948 Treaty, especially if the Soviets perceived a 
"provocation." so 
The Soviets replied several days later81 that the Norwegian 
government's position regarding bases was "insufficient" and pro­
ceeded to offer the Norwegians a non-aggression pact, reminding 
them again of their mutual boundary. 
The Norwegian reply to the Soviet demarche however, was 
delayed for a month, for on the same day as the delivery of the 
Soviet note the Norwegian Foreign Minister headed a delega­
tion to Washington and London to make, as he had suggested in 
his last address to the Storting, further inquiry concerning the 
nature of the proposed Atlantic Pact.82 
The next major statement of the Norwegian position did not 
come until Lange's report to the National Convention of the 
Labor party on the international situation, implying that Nor­
way was on the threshold of an historic decision. Although the 
speech provided another general review of international events 
followed by a plea by the Prime Minister for the Convention to 
take a stand on the question of the future course of Norwegian 
foreign policy,83 several points made by the Foreign Minister 
should be noted. 
First, in view of the still unanswered Soviet offer of a non­
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aggression pact and the continuing crisis in Berlin, the Foreign 
Minister's view of the Soviet Union was remarkably consistent. 
Although the Foreign Minister said that the Soviets were prima­
rily responsible for the paralysis of the United Nations84 and 
hindered other attempts toward creative international co­
operation,85 he said he had 'no intention of one-sidedly citing the 
Russians as the bogey in international politics." 86 The Foreign 
Minister said that the Russians alone did not bear the responsi­
bility for the course of events after the war. 
I am fully aware that there have been errors and serious errors also 
by the Western great powers. I am also aware that the Russians have 
good reasons for their suspicions of the Western countries87 
In spite of this, and notwithstanding the aid from, and good 
faith demonstrated by, the Russians during the liberation of 
North Norway, the Soviet's diplomatic and political offensive in 
Eastern Europe was cited by Lange as mainly responsible for the 
international tensions that existed and which therefore was forc­
ing Norway to look to regional security arrangements.88 Nev­
ertheless the Foreign Minister did not say that Norway was 
threatened directly by Soviet aggression, but persisted in his 
view that 
No great power today desires to start a world war; on the other hand 
it is also evident that danger is to be found in an unwanted and un­
intentional war occurring anyway. 
Because of this danger of an unpremeditated war and because 
the security apparatus of the United Nations could not function, 
Norway turned to a consideration of regional arrangements: first 
to Scandinavia and then to the evolving Western alliance. In 
discussing these actions, Lange clearly revealed his assumptions 
and reasons for his foreign policy goals. 
After the alternative of a non-committed Scandinavian association 
had been dropped, it was essential that our standpoint should be clear. 
In view of the tension in the international situation, we cannot allow 
Norway to lie militarily impotent and open to attack. To allow Nor­
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way to continue to be a military and political vacuum increases not 
only the risks for ourselves, but it also helps to increase the uncer­
tainty of the entire international situation, and it therefore contrary 
to that which is the main aim of our entire policy in the international 
sphere. 
The Foreign Minister said that the real need was to create "a 
power sufficiently strong to deter all from attack,'' and in this 
regard it was obvious that neither Norway nor Scandinavia was 
sufficiently large to take full advantage of modern military and 
economic techniques.89 
It was clear that the Norwegian government had two pre­
ferred outcomes: to deter war and to insure in advance external 
aid should war occur. Further, one policy was viewed as consist­
ently serving both of these aims: a regional approach to interna­
tional collaboration based on some form of "understanding" with 
the Western powers. And now that the Scandinavian defense 
pact discussions had failed, it could be anticipated that the 
"understanding"' would be explicit in the form of Norwegian 
membership in the Atlantic alliance. In the view of the govern­
ment, 
A weak Norway without allies is a danger—not only for our own 
peace, but for the peace of the world.90 
On the other hand, a policy which would result in a Norway 
which has rebuilt its defense and which is solidly anchored in coop­
eration with other democratic countries can render a contribution 
not only to ensure its own security, but also to stabilize and strengthen 
the democratic world and thereby world peace. 
Thus if the great danger to world peace was inadequately de­
fended but strategically important real estate encouraging an 
unintended war, the best way to deter such a war was to' es­
tablish in advance a clear-cut, mutually binding commitment 
among the Western democracies. 
The National Convention of the Labor party finally adopted a 
resolution which concluded that Norway must solve its security 
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problems in joint and binding collaboration with the Western 
democracies in the area of defense policy.91 
Following this endorsement, the government went to the 
Storting to request permission to join the preparatory discussions 
on the North Atlantic Pact so that Norway might be able to 
assert her views before the Pact was completed.92 In this state­
ment, the Foreign Minister repeated all the major arguments 
and reasons that had forced Norway to look to regional security 
arrangements. He emphasized the need to prevent war by "'shap­
ing a new stability1' within the framework of a "real power factor 
in world politics," noting that 
A solidarity which is limited to small entities which are otherwise 
neutral cannot have the effect necessary to prevent war.93 
The Foreign Minister also said that the Scandinavian alliance 
was not "a practical political possibility.'' Not only was it not so 
for the reason suggested above, but also for a more fundamental 
reason, 
It is not consistent with the solidarity in relation to the democracies 
in Western Europe and North America, which we during the entire 
period of the Scandinavian defense negotiations thought necessary 
to secure •peace.9* 
Lange noted for his colleagues that although Norway was 
required to make a choice, no pressure would be exerted by the 
West for Norway to choose the Atlantic Pact, telling them at the 
same time that he favored joining the discussions and reminding 
them of the unanswered Soviet offer of a non-aggression pact, 
saying that the government would not reply until the Storting 
had taken a position on the Atlantic Pact discussions.95 
Early in March the Storting met in secret session and agreed 
to Norway's joining the final round of discussions on the Atlan­
tic Pact against the eleven votes of the Communists after defeat­
ing a Communist motion to accept the proffered non-aggression 
pact.96 On the same day the government replied to the Soviet 
note, citing the UN Charter and politely rejecting the non­
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aggression pact as redundant, and announced its intention to 
join the Atlantic Pact discussions, recognizing at the same time 
the long history of good neighborly relations, adding the Norwe­
gian desire to preserve them, and reaffirming the Norwegian 
base declaration.97 
On the following day a public debate was held in the Storting 
on the Foreign Minister's February statement on the question of 
Norway's participation in the Atlantic Pact discussions.98 
Later in the month the government drafted a bill to sanction 
Norwegian accession to the Atlantic Pact,99 and this was pre­
sented to the Storting for its approval on March 29, 1949. After 
an extended debate,100 which was almost a carbon copy of the 
preceding major foreign policy debate, the Storting sanctioned 
Norway's signing and ratification of the Atlantic Pact by a vote 
of 130 to 13. The dissenters included the eleven Communist 
members plus two dissident members of the Labor party.101 
Finally on April 4, 1949, Foreign Minister Lange signed the 
North Atlantic Treaty in Washington making Norway one of 
the twelve charter members of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
1. At the risk of redundancy, it seems appropriate to emphasize again, 
especially in view of all that has been said about "Norway's return to 
neutrality" after the war, the seriousness of the Norwegian view of the 
security functions of the UN. The UN was more than a "good thing"; it was 
an instrument created, in part, to preserve peace in a world where force 
counted a great deal, and the Norwegians refused to doubt that their concerted 
efforts to make it succeed would fail. 
2. It will be recalled that the Foreign Minister had as early as January, 
1948, recognized the essential weaknesses of and contradictions within the 
United Nations; however (to the discomfort of many in Norway who did not 
share his evaluation), he unequivocally reaffirmed the policy of bridgebuild­
ing. Thus paralysis in the United Nations could be tolerated as long as 
Norway was not perceived as threatened. It is interesting to note that the 
Norwegians could nave hypothetically tolerated a threat to their security if the 
UN's security functions were perceived as effective. 
3. Reference here to the "Soviet Union'' and the "Western bloc" is in 
recognition of the fact that the so-called "Eastern bloc" was in reality a series 
of bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and was not a multilateral 
"bloc" until May, 1955, with the signing of the Warsaw Pact. The Western 
bloc, however, was based from the beginning on multilateral agreements. 
132 • Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes 
4. Revision would especially be required in her image of process and her 
image of geographic location. 
5. However, Lange's formulation left no reason to believe that Norway was 
committed to a Scandinavian orientation as an alternative to the United 
Nations. In fact, quite the opposite is implied: under certain circumstances 
Norway might be compelled to opt for a policy different from Denmark or 
Sweden since different problems are often not susceptible of common solu­
tions. 
6. The plans were presented to the Council on April 23-24, 1948. For an 
excellent and exhaustive chronological account of the public statements of the 
three major actors in the Scandinavian defense negotiations and discussions 
from January, 1948, to April, 1949, see Barbara Haskel, "Fors0ket pa a skape 
et Skandinavisk forsvarsforbund," Internasjonal Politikk, II (1965), pp. 
91-131. 
7. Foreign Minister linden was in Oslo on May 3, 1948. See Wilhelm 
Keilhau, "Norway and the Atlantic Pact," Norseman, Vol. VII (March-April, 
1949). 
8. This date was the occasion of the National Convention of the Social 
Democrats in Sweden which was attended by Danish Prime Minister Hedtoft 
and Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen. The latter, in an address to the 
delegates, stated that "the question of cooperation in the military field has 
been lately raised in different quarters. We ought perhaps to examine whether 
there exists a basis for such cooperation." See Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetarpartis Kongress, Protokoll, May 9-14, 1948, pp. 17-18. Swedish Prime 
Minister Erlander said, "It is an urgent task to examine whether the confi­
dence, friendship, and trust can become the basis for a practical cooperation," 
although difficulties which could not be underestimated would have to be 
overcome. Hedtoft said that co-operation was necessary because a threat to one 
country in Scandinavia was a threat to all of them. 
9. The lecture was delivered on June 4, 1948. Halvard Lange, Norsk 
Utenriks-politikk siden 1945 (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1952), p. 69. 
10. lhid. Lange said in this regard that "the defensive ability which a 
co-ordinated defense would represent would exceed the arithmetic sum of the 
three countries' defenses." Lange, it should be noted, always, spoke on terms 
of "defense coordination" or "cooperation" and never in terms of a "pact" or 
an "alliance." This becomes even more significant in retrospect, since it is 
known that the Swedes were, at least privately, speaking in these latter terms. 
11. Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
12. Ibid., p. 70. The following day, June 5, 1948, Lange said in a speech 
in Copenhagen that "we in Norway consider that the development of the 
military technique during and since the last war has put us, strategically 
speaking, in a very exposed position. We therefore think it right to recognize 
realistically that the possibility of keeping our country out of any future war is 
not particularly great." Cited in the Norseman, VI (July-August, 1948), 254. 
13. On the general subject of Danish foreign policy during this period the 
best capsule summary can be found in Erik Reske-Nielsen and Erik Kragh, 
Atlantpagten og Danmark 1949-62 (K0benhavn: Atlantsammenslutningen, 
1962), chap, i, "Vejen Til Atlantpagten," especially pp. 26-48; for a 
summary in English see Sven Henningsen, "The Foreign Policy of Denmark," 
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in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, Foreign Policies in a World 
of Change (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 100-103. 
14. The statement was made by Foreign Minister Rasmussen on June 2, 
1948, two days prior to Lange's Malmo address, in a foreign policy debate in 
the lower house (Folketing) of the Rigsdag. Cited in G. Naesselund Hansen, 
"Current Problems in Danish Foreign Policy," Norseman, VI (July-August, 
1948), 217. 
15. Reference here is to Hans Hedtoft. The "Scandinavianism1' of the 
Prime Minister is discussed in Carlo Christensen, "Hans Hedtoft," American 
Scandinavian Review, XLIII (June, 1955), 136-40. 
16. On this see Hans Engen, "Disagreement in the North,1' Norseman, VI 
(July-August, 1948), 213, who argued, "Denmark cannot be defended . 
Discussions concerning a Northern Alliance should therefore in reality he 
confined to Norway and Sweden." See also Franklin Scott, The United States 
and Scandinavia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 308. 
17. See Haskel, op. cit. 
18. An articulate activist element advocating greater Swedish involvement 
in international politics has long existed in Sweden, although it has never 
been able to obtain widespread public support or influence decisively govern­
ment policy. Nevertheless Sweden has had many close calls: in the Crimean 
War and the Schleswig-Holstein crisis in the nineteenth century, and in the 
twentieth century during the Union crisis of 1905 and on behalf of Finland 
both in World War I and World War II. See Herbert Tingsten, "Issues in 
Swedish Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1959), 474. Ting­
sten, the editor of Dagens Nyheter, is a modem activist, having long been a 
leading proponent of Swedish membership in the Atlantic alliance. 
19. See Karl Birnbaum, Swedish Foreign Policy (Stockholm: The Swedish 
Institute, 1962), pp. 1-5; and Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "Sweden: Neutralism or 
Neutrality?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVII (January, 1961), 
68-75. 
20. See Rowland Kenney, The Northern Tangle (London: J. M. Dent, 
1946), pp. 221-22. 
21. The great appeal and almost unquestioned efficacy of the non-alliance 
policy which is often said to exist among the Swedes is given strong expression 
in Ake Sandier, "Sweden's Post-War Diplomacy: Some Problems, Views, and 
Issues," Western Political Quarterly, CXXXI (December, 1960), 924-33. See 
also Nils Andre'n and Ake Landqvist, Svensk Utrikespolitik efter Krigen 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1965). 
22. Reske-Nielsen and Kragh, op. cit., pp. 45-47; Sandier, op. cit., p. 184. 
23. Unden made this statement in a speech to the Social Democrats' 
National Convention on May 11, 1948. See Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetarpartis Kongress, Protokoll, p. 124. 
24. On this point see Tingsten, op. cit., p. 475; and Sandier, op. cit., pp. 
179, 184. 
25. Swedish Defense Minister Vough quoted in Stockholms Tidingen, 
April 27, 1948 (editorial). See also Gunnar Hagglof, A Test of Neutrality 
(Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1961), pp. 21-22, who cites the military 
posture of Sweden (in addition to broad domestic political support and the 
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"balance of power") as an important factor in her defense of neutrality in 
World War II; and Birnbaum, op. cit., p. 4. 
26. See on this Gunnar Heckscher, Sweden and the East-West Conflict 
(Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1961), p. 4; and Sandier, op. dt., p. 184. 
27. The meeting was held in Stockholm on September 8-9, 1948. 
28. Reference here is to Senate Resolution 239, June 11, 1948, reported in 
Department of State Bulletin, XIX (July 18, 1948), 79-80. 
29. Negotiations opened on July 6, 1948. 
30. Hans Engen, "Disagreement in the North," Norseman, VI 
(July-August, 1948), 213. Engen suggests that Swedish aloofness from great 
power blocs would be threatened if Norway or Denmark were associated with 
the great powers. "For this, in the opinion of the Swedish government, would 
undermine the foundations of Swedish neutrality policy. If Norway, for 
example, pledged itself to the West, the Soviet Union would no longer take 
seriously Sweden's ability to maintain its neutrality. It must be a primary task 
of the Swedish government to prevent Norway from pledging itself to the 
West. This presumably is the chief reason why the Swedish government is 
now favorably disposed to the idea of a Northern military alliance. It is an 
attempt to offer compensation to Norway for the security which it would 
otherwise seek in an agreement with the West." 
31. Viktige storpolitiske Dokumenter 1945-50, (Bergen: Chr. Michelsens 
Institutt, 1950), pp. 89-90. 
32. See the Baltimore Sun, September 10, 1948. 
33. The meeting was held on October 15, 1948. For additional information 
see News of Norway, VI, No. 3 (October 23, 1948), 2. The members of the 
Commission were for Norway: Trygve Bratteli, Dag Bryn, W. Munthe Kaas, 
and Lt. General Ole Berg; for Denmark: Vice-Admiral A. H. Vedel, Frantz 
Hvass, Poul Hansen, and Harald Petersen; and for Sweden: Carl Hamilton, 
Elon Anderson, Sven Andersson (later replaced by G. F. Thapper), and Nils 
Swedlund. 
34. The speech was before a blue-ribbon audience in Oslo on October 19, 
1948, in honor of the Linge Company, the famous wartime underground 
group which sabotaged the Nazi's heavy water production at Rjukan. See 
Morgenhladet, October 20, 1948. 
35. Ibid. It is interesting to note that following the war a special investiga­
tion commission was appointed to probe the actions of Norwegian officials 
preceding and following the German invasion. The report strongly criticized 
the defense policies of the Nygaardsvold government, held Foreign Minister 
Koht "negligent" in keeping the government informed, and sharply criticized 
Defense Minister Ljungberg for failing to strengthen Norwegian defenses 
until the night of the invasion. The major actors responded by demanding a 
trial before the Norwegian High Court. That the official charges of negligence 
and "too little too late" and the dramatic events that followed served as 
"lessons" to the postwar government has been suggested as a part of the 
so-called Ninth of April complex. Norway Digest, Vol. XLIX, December 6, 
1946; and Vol. L, December 13, 1946. 
36. Stortingstidende, "Regegj0relse fra utenriksministeren om den utenriks­
politiske situasjon," October 30, 1948. 
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37. Ibid., p. 1984. Lange also noted that the continuing tension could lead 
to a "hysterical anticommunism in the West, tempting the democracies to 
cooperate openly with authoritarian regimes." 
38. Ibid., p. 1984-85. This "third image" view of war was especially 
pronounced in Lange's Military Society speech in April. For a provoking 
analysis of images of the "causes" of war, see Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, 
and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), passim. 
39. Lange made specific reference here to the Indochina problem, Pales­
tine, and Kashmir. 
40. Ibid., p. 1985. In this regard Lange mentioned the inability of the UN 
to establish international control over nuclear weapons. The failure he attrib­
uted directly to the refusal of the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European states to 
accept any form of international control. This is worth noting for most of 
Lange's references to the Soviet Union (unlike this one) are presented as 
evaluations made by others rather than his own judgments. 
41. Ibid., p. 1986. 
42. In a different context the Foreign Minister spoke of the "exposed 
strategic position Norway has today as a consequence of the development of 
air and war techniques." References to the evolution of "war techniques" and 
their transformation of Norway's strategic position can be traced back to the 
early 1940's, and they continued to be made frequently through the bridge-
building period of Norwegian policy. 
43. Ibid. Lange added, "Nevertheless it is clear that there is so much 
which binds us together that we must attempt to see if it is possible to 
overcome that which separates.'' In any case the scope of the investigations is 
apparently including both economic and military problems, and the nature of 
the investigations is to determine consequences of a Scandinavian defense 
arrangement for the security needs of each of the countries. 
44. Stortingstidende, "Debatt om utenriksministerens redegj0relse 30 okt. 
og 6 desbr.," December 10, 1948, p. 2530. 
45. Ibid., p. 2533. Lange, in answer to criticism which suggested that he 
was short-sighted with regard to the danger of war, said "I have not said that 
we are confronted by an immediate danger of war. . But there are present 
at all times the possibilities of an unpremeditated explosion, and it is not 
defensible to close one's eyes to the anguish and uncertainty about what the 
near future can bring." 
46. Ibid. Lange said there were limits, not far removed, to Norway's ability 
to defend herself without seriously threatening the program of reconstruction. 
Moreover this threshold should not be crossed in Lange's view for it would 
weaken the "defense will" of the people. 
47. Although the Storting gave overwhelming support to the foreign policy 
of the government, it came under strong criticism from the Communists (who 
refused support) as well as from others (including some in the Labor party) 
who felt either that the government was not moving with sufficient speed to 
solve Norway's security problems or that the government was adopting an 
excessively negative attitude toward the possibilities of a Scandinavian defense 
arrangement. It should be noted that the government requested and the 
Storting provided another extraordinary defense appropriation on December 
10, 1948, in excess of the 100 million kroner ($20 million) appropriated on 
March 16, 1948. 
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48. From Arbeiderbladet, cited in News of Norway, VI, No. 12 CDecem­
ber 25, 1948), 46. 
49. The Defense Commission met November 15-17, 1948, in 
Saltsjobaden, Sweden, and December 15-19 in Hornbaek, Denmark. 
50. Tim Greve, Norway and NATO (Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 
1963), p. 12, states that around the New Year of 1949 the Norwegian and 
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discussions see Haskel, op. cit. 
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gian perception of "dangers" which can threaten the peace (i.e., politico-
military vacuums) were not the same "dangers" perceived by the Swedes. 
56. Arbeiderbladet, January 3, 1949. 
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The Trend of 
Norwegian Foreign Policy 
The evolution of the Norwegian strategic image.—Prior to the 
outbreak of World War II, the authoritative Norwegian foreign 
policy elite perceived the structure of the international system in 
terms of great powers and small powers, with the process of 
international politics determined by the interactions among the 
great powers, whose respective aims, needs, and ambitions inevi­
tably led to the condition of violent conflict. The Norwegian 
elite also assumed that small states were not similarly motivated 
and had no interests in the conflicts among the great powers. In 
addition it did not perceive Norway to be "strategically located" 
and further assumed that declarations of neutrality based on 
international law would be respected and effective in the event 
of a future great power conflict. The Norwegian goal therefore 
was to maintain freedom of action in order to keep out of war 
should it occur, and its policy was to create the conditions that 
would make neutrality possible. This meant, in peacetime, that 
Norway would have to avoid commitments to any powers that 
might become embroiled in a conflict in the foreseeable future, 
i.e., by definition, all great powers. Under these circumstances 
perceptions of friendship and hostility were not prominent in the 
policy articulations of Norwegian policy-makers, nor were ques­
tions of ideology since different criteria were employed to govern 
the selection of alternatives and consideration of contingencies. 
It is clear that the key elements of the Norwegian strategic 
image were the perception of process (i.e., that the rules interna­
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tional law were, and would be, operational in any future war, 
thereby permitting neutrality) and their perception of their geo­
graphic location (i.e., that they were favorably endowed by a 
peripheral location vis-a-vis continental European struggles, a 
position that would enable them to remain aloof from any future 
European imbroglio). 
April 9, 1940, proved these two key assumptions, on which 
Norwegian policy was based, to have been incorrect. The judg­
ment of Norwegian policy-makers about the strategic importance 
of the western portion of Scandinavian peninsula was not shared 
by military authorities in Germany nor by political leaders in 
Britain (e.g., Churchill). And in the war which did ensue these 
strategic considerations outweighed Norway's unilateral declara­
tion of neutrality that was undefended and without guarantee. 
When the war did come, responsible policy-makers continued 
to assert the same judgments, arguing essentially that Norway 
was betrayed by an aggressive and hateful foreign great power. 
However, others made different evaluations, holding that the 
invasion of Norway was the result of its great strategic impor­
tance coupled with its isolationist policy that precluded effective 
aid in the event of attack, and an antipathy toward defense 
preparations that rendered impossible self-defense. This latter 
group soon gained control of the foreign policy-making machin­
ery of the Norwegian government in London. 
The strategic image of this new group was quite different 
from the former. This group perceived the system in terms of 
nation-states, some large and some small, but all states were a 
part of an inchoate and imperfect but nevertheless interdepend­
ent community in which it was difficult for one nation to isolate 
itself from the consequences of the actions of others. The process 
of international politics was seen as dominated by the great 
powers, and thus the substance of international politics would be 
determined for better or worse by the actions of and interactions 
among the great powers. Further the new elite judged the loca­
tion of Norway to be "exposed" and "strategic" rather than 
peripheral; thus, Norway was thought to be particularly "in­
volved" in international politics by virtue of her location. 
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As a result of these judgments a new action orientation 
emerged. No longer would Norway attempt to insure security by 
establishing in peacetime the conditions for neutrality in the 
event of war, but it would aim at collaborating with other na­
tions to help insure that another war would not occur. It was no 
longer possible in the judgment of the new Norwegian policy 
elite to separate conditions of war from conditions of peace. Both 
were viewed as inescapable conditions of international life. 
The policy that evolved from these new judgments was the 
"Atlantic policy," which looked to the solution of international 
problems and problems associated with national security on a 
regional basis. Later in the war, however, the Norwegian goal 
orientation was modified. Rather than work for the solution of 
national security problems on the basis of regional co-operation, 
the establishment of the United Nations Organization meant 
that the dilemma of national security was to be solved on the 
basis of universal collaboration. 
This new goal orientation resulted in another change in Nor­
wegian foreign policy that manifested itself in two phases. The 
first phase might be described as the "United Nations policy," 
the aim of which was to establish the prerequisites for an effec­
tive solution of national security problems on a universal basis 
through collective security. This policy therefore supported the 
establishment of a "strong' universal international organization 
in which those who possessed power would be given the author­
ity to use it. This first phase of Norwegian foreign policy was 
successful in the sense that a "strong' international organization 
with security functions was in fact established. Norwegian goal 
orientation was then refocused, aiming at the creation of the 
necessary conditions for the successful functioning of the United 
Nations Organization. This led to a new policy, one that has 
been referred to as the policy of "bridgebuilding," that is a 
behavioral pattern characterized by taking all actions that would 
facilitate congenial relations among the great powers and refrain­
ing from all actions that might affect adversely the relations 
among the great powers. During this period Norwegian security 
policy was rooted in the UN as a security instrument and there­
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fore depended on the ability of the Security Council to meet 
threats to the peace effectively. 
Consequently, one of the crucial variables underlying the 
Norwegian policy of bridgebuilding was the ability of the great 
powers to co-operate in reaching the solution of those problems 
that could threaten the existence of peace. In early 1948, how­
ever, the Norwegians acknowledged the existence of tensions in 
international politics that undermined the basic assumptions of 
the United Nations as a security instrument. Finally the Norwe­
gians perceived a threat to world peace (the existence of military 
and political vacuums in strategically located areas during times 
of rising tensions) that required them to search for means other 
than the United Nations and universal collaboration as the basis 
of their security policy. 
Two dimensions of the Norwegian strategic image now be­
came significant in the consideration of the alternative for an 
effective and adequate security policy. One concerned a convic­
tion about the process of international politics (referred to as 
"historical experience") that in times of conflict powerful protag­
onists will pre-empt areas of strategic importance. And second, 
the judgment that postwar bloc configurations and the new 
"techniques" of warfare had made Norway an area of strategic 
importance. After the Norwegians perceived the existence of 
deep-rooted conflict among the two great powers, the two judg­
ments converged, leading to the important conclusions that 
(1) Norwegian national security was threatened, and, more­
over, (2) a weak Norway was itself a threat to international 
stability. 
As a result, the goal orientation of the Norwegian government 
was again modified. It looked primarily to the establishment of a 
'new equilibrium' that would again provide the basis for inter­
national stability, and secondarily to an increase in the defense 
capability of Norway. Operationalizing the primary goal sug­
gested to the policy elite Norwegian ties to a broad-based re­
gional arrangement that would possess political, economic, and 
military viability and vitality. Moreover, the realization of the 
secondary goal was not feasible, for a variety of reasons,1 in the 
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absence of Norwegian collaboration with other nations. Thus, in 
order to make both goals operational, the Norwegians opted for a 
traditional strategy: participation in an alliance system. The 
Norwegian foreign policy elite was again probing for a regional 
solution to its security dilemma. 
Norwegian consideration of a Scandinavian alternative.— 
Although the Norwegian government had, during the period of 
the war, rejected the concept of a neutral Scandinavian bloc, and 
even though it was clear that a neutral Scandinavian bloc was 
not consistent either with the Norwegians' perception of the 
dangers that inhered in international politics or with their view 
of the best strategy to re-create international stability and a 
working foundation for the UN, the first attempt to shape a 
regional solution for Norwegian security problems was made 
within the Scandinavian area. 
Barring a radical revision of the basic assumptions held by 
both the Swedish and Norwegian foreign policy elites, it was 
predictable that the attempt to create a Scandinavian alliance 
would not succeed. In order to examine the problems encoun­
tered in the Scandinavian defense negotiations, a comparative 
examination of the strategic images held by each of the major 
actors should be reviewed. 
First, both the Norwegians and the Swedes envisioned their 
national purpose in terms of the maintenance of independence 
and the freedom to shape their own internal affairs. The geo­
graphic dimension of the cognitive component of the strategic 
image of both was similar; they both conceived themselves as 
occupying a strategically important area. However, their respec­
tive images of process resulted in a fundamentally different 
evaluation of the consequences for each of them of their exposed 
position. The Swedes tended to view their location in terms of its 
meaning for potentially interested great powers. They reasoned 
that if the Scandinavian peninsula were of strategic importance, 
it would be so for both sides, and thus all, in the absence of 
provocation, would have an incentive to leave the area in peace. 
The Norwegians, on the other hand, seemed to view the threat 
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to their own security and to Scandinavia in terms of a "'threat 
situation'' rather than in terms of a potential threat from one or 
another side in a future conflict. The Norwegians reasoned that 
in times of tension it was very destabilizing and therefore dan­
gerous to have strategically important areas inadequately 
defended, a situation they viewed as dangerous and tension-
producing because, even without provocation, it tempted 
pre-emption by strategy-conscious great powers. Such pre-emption 
did not necessarily require an aggressive great power, for it might 
be carried out for defensive reasons. Nevertheless, when it did 
occur, the result would be the same for the Norwegian people, 
and thus the only way to prevent such an "unpremeditated 
explosion" (as the Foreign Minister referred to the danger) was 
to insure in advance that pre-emptive occupation would not be 
feasible. The result of these different views however can be 
simply stated: the Swedes calculated highly the probability that 
they could keep outside a future conflict if it should occur;2 the 
Norwegians conversely attached a very low probability to their 
opportunity to escape involvement in the event of a future 
conflict. 
Their respective images of process also included another di­
mension which affected their policy judgments. The Swedes 
seemed to judge that the building of great power blocs was in 
and of itself destabilizing behavior; thus their offer of an isolated 
Scandinavian alliance to the Norwegians and the Danes served 
two purposes: first, it would tend to limit the comprehensiveness 
of the evolving Western bloc system, and second, it would pre­
clude a provocative great power foothold in the Scandinavian 
area. Both of these aims, had they become accomplished 
facts, would have served what the Swedes viewed as in the best 
interests of national security and international stability. The 
Norwegians, on the other hand, tended to view the process of 
international politics in a more complex way. They felt that 
international stability was a sine qua non for national security, 
that the two were inseparable and could best be guaranteed on a 
universal basis. Once it was clear that a universal collective se­
curity system did not exist, the Norwegians felt that regional se­
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curity systems would best serve the stability of international 
political relations by creating a "new equilibrium" that would, in 
turn, serve as the foundation for mutual respect among the great 
powers. The Norwegians were clearly more "system oriented" 
than were the Swedes, and it is obvious that they viewed their 
national fate as irrevocably tied to the course of events in interna­
tional politics.3 Thus the Norwegians looked to the creation of 
new "power factors" in the world, for in their view it was 
weakness leading to miscalculation, and ambiguity leading to 
misinformation, that would most likely be responsible for a new 
war. 
In short the Norwegians did not adhere to the Swedish con­
cept of the "divisibility of peace"; in the judgment of the Norwe­
gians, if war came, Norway was certain to be involved. The 
primary Norwegian concern therefore was to create a "power 
factor" sufficiently strong to deter pre-emption and to prevent 
miscalculation and misinformation, and thereby the unwanted 
war. 
Thus the temptation to argue that Norway was more con­
cerned with short-term military security in the event of war 
while the Swedes were concerned with employing political 
means to help insure that the unwanted war did not occur is to 
be avoided as beside the point.4 It is true that the Swedes did not 
share the anxiety apparently felt by the Norwegians in the 
situation in which they both found themselves in 1948-49. 
Thus the Swedes were hoping for a solution to Norway's secu­
rity dilemma that would not, in the view of the Swedes, exacer­
bate tensions. However, because the Norwegian view of both the 
existing dangers and of the optimal basis for stability and tension 
reduction differed fundamentally with those same judgments of 
the Swedes, the Norwegians found themselves in the position of 
being able to reconcile the requirements of their short-term 
security needs with their long-term aim of contributing to the 
evolution of more stable international relationships. 
Thus the different strategic images of the Norwegians and the 
Swedes resulted in different operational goal orientations that, in 
turn, required different strategies. With regard to their respec­
150 • Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes 
tive goals, the Norwegians were oriented toward alliances as a 
means of strengthening their own national security and interna­
tional stability. The underlying assumption of the policy was the 
judgment that politico-military vacuums were destabilizing to 
international security and a threat to national security. The 
Swedes were oriented toward the maintenance of conditions that 
would permit neutrality in war. Thus the policy of "non­
alliance" was modified in favor of Norway and Denmark in the 
hope of precluding their membership in the Western alliance 
system. The underlying assumption was that Scandinavia as a 
strategic unit need not be involved in a future conflict, and the 
specific assumptions were (1) a great power foothold on the 
Scandinavian peninsula would be provocative, making the 
Swedish position more vulnerable, and (2) politico-military 
blocs were destabilizing. The Norwegians and the Swedes thus 
disagreed both on the optimal strategy to deter war and the 
optimal strategy to guarantee national security, and it was be­
cause of these fundamentally different evaluations that the Scan­
dinavian defense alliance was not formed. 
If the absence of similar evaluations of the "facts" of their 
respective security problems and their resulting inability to agree 
on the optimal strategy to solve these problems was the cause of 
the failure of Scandinavian defense negotiations to reach a posi­
tive result, then some examination of their commencement is 
required, especially since some have speculated on the purpose of 
the Norwegians' entering the negotiations in the first place. 
As the title of the preceding chapter implies, the range of 
alternatives, as far as the Norwegians were concerned, was not a 
Scandinavian bloc or an Atlantic bloc, but rather an alternative 
on the one side of a Scandinavian bloc related in some way to the 
Atlantic powers, or membership in the Atlantic arrangement 
direcdy. It is to be recalled that the Norwegians agreed to the 
investigation of the Scandinavian Defense Commission on the 
basis of the political assumptions embraced by the Swedes, i.e., 
that the investigation would proceed as if the proposed Scandina­
vian alliance were to be neutral. Thus, the technical findings of 
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the Scandinavian defense investigations might have resulted in a 
revision of the assumptions of the Norwegians and therefore 
have made possible the establishment of a Scandinavian defense 
alliance. The fact however, is that the findings of the defense 
investigation tended rather to reinforce the assumptions of the 
Norwegians; thus it must be assumed that only the above-
mentioned options envisioned by the Norwegians were the oper­
ational alternatives during the period of the political discussions. 
This conclusion is further supported by the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister's many statements prior to, during, and after the politi­
cal discussions in January, 1949, and it is this point which seems 
to have been missed in subsequent analyses of this watershed 
period in the foreign policies of the Scandinavian countries. 
The subtle argumentation in which Lange engaged regarding 
the question of "an isolated Scandinavian pact without formal 
ties to the West" has already been pointed out. The continued 
repetition of this argument reveals, in context, that Lange was 
placing emphasis on the word formal, while the Swedes were 
emphasizing (without equivocation) the word isolated, i.e., the 
absence of ties with any great powers. In a statement to the 
Storting in February, 1949, Lange stated fairly clearly what it 
was the Norwegians were advocating during the period of the 
political discussions. He said that the two sides were not in 
agreement on the "character of the alliance-free pact" and that 
the central question concerned the nature such a pact would 
assume in the absence of a connection to the evolving Western 
alliance system. Perhaps even more revealing, however, is the 
Foreign Minister's statement that 
From the Norwegian side, in order to reach a common solution, we 
were willing to consider giving up the idea of a formal connection 
to the more comprehensive security system which is evolving in order 
to reach a common [Scandinavian] solution.5 
The Foreign Minister pointed out that this would have involved 
a substantial concession from the Norwegian side, but the 
concession was never made because 
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In the meantime we found that we were not able to accept that we 
should not discuss politico-security realities with the Western great 
6powers.
Thus the essential political difference is revealed in bold relief. 
The Norwegians were willing to make the concession that there 
would be no formal ties between a "neutral" Scandinavian bloc 
and the West, but that 'understandings" and contacts would 
nevertheless have to exist between the two entities.7 The Swedes 
could not accept this orientation. As Lange himself stated in this 
same address, the Swedes persisted in their view "that the pro­
posed defense pact must in all respects, both formally and in 
reality, be isolated." Lange said that the Norwegians, on the 
other hand, did not feel justified in precluding for themselves 
the possibilities of discussing security problems with the West. 
The Norwegians viewed the proposed Scandinavian bloc as 
ostensibly "alliance-free' but nevertheless loosely and informally 
tied to the Western bloc. The Swedes (never giving evidence to 
the contrary) could not accept this concept of a Scandinavian 
subsystem within a larger Western security system. In fact, as 
early as May, 1948, the Swedish Foreign Minister noted that 
among the advocates of Scandinavian co-operation are those in­
terested in Scandinavian inclusion in a Western bloc. He added, 
"It is clear that the Swedish Government, which does not wish to 
join a West bloc, is no less unwilling to do so via a Scandinavian 
alliance.1' 
The Swedish position was unequivocal, and it is quite obvious 
that what the Norwegians advocated, if accepted, would have 
fundamentally altered the political basis of Swedish foreign pol­
icy. Lange's reference, however, to the investigations of the 
Scandinavian Defense Commission as supporting the Norwe­
gian view is indicative of Lange's strategy: he was perhaps 
hopeful of altering Swedish assumptions when the Swedes 
viewed their implications in the light of the technical findings. 
The problem was, however, that for the Swedes the question of 
the political basis of their foreign policy was not susceptible of 
empirical argument. It was based on a principle that had stood 
the test of time, that was rooted in a strategic image that did not 
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admit to the existence of the same "facts" as did the Norwegians' 
evaluation of the situation in international politics. 
Thus, more specifically, the Scandinavian defense negotia­
tions failed because the Norwegians desired a Scandinavian bloc 
as in fact, if not organically, a subsystem within a larger Western 
security arrangement, and this desire was the issue between 
Norway and Sweden that became the substance of the political 
negotiations. Thus, to answer the question posed above, the 
implication is that the Norwegians entered the political discus­
sions because the political issue between the two might have 
been resolved in favor of Norway, especially in view of the 
findings of the technical investigations. 
Although no attempt has been made here to examine systemat­
ically the internal dynamics of the Norwegian foreign policy 
process, it is worth mentioning that the Scandinavian defense 
negotiations probably did work to political advantage of the 
authoritative foreign policy elite on the domestic scene. Al­
though the point about to be made is usually advanced in the 
polemical literature, suggesting a 'charade" on the part of Lange, 
it does have to its credit the recognition that the prerequisites for 
a Scandinavian alliance never did exist. 
The "charade hypothesis" in its basic form, is somewhat dia­
bolical, suggesting that the government engaged in the exercise 
of the Scandinavian defense negotiations in order to overcome 
domestic political opposition to Norwegian participation in a 
Western alliance system; thus the Foreign Minister was never 
"serious" about the Scandinavian discussions. The prototype ar­
gument would be as follows: 
Within Norway a hardcore element existed that was opposed 
to alliances. This hardcore included a small group on the right 
that would have Norway follow an independent national policy 
based on the traditional principles of neutrality, and left-wing 
members of the Labor party who were opposed to Norwegian 
association in a Western bloc for ideological and political rea­
sons. Some among this latter group, in fact, were decidedly cool 
toward the Marshall Plan for the same reason. Thus if Lange 
were to solve what he perceived as the Norwegian security 
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dilemma, he had to win over one or both of these groups. Thus 
in early 1948, when Lange began to recognize publicly the 
existence of international tensions that undermined the effec­
tiveness of the UN, he succeeded in turning attention to a 
co-operative Scandinavian effort to solve Norwegian security 
problems. By so doing he won an important preliminary victory, 
for the neutralists and pacifists in his own party were induced, 
by accepting the concept of a Scandinavian alliance, to accept 
the underlying assumption that Norway could not provide na­
tional security unilaterally. Thus the "pacifists/neutralists'" be­
came "Scandinavians." However, once it was demonstrated that 
the Scandinavian alliance could not provide the security that was 
required, the "new" Scandinavians had unwittingly sloughed the 
only possible basis for effective opposition to Norwegian associa­
tion with the Western bloc and were left with little choice 
except to accept the Atlantic Pact. Thus once the neutralists had 
been converted to Scandinavians, the domestic political battle 
had been largely won. 
Although the analysis of the negotiations provided above sug­
gests that this imputation of motive is probably without founda­
tion, even a superficial examination of the political problems 
faced by the government indicates the utility of the Scandina­
vian defense negotiations (and especially the findings of the 
joint investigations) in overcoming the domestic political obsta­
cles that had to be surmounted if any multilateral security policy 
were to be pursued. 
Indeed, when the final discussions of the Atlantic pact oc­
curred in the Storting, the opposition's arguments were weak, 
inconsistent, and doctrinal.8 The debate, for the most part took 
place between the Communists and the Laborites,9 and the 
spokesmen for the government gave innocuous answers to 
largely irrelevant objections. Certainly the potential thrust of the 
opposition, logically and politically undermined by their initial 
acceptance of a Scandinavian solution, was further deflected by 
the extended period of the Scandinavian investigations, an alter­
native that was never really debated in the Storting until after it 
was no longer an alternative. A simultaneous rather than sequen­
The Trend of Norwegian Foreign Policy • 155 
rial consideration of the two alternatives would have certainly 
affected the internal fight in the Labor party. Furthermore, the 
Lange-Torp mission to Washington delayed even further ex­
tended debate of the Atlantic alternative, which by the time of 
decision in early March was the only remaining multilateral 
security option open to the Norwegians. Thus, when the conclu­
sion was drawn that a neutral Scandinavia could not be self-
sufficient either in defense preparations or in the event of war, 
and once it was clear that the Swedes would not accept the 
concept of informal ties between Scandinavia and the West in 
the area of security policy, the neutralists-turned-Scandinavians 
were inextricably caught in an inexorable logic that permitted 
them no other course than to accept, as most of them did, the 
only other alternative, in addition to the non-aggression pact 
with the U.S.S.R., open at the time: Norwegian membership in 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
However, while the internal political process mentioned 
briefly here raises interesting questions related to parliamentary 
control over foreign policy and to the tactical genius of political 
leadership, the evidence seems to show clearly that the basic 
"charade" assumption is not tenable and is certainly not consist­
ent with the decisive issues in the negotiations. 
It is sufficient to say that the government probably benefited 
from the "public education" gained as a result of the attempted 
Scandinavian solution to the problem of Norwegian security. 
Another proffered and more widely accepted explanation for 
the failure of the Scandinavian defense negotiations and Nor­
way's subsequent membership in the Atlantic alliance is that 
which suggests American pressure in general, and specifically 
the refusal of the U.S. to give arms supply priority to a Scandina­
vian bloc as the 'cause'' of the breakdown. 
As acknowledged above, the report of the Scandinavian De­
fense Commission stated that substantial rearmament would 
have to be undertaken in Norway and Denmark, and Sweden 
would have to engage in a fairly comprehensive program of arms 
modernization. This immediately raised the question of arms 
supplies, for it was certain that neither Norway nor Denmark, 
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neither of whom possessed significant armaments industries, 
could rearm on a substantial scale without undermining their 
international financial position and ultimately their reconstruc­
tion programs, and Sweden acknowledged her lack of capacity to 
provide the necessary arms to her neighbors. Thus Norway and 
Denmark would be required to procure arms from abroad. 
As previously mentioned, all of the actors in the negotiations 
were agreed on this question of arms procurement necessitated 
by the requirement to increase their defense capability. One 
intervening factor, however, somewhat complicates the consider­
ation of the question of the relation of American arms deliveries 
to the eventual failure of the negotiations. A State Department 
Press Officer,10 one week prior to the second round of negotia­
tions in Copenhagen, announced concerning American arms 
supplies that "It is natural that such supplies as may be available 
should go to countries associated with us in collective defense 
arrangements." u Although it is not absolutely clear whether the 
statement was directed specifically toward Scandinavia, it nev­
ertheless caused some consternation in the North, as it did in the 
U.S. The statement was labeled as "poorly timed" and "careless"' 
by many, and James Reston, writing in the New York Times 
suggested that it was intended to test the aims of several of the 
European countries with regard to the proposed Atlantic Pact. 
Reston indicated that the United States was hopeful of gaining 
the co-operation of Denmark (and Greenland), Portugal (and 
the Azores), and Iceland, Eire, Norway, and Sweden, 'all of 
whom have certain facilities necessary to an effective Atlantic 
security system." 12 
Undoubtedly, there was great interest in the U.S. regarding 
Scandinavian participation in the Atlantic defense system under 
negotiation, but Reston, again writing in the New York Times 
after the failure of the Scandinavian defense negotiations, ques­
tioned the wisdom of the U.S. policy toward the Scandinavian 
discussions.13 
Reston discussed the Atlantic Pact as embodying two primary 
concepts: the political and the military. He indicated pressure, 
asserting that the questions of Scandinavia's membership in the 
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alliance was discussed by the National Security Council in the 
U.S., and N.S.C. analysts had concluded that ''the North Atlan­
tic Pact would definitely be weakened, in strategic and psycho­
logical terms, if Norway and Denmark did not join. 
Reston suggests, however, that the National Security Council 
may have overemphasized the military concept of the Pact at the 
expense of the political value to both Scandinavia and the North 
Atlantic Alliance of a neutral Scandinavian bloc. Further, he 
suggests that military concepts had dictated the American posi­
tion regarding the Scandinavian defense negotiations in general 
and defense supplies in particular. The problematical point that 
emerges, however, is the assumption made by Reston and by 
many others " examining the same issues, that in some way the 
U.S. might have been able to alter the outcome of the Scandina­
vian defense negotiations by having taken a different position 
with regard to the question of the deliveries of defense material 
to a neutral Scandinavian bloc.15 Although this argument has 
appeal, it fails to take account of the deep political schism that 
existed between Norway and Sweden regarding the relationship 
of the proposed Scandinavian pact to the larger Western security 
system. 
Speaking hypothetically, for illustration, it can be said that if 
the Oslo meeting had been successful, that is, if Sweden had 
submitted to the Norwegian demand to have consultations with 
the leaders of the Western alliance system regarding what the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister referred to as "politico-security real­
ities,1' then (but only then) would the "prerequisites" for a 
Scandinavian alliance have existed from the point of view of 
Norway. And, were this concession made by Sweden, and had 
the U.S. persisted in its policy of arms deliveries to non-
associated states, then it could be assumed that the U.S. had in 
fact blitzed the Scandinavian defense negotiations. Although it 
might be argued that the U.S. would not have changed its 
articulated policy, this hypothetical confrontation did not in fact 
take place, since the necessary prerequisites (i.e., •political agree­
ment between Norway and Sweden) for the confrontation be­
tween the U.S. and the Scandinavians failed to materialize. 
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Consequently, with regard to the arms supply hypothesis the 
conclusion must be reached that the question of military supplies 
was not decisive in the Scandinavian defense negotiations due to 
the inability of the participants to agree on the larger question of 
the political orientation of the proposed alliance, an issue that 
had plagued the discussion of a "Scandinavian solution'' since 
the spring of 1948.16 
Finally, a related (and very common) explanation for the 
choice made by the Norwegian government to join the Atlantic 
alliance suggests that economic implications were decisive, that 
Norwegian Socialists were not about to sacrifice their social and 
economic programs for defense. This analysis is obviously credi­
ble and was on several occasions explicitly supported by one of 
the principal Norwegian actors, the Defense Minister, who 
argued that in the absence of external aid either (1) the time 
period for reconstruction would have to be extended or (2) the 
security program would have to be reduced. 
It can be assumed straight away that both of these conditions 
of a self-reliant security policy were unacceptable to the Norwe­
gians. The government had never considered reducing the de­
fense effort; in fact, quite the contrary is the case as is demon­
strated by the extraordinary defense appropriations in 1948. The 
second condition, postponing the recovery program, was un­
doubtedly distasteful for many obvious reasons, not the least of 
which is that the Labor party was enjoying its first absolute 
parliamentary majority and was to face elections again in the fall 
of 1949. 
The examination of the evolution of Norwegian security pol­
icy provided herein does not permit a definitive statement of the 
role played by economic considerations in the final choice that 
was made by the government. However, the examination that 
has been made does demonstrate that economic considerations 
were not initially involved, for the search for regional security 
arrangements began essentially as a step toward the stabilization 
of international political relations as a means toward increasing 
the security of Norway. Thus economic considerations supported 
but were not essential to the choice that was made, and they 
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were collateral rather than central in the development of alterna­
tives by the Norwegian government, since the definition of al­
ternatives tended to be based on politico-strategic rather than 
economic criteria. 
Conclusion.—In short, the failure of the Scandinavian de­
fense negotiations and the subsequent decision to join the North 
Atlantic Alliance can be explained by reference to, and was 
consistent with, the Norwegian strategic image as it had 
evolved by the end of the summer of 1948. It may well be that 
the most desirable solution from the Norwegian point of view 
would have been a semi-independent Scandinavian bloc loosely 
tied to a Western alliance that would have guaranteed the 
Northern bloc's security in the event of war. Such an arrange­
ment would have satisfied the deterrence goal as well as the 
national security goal of the Norwegian government; in addition 
it would have involved the least provocation (in the Norwegian 
view of the possible alternatives) to the Soviet Union. The 
inability of the Swedes and the Norwegians to agree on such an 
arrangement left the Norwegians with no acceptable choice 
other than the Atlantic Alliance, for the failure to join the 
Alliance would have required the denial of every political and 
strategic judgment made by the Norwegian foreign policy elite 
over the preceding nine years, and particularly the preceding 
twelve months, and would have required the Labor party to 
discredit its own Foreign Minister. Thus to the extent that the 
other authoritative decision-makers shared the environmental 
judgments of the Foreign Minister, the decision to join the 
Atlantic Alliance was certain to be made, and could have been 
avoided only by a major denunciation of the existing political 
leadership or by an intervening environmental event that would 
have been perceived in such a way so as to result in a substantial 
restructuring of the Norwegian strategic image. 
Consequently, the Labor party conference could have altered 
the outcome only by forcing a thorough purge of its own leader­
ship. Although both institutional mechanisms and traditions fa­
vored the continued incumbency of the Norwegian govern­
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ment—and therefore their preferred values and outcomes, many 
of the national and international moves that have been reviewed 
are probably best understood in the context of the leadership 
maintenance function of the Norwegian elite on the domestic 
scene. 
This interesting problem, however, is the subject of another 
study. The crucial finding for this ex post facto analysis is that 
images and outcomes corresponded very closely, and potential 
mediating factors were not sufficiently powerful to alter the 
outcome. Examining only elite images would have left unex­
plained certain of the tactical domestic and diplomatic maneu­
vers that were reviewed above, but the final outcome, given the 
alternatives, was predictable from the image structure itself. 
There is no reason to believe that the needs for foreign policy 
leaders to reduce dissonance are any less than those of the rest of 
us. Thus, if the image structure and content can be correctly 
defined, the range of relevant choices available to decision mak­
ers can be reduced considerably. In short, given a certain range 
of alternatives, knowledge of the decision-makers strategic image 
permits the projection of probable outcomes. 
Obviously, intervening factors might alter the predicted out­
comes. As mentioned above in this case, the substitution of 
authoritative decision-makers for those whose images were exa­
mined might have (indeed probably would have) altered the 
outcome. However, there were also observable forces working 
against the probability of such a substitution's occurring. Thus, 
for future study, it would be important to examine both the 
relation between modifications in the structure and content of 
elite images with changes in elites and to study the stability (or 
''staying power") of decisional units during periods of crisis or, at 
a lower level, during periods when cardinal choices are con­
sciously under consideration—as was the situation in the case 
presented here. 
It is normally assumed that feedback processes may operate so 
as to modify images, but it is also known that images are remark­
ably resilient and that individuals protect themselves from disso­
nance when image and "reality" do not correspond. The many 
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references to "historical experience" by Lie and Lange would 
seem to demonstrate the operation of a feedback modification 
process, but as Chapter II points out, modification of authorita­
tive images was effected only after a change of top personnel in 
the foreign office. The former leadership (Koht's entourage) 
maintained their previous views and "explained away' or other­
wise ignored non-corresponding and non-reinforcing events. 
Moreover, the many subsequent references to "historical experi­
ence" by the new leadership over the nine-year period examined 
seemed to be image-confirming rather than image-modifying. 
In short, it appears not to have been a catastrophic historical 
event that modified images; rather, it was a catastrophic histori­
cal event that "confirmed" the image articulated by non-authori­
tative "outs'' and discredited the images of the authoritative 
decision-makers, legitimating, thereby, the views of the former 
dissidents and their claims for authority. Thus, for future study 
it will be important to specify the conditions under which the 
images of authoritative elites are significantly modified by either 
a catastrophic experience or image-denying information over a 
slice of time or by changes in elite personnel. However, disso­
nance theory, the ability of some elites to take actions that are 
self-fulfilling, and the "lesson" of this case would all tend to 
favor the hypothesis that authoritative strategic images are sub­
stantially modified primarily by substitutions of authoritative 
decision-makers. If this hypothesis can be confirmed by other 
studies, the prospect for achieving widely corresponding images 
among international elites is dim indeed, especially since sociali­
zation and recruitment patterns of decision-makers suggest the 
superordinate hypothesis that substitutions of incumbents in sta­
ble polities will normally not result in substitutions of authorita­
tive elite images. Consequently, we are left with the gloomy 
conclusion that strategic images, and therefore foreign policy 
outcomes, are radically modified primarily as a result of either 
(1) a political disaster accompanied by elite turnover—as in this 
study or (2) revolution; that is, in both cases the replacement of 
authoritative decision-makers by those with different socialization 
experience and recruitment patterns. 
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Consequently, the job for the policy scientist is suggested. If 
revolution and political disaster are thought to be too costly, but 
if image modification is thought to be essential, then new tech­
niques and strategies for achieving corresponding (i.e., identical 
or complementary) images among national decision-making elites 
must be explored. 
1. The articulations of the foreign policy elite reveal two classes of reasons. 
Some were objective: Norway's limited economic resources and capacity; others 
were subjective: a prior commitment to the reestablishment of Norwegian 
living standards. 
2. Osten Unden the Swedish Foreign Minister at the time of the Scandi­
navian Defense negotiations, stated very clearly the nature of the Swedish 
judgment in this regard in 1957. He said that in the event of a strategic 
nuclear war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. it was absurd to think that 
Sweden could affect the outcome, and as long as Sweden was not involved in 
any bloc it was "difficult to think of any motive for an attack on Sweden 
during the short and violent duel with which such a war would begin and 
probably end. Assume on the other hand that the nuclear weapons are put in 
mothballs. . It would then be a matter of conventional arms. How would 
this affect Sweden's position? Well, this is practically the same type of attack 
we were thinking of after the Second World War when we decided not to 
enter any great power bloc. The two bombs dropped on Japan had then not 
really come into the picture . we have no reason willingly to join an 
alliance group if war has the character, militarily speaking, that the Second 
World War nad. We can therefore start from the assumption that in both 
these cases of general warfare there are very powerful reasons why Sweden 
should try to pursue a policy of neutrality. . "—Speech by the Foreign 
Minister at the Conference of the Social Democratic Youth Federation, 
November 5, 1957 (Stockholm: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), mimeo­
graph. 
3. At the time of the defense negotiations the Swedes were clearly more 
"regionally oriented" in terms of what they perceived as the balance of power 
in the North and especially the "situation of Finland," which was viewed as 
contingent on Swedish abstention from a close military relationship with the 
West. See Gunnar Heckscher, Sweden and the East-West Conflict (Stock­
holm: The Swedish Institute, 1961), p. 4; Herbert Tingsten, "Issues in 
Swedish Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXVII (April, 1959), 479; and 
Samuel Abrahamsen, Sweden's Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Public 
Affairs Press, 1957). 
4. Ironically, a variation of this argument, employing the same assump­
tions, is made by one of Norway's leading foreign policy analysts. Nils 0rvik, 
The Decline of Neutrality 1914-1941 (Oslo: Tanum, 1953), p. 267, writes, 
regarding Norway's subsequent membership in NATO and Sweden's contin­
ued policy of freedom from alliances, that Norway is likely to be better off if 
an unprovoked Russian attack is inevitable and will come within a few years, 
while Sweden will profit from a long period of peace." 
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5. Reference here is to Lange's statement in the Storting on February 3, 
1949, reported in Utenriksdepartementets Pressetjeneste, Norges Linje (Oslo: 
Tiden, 1949), pp. 29-30. 
6. Ibid. 
7. The point made here represents undoubtedly one of the greater ironies 
of the postwar period. The U.S.S.R. opposed the Swedes' concept of a neutral 
Scandinavian alliance because they thought it would become a part of the 
Western alliance system, while this was precisely the concept which the 
Swedes were resisting. The Americans on the other hand initially refused 
priority on military supplies to a "neutral" Scandinavian alliance, which had it 
in fact come into existence, would hardly have been neutral. The final irony is 
the Soviet protest in late January of a Scandinavian alliance, which they 
disliked least, just prior to its failure, leading to Norwegian and Danish 
participation in the wider security arrangement which the Soviets opposed the 
most. 
8. See Torolf Elster, "Norges utenrikspolitiske stilling/' 0konomi og Poli­
tik, XXV (1951), 39. 
9. See Infra, Appendix B. 




11. See James Reston, New York Times, January 15, 1949. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Reference here is to two articles by James Reston in the New York

Times, February 11, 1949 and February 20, 1949.

14. Compare for example, Raymond Lindgren, Norway-Sweden: Union, 
Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1959), pp. 261-66; Franklin D. Scott, The United States and Scandi­
navia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 307. The U.S. later 
denied that priorities had been established on arms supplies. 
15. This is not to suggest that the Americans did not "think" they were 
influencing the outcome of the Scandinavian defense negotiations, for there is 
no reason to believe that the U.S. had a perfect information regarding the 
ongoing discussions. It is quite plausible that the State Department thought it 
was influencing the outcome of the talks as a result of its statement on arms 
supplies, when in fact it was not. 
16. This discussion of the American position vis-a-vis the Scandinavian 
countries is not intended to suggest that the Scandinavians were not under 
considerable pressure. Indeed they were being pressured by the U.S., the 
British, and the Soviet Union all during this period. The Soviets from 1947 
opposed all concepts of any kind of a Scandinavian defense arrangement, 
arguing that it would be little more than a link in the American security 
system, and when the Scandinavian Defense Commission was established the 
domestic Communists in Scandinavia were "markedly hostile to the idea." See 
Tim Greve, Norway and NATO (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1959), p. 10, 
and Halvard Lange, Norsk Utenrikspolitikk siden 1945 (Oslo: Tanum, 
1952), p. 97. The British had reportedly warned the Swedes about leading 
Scandinavia "down the blind road of neutrality," and the Americans obviously 
were looking for as wide a formal participation in the Atlantic Alliance as 
possible. From the point of view of world politics in an era of intercontinental 
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bombers (as in the decade following the war), and in view of the so-called 
polar strategy which had emerged in the U.S. it can hardly be doubted that 
the U.S. desired Scandinavian participation, or at least the participation of 
Norway and Denmark with their strategically important overseas possessions of 




Composition of Parliament after the 
Elections of 1936-1965* 
PARTY 1936 1945 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 
Communist 11 . . . 3 1 
Labor 70 76 85 77 78 74 68 
Socialist People's . .  . 22 
Liberal 23 20 21 15 15 14 18 
Center 18 10 12 14 15 16 18 
Christian People's .  . 2 8 9 14 12 15 13 
Conservative 26 25 23 27 29 29 31 
* Olaf Chr. Torp, Stortinget (Olso: Tohan Grundt Tanum, 1962), p. 14; 
and Vilhelm Haffner, Stortinget (Olso: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1946), p. 110; 
News of Norway, September 16, 1965, p. 109. 

APPENDIX B 
Data on the Debate regarding the 
Ratification of the Atlantic Pact* 
PARLIAMEN­
TARY REPRE- PER CENT 
PARTY SENTATION SPEAKERS SPEECHES CC t OF CC 
Labor 76 13 14§ 950.0 40.8 
Communist 11 6 8|| 698.5 30.0 
Liberal 20 7 7 370.0 16.0 
Conservative 25 2% 2 181.5 7.8 
Christian People's .  . 8 2% 2 98.0 4.2 
Fanner's 10 1J 1 31.0 1.2 
Total 150 31 34 2,329.0 100.0 
* See Stortingstidende, "Samtykke til ratifikasjon av Atlanterhavspakten," 
March 29, 1949, pp. 657-712. 
t "Column centimeters" of "relevant" debate. Not included: introductory 
remarks by the presiding officer, a discussion of opening the galleries to the 
public, and voting procedures and reports. 
X Represents a statement of position by the party's parliamentary leader 
and/or assistant leader. 
§ Foreign Minister Lange spoke twice. 
|| Stortingsmenn Vogt and L0vlien each spoke twice. 
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A stimulating and provocative analysis of the functioning Norwegian 
political system is provided in HARRY ECKSTEIN'S Division and Cohe­
sion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton Uni­
versity Press, 1966), where he presents an analysis of the Norwegian 
political system in terms of his previously published monograph, "A 
Theory of Stable Democracy'' (Research Monograph Number 10 by 
the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1961). 
Finally, the student interested in Norway or in comparative parties or 
electoral behavior should consult HENRY VALEN and DANIEL KATZ, 
Political Parties in Norway: A Community Study (Oslo: Universi­
tetsforlaget, 1964), for a penetrating analysis (based on survey meth­
ods and contrasted with the American party system) of the structure 
and functioning of political parties in the Norwegian political system 
with special emphasis on decision-making and on oligarchic tend­
encies. 
In addition to the landmark studies noted above, other important 
sources in English include The Norway Yearbook, published annu­
ally by Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag in Oslo, which provides a wide 
variety of background information on Norwegian political, social, and 
economic life. The Times (London) carried accounts of the Nor­
wegian government in exile during the Second World War, and the 
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political events of the postwar years are well-summarized in Norway 
Digest (1946-48) and News of Norway (1948-present), both pub­
lished in English by the Norwegian Information Office in Washing­
ton, D.C. The latter, particularly, provides a high quality weekly 
synopsis of Norwegian political developments. Those interested in 
Norwegian and Scandinavian politics are also referred to The 
American Scandinavian Review, published by the American Scandi­
navian Foundation. The Review carries periodic lead articles on the 
foreign policies of the five Nordic countries and each issue summarizes 
political events of the past quarter year in each of the Nordic 
countries. Also helpful is The Norseman (1943-1958), which pro­
vided by far the most varied publication on internal and external 
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Continued from front flap) 
: The stability of any given strategic image, 
Mr. Burgess indicates, is related to that ten­
dency on the part of the authoritative elite 
to reinterpret international events in accord­
ance with prevailing presuppositions, which, 
because of the practices of political recruit­
ment, are commonly inherited by the elite's 
successors. Since strategic images are closely 
associated with individuals, the emergence 
of a new strategic image seems to corre­
spond to a non-routine change in top per­
sonnel. An understanding, therefore, of the 
strategic image of a member or members of 
a given authoritative elite, derived from 
close study of public statements on foreign 
policy and public acts affecting policy, con­
stitutes a remarkably reliable basis for 
making valid predictions concerning future 
developments on the international scene. 
Philip M. Burgess is assistant professor 
of political science and director of the Be­
havioral Sciences Laboratory at the Ohio 
State University. 
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